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INTRODUCTION
"[T]o alter, amend, or add to any treaty, by inserting any clause,
whether small or great, important or trivial, would be on our part an
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usurpation of power, and not an exercise ofjudicial functions. It would
be to make, and not to construe a treaty. Neither can this Court supply
a casus omissus in a treaty, any more than in a law. We are to find out the
intention of the parties by just rules of interpretation applied to the sub-
ject matter, and having found that, our duty is to follow it as far as it
goes, and to stop where that stops-whatever may be the imperfections
or difficulties which it leaves behind."'
With this passage in Chan v. Korean Air Lines, an opinion authored
not surprisingly by Justice Antonin Scalia, a new strain of restrictive
formalism in statutory interpretation spreads to the construction of
an international treaty. Proponents of this "new textualism" assert
that federal courts must refrain from any invasive interpretive tech-
niques, regardless of the effects on the long-term health of a statutory
body of law. Supporters of "dynamic" interpretation, in contrast, rec-
ognize an active judicial role in ensuring the vitality of statutes. As
Chan illustrates, the construction of treaties has also now fallen under
the influence of this enduring controversy over the powers of federal
courts to develop statutory law.
Indeed, few subjects have fascinated-and divided-legal scholars
in recent years as much as the appropriate role of the judiciary in the
interpretation of statutes. For much of this country's legal history,
2
statutory interpretation received little close scholarly attention. Mat-
ters began to change in the latter half of this century, however, as the
nation's social and economic problems increasingly required broad
legislative (and in particular federal) solutions. By 1982, Guido
Calabresi was able to observe with little risk of contradiction that this
country had entered an "age of statutes.,3 The message was not lost
on scholars. In the decade and a half since Judge Calabresi's telling
observation, the interpretation of statutes as this nation's new
Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd., 490 U.S. 122, 135 (1989) (alteration in original)
(quoting The Amiable Isabella, 19 U.S. 1, 32, 6 Wheat. 1, 71 (1821)).
2 Notable exceptions include REED DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND AP-
PLICATION OF STATUTES (1975); Karl Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision
and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REv. 395
(1950); Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863 (1930); and elements
of the legal process theory developed in the 1950s by Professors Henry Hart and
Albert Sacks, see HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAw (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip
P. Frickey eds., 1994).
3 GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 163 (1982).
[Vol. 146: 687
DYNAMIC TREATYINTERPRETATION
"primary source of law"4 has become one of the most animated
themes of American legal scholarship!
But as courts and scholars continue to dissect the implications of
our "age of statutes,"6 the law is already rapidly progressing into the
next significant stage in its development: unification on a trans
national level. The initial focus in this direction has been on private,
and in particular commercial, law. Recent years have witnessed the
emergence of a whole new generation of international conventions
designed to unify the law governing international commercial trans-
actions. The forward edge for this new generation now also has be-
come its paradigm: the United Nations Convention on Contracts for
the International Sale of Goods (the "U.N. Sales Convention" or
CISG) . In addition to the United States, this Convention has already
been ratified by nations whose combined economies account for
nearly two-thirds of all world trade.8
The push toward an international unification of the law has not
ended there. In the last decade, international conferences have
adopted conventions governing such diverse subjects as financial leas-
ing, factoring, bills of exchange and promissory notes, and stand-by
letters of credit. Drafting work is also proceeding apace on a variety
of like-minded projects, including international security interests as
well as receivables financing.9 Taken together, these conventions
form the foundation for a proto-"International Uniform Commercial
Code."
William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Rea-
soning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 321 (1990).
5 The current scholarly debate over statutory interpretation in this country is ana-
lyzed infra Part I.B.3.
6 CALABRESI, supra note 3, at 163.
See U.N. Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Apr. 10,
1980, S. TREATY Doc. No. 98-9 (1983); 19 I.L.M. 668-99 (1980) [hereinafter CISG].
The official English language text also can be found in Final Act of the United Nations
Conference on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Annex I, U.N. Doc.
A/Conf.97/18 (1980) [hereinafter Final Act], in Official Records, Conference on Con-
tracts for the International Sale of Goods 178, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.97/19 [hereinafter
Official Records], and in 52 Fed. Reg. 6262-02 (1987)
8 Based on statistics published by the International Monetary Fund, in 1996, the 51
present member states of the U.N. Sales Convention accounted for approximately
71% of all world imports of goods and 63% of all world exports. See DIRECrION OF
TRADE STAT. Q., Sept. 1997, at 3-9.
9 For an examination of this new generation of international commercial law con-
ventions, see infra notes 32-43 and accompanying text. See also infra note 35 (discuss-
ing law unification efforts in other fields of private law).
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This maturation of the law into the international dimension also
carries subtle but powerful consequences for the allocation of author-
ity in our federal system. The law unification efforts of this new gen-
eration take the constitutional form of treaties.' ° Senate ratification
of a particular convention thus results (as was the case with the U.N.
Sales Convention) in the federalizing of the law within its scope." A
derivative consequence is that questions of interpretation and appli-
cation will "aris[e] under... [a] Treat[y]" of the United States, 12 and
thus fall within the "federal question" jurisdiction of the federal
courts.13 At issue in the ratification process, in other words, is nothing
less than federal arrogation of traditional state competence in the law
governing private, and in particular commercial, relations.1
4
'0 The conventions are structured to obtain their authority as law through the
Senate treaty ratification procedure of Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution. See
U.S. CONST. art II, § 2. For a discussion of this procedure in the context of the ratifica-
tion of the U.N. Sales Convention, see Peter Winship, Congress and the 1980 Interna-
tional Sales Convention, 16 GA.J. INT'L & COMP. L. 707, 721-26 (1986).
" See Filanto, S.p.A. v. Chilewich Int'l Corp., 789 F. Supp. 1229, 1236 (S.D.N.Y.
1992) (stating that the convention, as a treaty, is the supreme law of the land); Richard
E. Speidel, The Revision of UCC Article 2, Sales in Light of the United Nations Convention on
Contractsfor the International Sale of Goods, 16NW.J. INT'L L. & Bus. 165, 166 (1995) ("In
the United States, [the U.N. Sales Convention] is a self-executing treaty with the pre-
emptive force of federal law."). This effect arises from the Supremacy Clause of Arti-
cle VI of the Constitution. See U.S. CONST. art. VI ("[A] II Treaties made, or which shall
be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the
Land....").
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
"See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 112(2) (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS]
("The determination and interpretation of international law present federal questions
and their disposition by the United States Supreme Court is conclusive for other
courts in the United States."). In theory, nothing prevents a state court from inter-
preting a treaty of the United States as an issue of federal law. Instances of this are
rare, however. See Sei Fujii v. State, 242 P.2d 617, 619 (Cal. 1952) (construing a provi-
sion in the Charter of the United Nations). The reason for this is that federal courts
have original jurisdiction in such cases, see 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994), and defendants
have an automatic right of removal should the corresponding claims initially be pur-
sued in state court, see 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1994). In any event, pursuant to the Su-
premacy Clause in Article VI of the United States Constitution, the final authority for
the interpretation of treaties will rest with the United States Supreme Court.
" As a consequence, the jurisprudence on the interpretation and development of
the Uniform Commercial Code as the law of the several states will not, except through
comparison and contrast, guide the interpretation of the international commercial
law conventions. For a contrast between the interpretive philosophy of these conven-
tions and the Uniform Commercial Code, see infra Part III.B.2. To be sure, the scope
of private law unification efforts such as the U.N. Sales Convention is limited to rela-
tions with defined international attributes. See infra note 326 and accompanying text.
But just as interstate trade supplanted purely intrastate trade in the maturing of our
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Unfortunately, extant Supreme Court jurisprudence on the in-
terpretation of treaties is ill-equipped to accommodate this next sig-
nificant stage in the development of the law. In large measure, this
jurisprudence remains rooted in the public international law premise
that treaties solely reflect a "contract" between sovereign nations.' 5
The consequence has been an inflated view of both the subjective in-
tent of "the parties" and the degree of appropriate deference to the
views of the Executive Branch in interpretive inquiries. 6 Whatever
their propriety in that context, such considerations are considerably
less compelling for international conventions that regulate solely
commercial relations between private entities.
Moreover, and more destructively, the Court's treaty jurispru-
dence has fallen under the strong influence of a resurgent strain of
formalism in domestic statutory interpretation. Although sometimes
liberal in rhetoric, the common practical outcome of treaty interpre-
tation by the Court has been of a distinctly conservative nature. Echo-
ing the Chan opinion with which this Article began, the Court has
consistently refused to view a treaty as a body of integrated norms that
is capable of generating internal solutions for gaps in its provisions.'
8
Instead, when faced with an unsettled question under a treaty, the
domestic economy, so too will the future of commerce lie in the growth of transac-
tions with an international dimension.
" See Socit6 Nationale Industrielle A6rospatiale v. United States Dist. Court, 482
U.S. 522, 533 (1987) ("[I]n interpreting an international treaty, we are mindful that it
is 'in the nature of a contract between nations . . . ." (quoting Trans World Airlines,
Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 253 (1984))); see also Zicherman v. Korean
Air Lines Co., 516 U.S. 217, 226 (1996) (observing with regard to interpretation that a
treaty is "an agreement among sovereign powers"); Washington v. Washington State
Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 675 (1979) ("A treaty... is
essentially a contract between two sovereign nations."); Santovincenzo v. Egan, 284
U.S. 30, 40 (1931) (stating that "treaties are contracts between independent nations").
'6 See O'Connor v. United States, 479 U.S. 27, 33 (1986) (stating that the executive
application of a treaty is entitled to "great weight"); Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v.
Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 184-85 (1982) ("[T]he meaning attributed to treaty provisions
by the Government agencies charged with their negotiation and enforcement is enti-
fled to great weight."); see also Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd., 490 U.S. 122, 151 n.15
(1989) (Brennan, J., concurring) (noting that the Court "owe[s] considerable defer-
ence to the views of the Executive Branch concerning the meaning of an international
treaty"); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 13, § 326(2)
(stating that courts "will give great weight to an interpretation made by the Executive
Branch"). For a more detailed analysis of this issue, see infra Part I.B.2.
17 For a discussion of the "legislative" character of the U.N. Sales Convention and
its progeny, see infra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
"a This restrictive approach to treaty interpretation by the Supreme Court is ana-
lyzed infra in notes 149-55 and accompanying text.
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common approach has been to retreat to otherwise-applicable domes-
tic law, "'whatever may be the imperfections or difficulties"'' 9 this may
leave in the fulfillment of the international law project.
This Article will demonstrate that the new generation of interna-
tional conventions rejects this narrow conception of the judicial func-
tion. Inspired by a paradigm established in the U.N. Sales Conven-
tion, these commercial law conventions contemplate an active role for
the courts in developing the law within their scope. I will argue that
an essential element of this dynamic interpretive process is a delega-
tion of authority to fashion new substantive law as normative gaps
emerge in a convention's express provisions. The consequence is a
repudiation of the resurgent strain of restrictive formalism that has
gained recent prominence in domestic statutory interpretation and
that has influenced Supreme Court treaty jurisprudence as well.
Parts I and II set the context for an analysis of this dynamic inter-
pretive process. Part I first explores the contention that much of the
Supreme Court's treaty caselaw is inapposite for the interpretation of
international conventions that regulate purely private relations. It
then examines the continuing controversy in the United States over
the appropriate role of the judiciary in domestic statutory interpreta-
tion. The goal of this exercise is to set the jurisprudential context for
a parallel analysis of the "autonomous" interpretive regime embraced
in the U.N. Sales Convention and its progeny.
Part II introduces the core elements of this interpretive regime. I
demonstrate there that the interpretive paradigm established in the
U.N. Sales Convention endorses a policy favoring an "internal" filling
of gaps and resolution of ambiguities. That is, it empowers adjudica-
tors to resolve unsettled questions not through a retreat to domestic
law, but rather on the basis of the "general principles" reflected in a
convention's regulatory scheme.
Part III is the heart of this Article, for it is there that I address the
repudiation of the essential tenets of the "new textualism" that has
gained recent prominence in domestic statutory interpretation. Part
III.A first demonstrates that, contrary to the animating theme of tex-
tualism, the U.N. Sales Convention and its progeny sanction a broad
repertoire of interpretive techniques in the judicial development of
the law. This includes an active resort to the drafting history that gave
life to the relevant international convention.




But as Part III.B then shows, it is in the role of adjudicators in fill-
ing normative gaps that the effects of this dynamic interpretive proc-
ess will be most pronounced. I argue that the "general principles"
methodology amounts to a delegation of lawmaking authority to fed-
eral courts within the scope of an international convention. The par-
ticular significance of this conclusion emerges from an observation
that such "general principles" are nowhere expressly identified, and
many the existence of which is more evident (such as "good faith"
and "reasonableness") have neither a preordained nor an immutable
content. Implicit in this approach is thus an active role for the judici-
ary in identifying and giving substance to the principles that will
guide the future development of the law.
This conclusion alone strikes at the foundation of a restrictive
formalist approach to the lawmaking powers of federal courts. The
international dimension raises its significance to a higher power. Bol-
stered by mandatory deference to the needs of international uniform-
ity, I argue that the delegation of lawmaking authority amounts to an
instruction to the federal judiciary to participate with courts of other
member nations in fashioning an international common law around
the frame of an international convention. Part III.B then contrasts
this internal-development methodology with the substantial continu-
ing influence of the preexisting common law under the Uniform
Commercial Code in this country.
It is difficult to overstate the impact of an internal-development
methodology as the law-unification movement progresses into the in-
ternational dimension. Even a comprehensive effort such as the U.N.
Sales Convention will fail to provide guidance on a variety of matters
within its scope. Issues as significant as the treatment of a "battle of
the forms" in contract formation, the appropriate role of "good faith"
in international transactions, the proper interest rate on amounts in
default (which alone has already generated well over one hundred
reported decisions), and the power of equitable principles to disci-
pline abuse all remain unresolved under the Convention. Unfortu-
nately, such fissures in coverage are inevitable in the articulation of
general legal standards to govern disparate cultural and legal tradi-
tions, and their frequency will only increase under the corrosive effect
of time.
A restrictive formalist approach to interpretation permits domes-
tic adjudicators to embrace their natural bias for familiar domestic le-
gal norms in filling such gaps. The inevitable consequence is a pro-
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gressive disintegration of whatever international uniformity a conven-
tion has achieved in the first place.
The "general principles" methodology, in contrast, seeks to pre-
clude such a destructive retreat to domestic law. As the inevitable un-
settled questions emerge, it empowers domestic courts to participate
in the fashioning of solutions on an international level. In doing so,
this internal-development methodology promotes in a particular way
the long-term success of an international law unification effort.
Part III concludes with an examination of this methodology in ac-
tion. Part III.C demonstrates that the authority delegated to adjudi-
cators extends not only to filling substantive gaps. Rather, inspired by
the dynamic jurisprudence of modem civil law courts, the "general
principles" approach also empowers adjudicators to adapt a conven-
tion to accommodate social and technological changes in the regu-
lated field of law. Finally, Part III.D examines certain procedural an-
tidotes to the potential homesickness of domestic courts in this
dynamic interpretive process.
Intense scholarly debate in this country in recent years has devel-
oped the jurisprudence of domestic statutory interpretation to a high
art. But the boundaries of the debate are changing. As national
economies continue toward global integration, so too is the law pro-
gressing toward unification on an international level. New, broader
perspectives on interpretation are required to accommodate the dy-
namics of this process. The sum of my thesis is that the "general
principles" methodology embraced in the U.N. Sales Convention and
its progeny represents the most promising interpretive paradigm for
this next significant stage in the development of the law.
I. THE DOMESTIC CONTEXT FOR THE INTERPRETATION
OF INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS
A. The Promise of International Private Law Conventions and
Their Curious Legal Nature
Since the rise of modern nation-states in the nineteenth century,
the interests of international uniformity in the law have been left to
cooperation among the formally sovereign nations." Initial efforts in
20 In the infant stages of its development, the law governing commercial transac-
tions, interestingly, held the promise of maturing into a truly international body of
unified legal norms. With the growth of commerce in the middle ages, the concept of
a specialized "law merchant," the lex mercatoria, emerged as a system of uniform equi-
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this direction began as early as the turn of the century." After the
upheavals of World War I brought the need for international coop-
eration into sharper focus, work began in earnest on the unification
of the law governing the core international commercial transaction,
the sale of moveable goods. Responsibility for this undertaking ini-
tially fell to one of the prime forces in the international unification of
the law, the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law,
commonly known by its French acronym, UNIDROIT! 2 After the de-
lays occasioned by World War II, the drafting work of UNIDROIT led
to the adoption at a conference in the Hague in April, 1964, of two
separate conventions, one governing the substantive principles of in-
table norms to govern the interaction of commercial traders at international fairs,
markets, and seaports. See RUDOLF G. SCHLESINGER, COMPARATIVE LAW 184-85 (2d ed.
1959) (discussing the development of the "commercial customs and laws of the West-
ern world"); Harold J. Berman & Colin Kaufman, The Law of International Commercial
Transactions (Lex Mercatoria), 19 HARV. INT'LLJ. 221, 224-26 (1978) (discussing the de-
velopment of an international commercial law in Europe between the 11th century
and the 18th century). The rise of the modern nation-state brought an end to the
promise of a transnational lex mercatoria. The elevated sense of nationalism and sover-
eignty which characterized this process manifested itself, in jurisprudential terms, in a
strict positivist view of the state as the exclusive originator of law. In continental
Europe, this view took the form of the codification movement, which established the
civil codes as the exclusive source of law and thus rejected all norms of external origin.
For an analysis of the approach of the European civil codes, see infra notes 188-200
and accompanying text. Even in common law countries such as England and the
United States, the substantive principles of the law merchant were absorbed into, or
displaced by, national law through judicial action. See Berman & Kaufman, supra, at
226-27. The consequent intellectual isolation led to the gradual development of dif-
ferent legal institutions and concepts, and ultimately to different solutions for the
same practical problems. As Rudolf Schlesinger has observed, this problem was par-
ticularly acute in civil law systems. See SCHLESINGER, supra, at 188 (observing that the
revolutionary changes initiated by the civil codes caused the jurists in each country "to
concentrate their efforts on the interpretation and development of their own code
systems" and that "[I] inguistic and conceptual barriers between lawyers of various civil
law countries thus were bound to grow"). For similar observations, see Berman &
Kaufman, supra, at 227-28.
21 From the end of the last century until 1928, the Netherlands convened confer-
ences in the Hague to discuss the unification of the law governing international com-
mercial transactions. For a discussion of this historical background, see Paul Lansing,
The Change in American Attitude to the International Unification of Sales Law Movement and
UNC/TRAL, 18 AM. BUS. L.J. 269, 269-70 (1980), and BradleyJ. Richards, Note, Con-
tracts for the International Sale of Goods: Applicability of the United Nations Convention, 69
IOWAL. REV. 209, 212-14 (1983).
Although it originally came into being as an entity affiliated with the League of
Nations, UNIDROIT is now an independent organization with headquarters in Rome.
See Charter of the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law, done Mar.
15, 1940, 15 U.S.T. 2494, U.K.T.S. 54 (1965) (entered into force for the United States
on Mar. 13, 1964). Through special legislation in 1963, Congress officially authorized
participation in UNIDROIT by the United States. See 22 U.S.C. § 2 69g (1994).
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ternational sales law,23 and the other the formation of international
sales contracts.
24
Although these "Hague Conventions" formally entered into effect
for eight nations in 1972, the participants in their creation almost ex-
clusively represented industrialized Western-European states.2 The
result was that nations of other cultural, legal, and political traditions
did not regard the conventions as a serious attempt at a truly global
unification of the law. It was clear almost from their adoption, there-





The failure of the Hague Conventions nonetheless led to the
emergence of a second major force in the international unification of
private law,27 the United Nations Commission on International Trade
Law (UNCITRAL).28 As early as 1968, UNCITRAL began preliminarywork for a comprehensive review of the Hague Conventions, and in
2Convention Relating to a Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods, done
July 1, 1964, 834 U.N.T.S. 107 [hereinafter ULIS], reprinted in JOHN 0. HONNOLD,
UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES UNDER THE 1980 UNITED NATIONS CON-
VENTION 667-91 (2d ed. 1991).
21 Convention Relating to a Uniform Law on the Formation of Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods, doneJuly 1, 1964, 834 U.N.T.S. 169 [hereinafter ULF],
reprinted in HONNOLD, supra note 23, at 659-66.
" See Elizabeth Hayes Patterson, United Nations Convention on Contracts for the Inter-
national Sale of Goods: Unification and the Tension Between Compromise and Domination, 22
STAN. J. INT'L L. 263, 266-70, 267 (1986) ("The countries which drafted the Hague
Conventions were mainly European."); Martin L. Ziontz, Comment, A New Unjform
Law for the International Sale of Goods: Is It Compatible with American Interest, 2 Nw. J.
INT'LL. & Bus. 129, 134 n.35 (1980) (observing that 19 of the 28 participating states at
the Hague Conference were from Western Europe).
16 Ulrich Huber, Der UNC1TRAL-Entwuf eines fibereinkommens fiber Internationale
Warenkaufvertrdge, 43 RABELsZ 413, 414 (1979) (translation by author).
27 A final principal force in the international unification of private law is the
Hague Conference on Private International Law. For information on the work of this
organization, see infra note 35.
2UNCITRAL was created by Resolution 2205 of the United Nations General As-
sembly on December 17, 1966, in order "to promote the progressive harmonization
and unification of the law of international trade." G.A. Res. 2205, U.N. GAOR, 21st
Sess., 1497th plen. mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. A/6396 (1966). For information on the work-
ings of UNCITRAL in general, see John Honnold, The United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law: Mission and Methods, 27 AM. J. COMP. L. 201 (1979). For a
critical analysis of the conservative bias of such "private legislatures," see Paul B.
Stephan, Accountability and International Lawmaking: Rules, Rents and Legitimacy, 17 Nw.
J. INT'L L. & Bus. 681, 701 (1997) (arguing that from the nature of the process,
"private international lawmakers... will produce a large portion of open-ended rules
that largely confirm the status quo").
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1969 established a Working Group charged with this responsibility.2
After nearly ten years of drafting efforts, this Working Group-with
the active participation of representatives of the United Statess°-
produced a unified convention governing both the formation and
performance of international sales contracts. A diplomatic confer-
ence convened by the United Nations General Assembly in April,
1980, in Vienna, unanimously adopted the Convention on April 11,
1980.31 The U.N. Sales Convention then entered into effect accord-
ing to its terms on January 1, 1988, after the ratifications of the
United States, China, and Italy exceeded the required threshold of
ten member states.
32
The success of this Convention has been little short of stunning.
In the ten years since it entered into effect in 1988, fifty-one nations
have either acceded to or ratified the Convention.3 Significantly,
represented among this number are nations from all geographic re-
gions, from all political perspectives (including former socialist states
as well as traditional western democracies), and from all stages of
economic development (from highly and newly industrialized coun-
tries to developing economies).
Scholars interested in a more detailed introduction to the history of the Con-
vention should see Patterson, supra note 25, at 265-77; Maureen T. Murphy, Note,
United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods: Creating Uniform-
ity in International Sales Law, 12 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 727, 728-36 (1989). For an official
summary record of the history of the drafting and adoption of the Convention, see
FinalAc supra note 7, in Official Records, supra note 7, at 176-77.
'0 For a discussion of the participation by the United States in the drafting of the
U.N. Sales Convention, see Henry Landau, Background to U.S. Participation in United
Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 18 INT'L LAW. 29, 30-31
(1984), and Patterson, supra note 25, at 265-77.
*" See FinalAct, supra note 7, in Official Records, supra note 7, at 177.
32 See CISG, supra note 7, art. 99(1). The Senate of the United States ratified the
U.N. Sales Convention in October, 1986, and the United States deposited the ratifica-
tion with UNCITRAL on December 11 of the same year. For a history of this ratifica-
tion, see Winship, supra note 10, at 708-10.
-" A complete list of the member states of the various conventions adopted under
the auspices of UNCIRAL is published periodically under the titie Status of Conven-
tions. See Status of Conventions and Model Laws, U.N. Office of Legal Affairs, Interna-
tional Trade Law Branch, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/428 [hereinafter Status of Conventions].
The most current Status of Conventions can also be found on the internet. See
UNCITRAL Homepage (last modified Mar. 16, 1998) <http://www.un.or.at/uncitral>
[hereinafter UNCITRALHomnepage].
3 The Convention's diverse membership includes, for example, France, Germany,
and the United States; China, Cuba, and Russia (as well as nearly all formerly socialist,
eastern European countries); Argentina, Chile, and Mexico; Syria, Uganda, and Zam-
bia; and Australia, New Zealand, and Singapore. See Status of Conventions, supra note
33, at 3-4.
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This success has also inspired unification efforts in other fields of
international commercial law.3 5  An international conference con-
ducted under the auspices of UNIDROIT adopted, in 1983, a Con-
36
vention on Agency in the International Sale of Goods. Following ex-
tensive drafting work, a similar conference held in Ottawa, Canada, in
1988, adopted separate conventions governing two significant classes
of international financial transactions: the UNIDROIT Convention
on International Financial Leasing, 7 and the UNIDROIT Convention
on International Factoring.3 These latter two conventions have al-
ready entered into force.3 9
Similarly, an international conference adopted, in 1988, a
UNCITRAL Convention on International Bills of Exchange and In-
Parallel to these commercial law unification efforts, a number of conventions of
a private law character have been adopted under the auspices of the Hague Confer-
ence on Private International Law. This organization has primarily focused on con-
ventions governing civil procedure and domestic relations matters, three notable of
which the United States has already ratified: Convention on the Civil Aspects of In-
ternational Child Abduction, concluded Oct. 25, 1980, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, 1343
U.N.T.S. 89; Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Docu-
ments in Civil or Commercial Matters, opened for signature Nov. 15, 1965, 20 U.S.T. 361,
658 U.N.T.S. 163 [hereinafter Hague Service Convention]; and the Convention on the
Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, opened for signature Mar. 18,
1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, 847 U.N.T.S. 231 [hereinafter Hague Evidence Convention].
For the Supreme Court's interpretation of the latter two conventions, see infra notes
149-50 and accompanying text. In a similar vein, the United States has ratified the
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, done
June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 (commonly known as the New York
Convention), which was prepared under the auspices of UNCITRAL.
36 UNIDROIT Convention on Agency in the International Sale of Goods, done Feb.
17, 1983, 22 LL.M. 249 [hereinafter Convention on Agency]. For more information
on this and other UNIDROIT conventions, see Paula Howarth, UNIDROIT Homepage
(visited Mar. 3, 1998) <http://www.agora.stm.it/unidroit/> [hereinafter UNIDROIT
Homeage] .
37 UNIDROIT Convention on International Financial Leasing, done May 28, 1988,
27 I.L.M. 931 [hereinafter Convention on Financial Leasing]. Thirteen states, includ-
ing the United States, are signatories to this Convention. See UNIRO1T Homepage su-
pra note 36.
m UNIDROIT Convention on International Factoring, done May 28, 1988, 27
I.L.M. 943 [hereinafter Convention on Factoring]. Thirteen states, including the
United States, are signatories to this Convention. See UNLDROITHomepage supra note
36.
39 Both the Convention on Factoring and the Convention on Financial Leasing
entered into force in France, Italy, and Nigeria on May 1, 1995, and in Hungary on
December 1, 1996. The latter Convention entered into force for Panama on October
1, 1997. For current information on the status of the ratification of these conventions,
see UNIDROITHomepage, supra note 36.
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ternational Promissory Notes.4 Most recently, UNCITRAL approved
a Convention on Independent Guarantees and Stand-by Letters of
Credit.4' And work is proceeding under the auspices of UNIDROIT
on a convention on security interests in large mobile equipment,42 as
well as under the auspices of UNCITRAL on a convention governing
international receivables financing.43 All of these projects have pro-
ceeded with the active participation of the United States.
44
Taken as a whole, these conventions form a proto-"International
Uniform Commercial Code."" To be sure, the diverse unification ef-
forts reflect varying degrees of ambition, and stand at different stages
in the ratification process. What is nonetheless significant is what
they have in common. As we shall see below,46 the projects (with cer-
tain exceptions) carry forward a core consensus achieved in the draft-
ing of the U.N. Sales Convention on the methodology for their inter-
pretation and supplementation. As a result, the depth and breadth of
" Convention on International Bills of Exchange and International Promissory
Notes, approved Dec. 9, 1988, 28 I.L.M. 170 [hereinafter Convention on Bills of Ex-
change]. Six states have signed the Convention, including the United States on June
29, 1990. Information on this and the other projects of UNCITRAL can be found in
UNCITRAL Homepage supra note 33. See also Peter Winship, International Commercial
Transactions: 1995, 51 Bus. LAW. "1493, 1500 (1996) (discussing the status of various
international private law conventions).
41 See Convention on Independent Guarantees and Stand-by Letters of Credit, done
Dec. 11, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 735 [hereinafter Convention on Guarantees].
12 Proposed UNIDROIT Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equip-
ment (Tentative Draft, Nov. 1997) (on file with author) [hereinafter Draft Convention
on Security Interests]; see also Winship, supra note 40, at 1498.
's Draft UNCITRAL Convention on Assignment in Receivables Financing
(Tentative Draft, Jan. 12, 1998) [hereinafter Draft Convention on Receivables Financ-
ing]. The most current draft of this Convention is available at the homepage of the
American Bar Association. See FTP Catalog-Business Law (visited Mar. 27, 1998)
<http://www.abanet.org/ftp/pub/buslaw/home.html>; see also Winship, supra note
40, at 1499-500.
4' The specific representatives of the United States in such conferences are attor-
neys with the Office of the Legal Advisor of the United States Department of State and
their appointees, who are typically law professors. For a comprehensive analysis of the
work of this Office in the area of private international law, see Peter H. Pfund, Contrib-
uting to Progressive Development of Private International Law: The International Process and
the United States Approach, 249 RECUEIL DES COURS 1, 51-75 (1996).
4 UNCITRAL has also prepared model laws for consideration by member states as
domestic legislation. The most significant of these is the 1996 UNCITRAL Model Law
on Electronic Commerce. Others include the UNCITRAL Model Law on Interna-
tional Credit Transfers, the UNCiTRAL Model Law on Procurement of Goods, Con-
struction and Services, and the recently completed Model Law on Cross-Border Insol-
vency. Information on these projects can be found in UNCITRAL Homepag4 supra note
33.
'6 See infra notes 172-76 and accompanying text.
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the patterns established in the judicial elaboration of the U.N. Sales
Convention will be of significance far beyond that unification effort
alone.47
These private law conventions are of a curious legal nature, how-
ever. Viewed from one angle, they carry the constitutional character
of self-executing treaties. s These obtain their authority as law from
the power of federal preemption defined in the "treaty" clause of Ar-
ticle VI of the Constitution.4 The U.N. Sales Convention thus en-
tered into force in this country through the Senate treaty ratification
procedure of Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution, and without
separate legislation incorporating it into the formal body of the
United States Code.50
From a substantive perspective, however, the conventions have
the look and feel of standard federal statutes. Their operative provi-
sions impose no formal obligations on the United States in its inter-
national conduct as a sovereign entity.-5 Rather, the focus is solely on
the substantive law governing the interaction between private entities.
That is, similar to a typical private law statute, the subjects of a con-
vention's legal standards are solely private actors, and, derivatively,
" Part III.C-D examines in detail the impressive body of interpretive caselaw under
the U.N. Sales Convention.
'8 See supra note 11. For an examination of the legal nature of such "self-
executing" treaties, see Ronald A. Brand, Direct Effect of International Economic Law in the
United States and the European Union, 17 Nw.J. INT'L L. & BUS. 556, 560-62 (1997), and
Carlos Manuel Vazquez, The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 89 AM. J. INT'L L.
695 (1995).
49 U.S. CONsT. art. VI ("[AJI1 Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land....").
" See U.S. CONsT. art II, § 2; Winship, supra note 10, at 707-09. This procedure can
be contrasted with that of previous substantive private law unification efforts, such as
the Hague Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to Bills of Lading
(the "Hague Rules"). The substance of the Hague Rules was adopted by separate legis-
lative action in the form of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA). See ARNOLD
W. KNAUTH, THE AMERICAN LAW OF OCEAN BILLS OF LADING 118-32 (4th ed. 1953)
(discussing American participation in the development of the Hague Rules);
Benjamin W. Yancey, The Carriage of Goods: Hague, COGSA, Visby, and Hamburg, 57TUL.
L. REV. 1238, 1242-43 (1983) (discussing the enactment of COGSA on April 16, 1936).
Indeed, the U.N. Sales Convention and its progeny do not even permit local amend-
ments by the ratifying nations. See, e.g., CISG, supra note 7, art. 98 ("No reservations
are permitted except those expressly authorized in this Convention."); Convention on
Factoring, supra note 38, art. 20 (same); Convention on Financial Leasing, supra note
37, art. 22 (same).
51 To be sure, the conventions also contain certain diplomatic provisions. See, e.g.,
CISG, supra note 7, arts. 89-101. But these merely respect formalities such as the pro-
cedure for accession, ratification, and denunciation, and impose no substantive obli-
gations on the contracting states in their subsequent conduct as international actors.
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the courts and arbitral tribunals whose jurisdiction is invoked to re-
solve disputes over scope and meaning.
The interpretation of the new generation of international private
law conventions"" thus presents federal courts with somewhat of a
paradox. On the one hand, because they regulate purely private rela-
tions, the interpretive standards developed for public international
law treaties would appear inapposite in this context. One can
scarcely overlook, however, that the conventions are international in
character. Indeed, their very mandate to interpreters is to bring
about international uniformity in the regulated field of law."' A nec-
essary component of this goal is harmony among the interpretive ap-
proaches of the domestic courts in the various member states that are
charged with resolving disputes within their scope.
Part I.B sets the context for the resolution of this paradox. After a
brief review in Part I.B.1 of the fundamental problem in interpretive
inquiries, Part I.B.2 examines extant Supreme Court precedent on
the interpretation of treaties. I then turn in Part I.B.3 to an examina-
tion of the continuing debate in this country over the appropriate
role of the judiciary in domestic statutory interpretation. The goal in
this process is to establish the jurisprudential environment for a paral-
12 Treaties are of the same constitutional dignity as statutes. In the event of a con-
flict between the two, the later in time will prevail. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 18
(1957) (stating that "when a statute which is subsequent in time is inconsistent with a
treaty, the statute to the extent of the conflict renders the treaty null"); Chae Chan
Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 602 (1889) (finding that an earlier treaty must
yield to a later statute excluding aliens); Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194
(1888) ("By the Constitution a treaty is placed on the same footing, and made of like
obligation, with an act of legislation .... [B]ut if the two are inconsistent, the one last
in date will control the other, provided always the stipulation of the treaty... is self-
executing.").
53 Although the term "private international law" is more commonly used in this
context, it unfortunately has been used to address two separate subjects. In civil law
countries, the term refers to what is known in this country as "conflict of laws." See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 13, § 101 cmt. c. In the
United States, the term is often used in a more general sense to refer to all interna-
tional legal standards that govern transactions between private entities, such as the
international sale of goods or international letters of credit. To limit the confusion, I
will use the term "international private law" when addressing this broader concept of
substantive private law. For an earlier elaboration of this term, see John A. Spanogle,
Jr., The Arival ofInternational Private Law, 25 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 477, 477
(1991).
5See infra notes 70-79 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 1794 and accompanying text.
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lel analysis of the new generation of international conventions under
consideration here. 6
B. The Domestic Debate over the Role of the Judiciary
in Interpretive Inquiries
1. The Fundamental Problem
Much of the friction in the identification and application of law
stems from the simple fact that the rules of law "are finite, and the
subject of it infinite."57 In other words, however seriously a legal sys-
tem takes the familiar maxim that "like cases should be decided
alike," no two cases are, in fact, exactly alike. Moreover, lawmakers
will often fail to foresee the implications of applying general stan-
dards of conduct, even to the specific circumstances known at the
time of adoption. And the "inventiveness of reality" will mean that
many such implications will not be foreseeable at all. s Some degree
of indeterminacy is thus inherent in all legal standards, however care-
fully defined, and certain essential equitable values of their nature are
not susceptible to precise articulation in any event.59
These problems appear with particular force when the subject of
legal standards spans disparate legal and political cultures. The het-
erogeneity of the participants in the lawmaking process itself,6 the di-
16 See infra Part III.A-B.
57 See 1 HENRY BALLOW, A TREATISE OF EQUITY 9 (3d ed., Philadelphia, P. Byrne
1805).
's Konrad Zweigert & Hans-Jfirgen Puttfarken, Statutory Interpretation-Civilian Styl
44 TUL. L. REv. 704, 704 (1970); see also William N. Eskridge, Jr., Spinning Legislative
Supremacy, 78 GEO. L.J. 319, 333 (1989) ("Every statute is enacted against a congeries
of background assumptions about law, society, and the operation of the statute itself.
These assumptions often turn out to be wrong, or insufficiently sophisticated, as cir-
cumstances change over time....").
59 This unavoidable indeterminacy in legal standards is a well-known phenome-
non. For an introduction to the literature on the subject, see H.L.A. HART, THE
CONCEPT OF LAW 124-41 (1961) (discussing the two "connected handicaps" of
"ignorance of fact" and "indeterminacy of aim" in the identification of general stan-
dards of conduct);Jules L. Coleman & Brian Leiter, Determinacy, Objectivity, and Author-
ity, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 559-94 (1993) (discussing arguments about the limits of de-
terminacy).
60 Interestingly, as we have seen, the U.N. Sales Convention arose precisely from
the failure of the Hague Conventions to address the diversity of cultural and legal tra-
ditions involved in international commerce. See supra notes 25-32 and accompanying
text. To address such concerns, the work on the creation of the U.N. Sales Conven-
tion began with the express goal of accommodating the differing cultural, legal, and
political approaches to the regulation of international contracting. See Report of the
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versity of cultural norms in the regulated sphere of conduct,6' and the
need to capture the agreed-upon legal concepts in different lan-
guages62 all combine to increase substantially the risk of indetermi-
nacy in transcultural legal standards.
International law unification efforts nonetheless share with tradi-
tional statutes an important institutional characteristic regarding the
indeterminacy in legal standards: The institution charged with resolv-
ing the inevitable gaps and ambiguities (the Judiciary) is distinct and
separate from that which established them (for statutes, the Legisla-
ture, in cooperation with the Executive; for treaties, the reverse).
This poses a challenging jurisprudential problem. Controversies fal-
ling within the "open texture"6 of a treaty or statute must be resolved
just as those the outcome of which can be derived with relative clarity
from their express provisions must be resolved. An adjudicator may
not simply declare the law ambiguous and dismiss the litigants with-
out a resolution of their dispute. But what is the appropriate role of
Working Group on the International Sale of Goods, UNCITRAL Working Group on the In-
ternational Sale of Goods, 1st Sess., para. 1(a), U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/35 (1970)
[hereinafter Report on First Session], reprinted in [1968-1970] 1 Y.B. Comm'n Int'l Trade
L. 177, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/SER.A/1970 (reciting as the working group's goal"to ascer-
tain which modifications of the existing texts might render them capable of wider ac-
ceptance by countries of different legal, social and economic systems, or whether it
will be necessary to elaborate a new text for the same purpose, or what other steps
might be taken to further the harmonization or unification of the law of the interna-
tional sale of goods"); see also CISG, supra note 7, pmbl. (stating the premise that
"[t]he adoption of uniform rules which... take into account the different social, eco-
nomic and legal systems would contribute" to the promotion of international trade).
61 The inevitable differences among the drafters of the U.N. Sales Convention coa-
lesced, not surprisingly, around the principal legal, political, and cultural fault lines of
the times. For an analysis of the effect of these fault lines, see Gyula Errsi, A Propos the
1980 Vienna Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 31 AM. J. COMP. L.
333, 347-52 (1983) (discussing the North-South and East-West debates); Alejandro M.
Garro, Reconciliation of Legal Traditions in the U.N. Convention on Contracts for the Interna-
tional Sale of Goods, 23 INT'L LAW. 443, 450-80 (1989) (same).
62 Legal concepts are not universal, nor do they come in neat, easily convertible
atomic units. Any one legal concept in a given legal system may thus overlap with
parts of two or more concepts in another. The problems inherent in capturing stan-
dards in the words of any one language thus increase exponentially with the number
of required translations. As Professor John Honnold has aptly observed, "words [are]
mushy, ambiguous things even for ordinary communications .... International unifi-
cation of law raises these difficulties to a higher power." John Honnold, The Sales Con-
vention in Action-Uniform International Words: Uniform Application?, 8J.L. & COM. 207,
207 (1988).
0 This famous description of the indeterminacy of law originated with H.L.A.
Hart, then Chair ofJurisprudence at Oxford University. See HART, supra note 59, at
124-25 (discussing the indeterminacy and "open texture" inherent in both precedent
and legislation).
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an interpreter in resolving ambiguities and, more important, in filling
gaps? What principles should she apply to resolve such difficult
cases?64 And to what extent is she bound in her search for guidance?
Consider, for example, a statute that purports to regulate com-
prehensively the formation and performance of contracts, but fails to
address (at least unambiguously so) the issue of liability for failed
contractual negotiations.65 Suppose, then, that a party's expectations
are frustrated in the negotiation process and she now seeks judicial
intervention in a dispute over reliance damages.
One is confronted squarely here with the problem of defining the
appropriate standards and sources of law to resolve this issue left un-
settled in the statute. Does the statute's failure to provide an express
remedy preclude a court from recognizing one? Is the court limited
to the statutory text in resolving the matter? May it step back a level
of abstraction to consult the values of the drafters or to consider the
broader spirit of the legislation? Finally, should it, in addition or in-
stead, resort to the norms of the preexisting legal order, such as the
customary or common law?
As the law assumes an increasingly international dimension, the
significance of this complex of problems comes into sharper focus.
With respect to international treaties, the adjudicators charged with
filling in gaps and resolving ambiguities are themselves products of
differing cultural, legal, and political traditions. Regardless of the
substantive standards chosen, therefore, there is increased concern
that adjudicators will turn to their familiar, and nonuniform, norms
of domestic law in the interpretation of international standards. The
risk, in other words, is that the verbal uniformity achieved by a par-
ticular unification effort may be frustrated by a "homeward trend"6a in
interpretation by the diverse domestic adjudicators.
H.L.A. Hart referred to these as the "unenvisaged" cases. Id. at 126. In Ronald
Dworkin's terminology, these are the "hard cases." Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88
HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1058 (1975).
The Uniform Commercial Code in this country, for example, contains no provi-
sion relating to precontractual liability. For an analysis of the resolution of such a
problem, see E. Allan Farnsworth, Precontractual Liability and Preliminary Agreements:
FairDealing and Failed Negotiations, 87 CoLUM. L. REv. 217, 239-40 (1987) (also describ-
ing various European approaches to precontractual liability) and Nicola W. Palmieri,
Good Faith Disclosures Required During Precontractual Negotiations, 24 SETON HALL L. REV.
70, 91-95 (1993) (discussing the U.C.C.'s good faith requirement in this context).
See Michael F. Sturley, The 1980 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the In-
ternational Sale of Goods: Will a Homeward Trend Emerge?, 21 TEX. INT'L LJ. 540, 542




Unfortunately, much of Supreme Court treaty caselaw is at best
unhelpful and at worst misleading in the resolution of these funda-
mental interpretive problems under the new generation of interna-
tional private law conventions. We will see shortly that for conven-
tions of such a "legislative" character, this caselaw merely returns the
analysis to our original controversy over the appropriate role of the
judiciary in developing statutory law.
2. The Limited Utility of the Existing Domestic Approaches
to Treaty Interpretation
We have already observed that the U.N. Sales Convention and its
progeny were born into a curious legal limbo. Although interna-
tional in character, they directly implicate few public international
67law concerns. The operative provisions of the U.N. Sales Conven-
tion, for example, impose no obligations on the United States in its
conduct as a sovereign entity. Application of such a convention thus
does not implicate as directly the foreign policy and sovereignty con-
cerns inherent in treaties governed by public international law.
Rather, these provisions merely regulate the relations between private
entities involved in defined commercial transactions.6 One might
67 Admittedly, the line between "public" and "private" international law is a fluid
one. Public international law is traditionally understood as the law governing the ob-
ligations of states in their conduct as sovereign entities, whether among themselves or
in their contact with private parties. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELA-
TIONS, supra note 13, § 101 (defining "international law" as the "rules and principles of
general application dealing with the conduct of states... and with their relations inter
se, as well as with some of their relations with persons"). For a comprehensive review
of the functions, formation, and subjects of public international law, see Ian Brownlie,
International Law at the Fiftieth Anniversay of the United Nations: General Course on Public
International Law, 255 RECUEIL DES COURS 9, 21-65 (1995). International private law,
in contrast, deals with the interaction between purely private entities. Even some in-
ternational conventions of a "private" nature, however, involve actions by state gov-
ernments. Examples might include the 1965 Hague Convention on Service of Process
Abroad and the 1970 Hague Convention on Taking Evidence Abroad, both of which
require the Executive branch to establish a "Central Authority" to monitor their op-
eration and assist in their implementation. See Hague Service Convention, supra note
35, arts. 2-6; Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 35, art. 2.
The operative provisions of the international commercial law conventions under
consideration here, in contrast, regulate solely private law transactions without the di-
rect involvement of state actors. The interpretation of the conventions will, of course,
involve judicial officers of the member states, but this is precisely the role played by an
independentjudiciary in the interpretation of a purely domestic private law statute.
For a discussion of the spheres of application of the conventions, see infra note
326 and accompanying text.
1998]
706 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
thus conceive of a private law convention in this respect as a
"legislative treaty."69
In light of the U.N. Sales Convention's private sphere of applica-
tion, the specific rules developed for the interpretation of treaties
governed directly by public international law will provide little
authoritative guidance. This conclusion obtains in particular for the
interpretive standards defined in the Vienna Convention on the Law
70of Treaties. Whatever force they otherwise may have in this coun-
try,71 these standards focus on the interpretation of the international
obligations of nations in their conduct as sovereign entities. As a re-
sult, the better view is that they are inappropriate for the interpreta-
69 See David J. Bederman, Revivalist Canons and Treaty Interpretation, 41 UC.A L.
REV. 953, 963 (1994) (arguing that "[slome treaties clearly have the flavor of legisla-
tion");James C. Wolf, Comment, The Jurisprudence of Treaty Interpretation, 21 U.C. DAvIS
L. REV. 1023, 1031-52 (1988) (discussing the implications of viewing treaties as legisla-
tion). The Supreme Court itself has often referred to the similarities between treaties
and legislation. See Ross v. McIntyre, 140 U.S. 453, 475 (1891) (equating the interpre-
tation of a treaty with that of a statute and noting that "[ i] t is a canon of interpretation
to so construe a law or treaty to give effect to the object designed"); Geofroy v. Riggs,
133 U.S. 258, 270 (1890) ("It is a rule in construing treaties as well as laws, to give a
sensible meaning to all their provisions if that be practicable."); Whitney v. Robertson,
124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888) (noting that self-executing treaties "have the force and effect
of a legislative enactment"); Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829) ("Our
Constitution declares a treaty to be the law of the land. It is, consequently, to be re-
garded in courts ofjustice as equivalent to an act of the legislature, whenever it oper-
ates of itself, without the aid of any legislative provision.").
70 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8
I.L.M. 679 (1969) (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) [hereinafter Vienna Convention
on Treaties]. This convention is clearly directed to treaties that impose obligations on
sovereign entities under public international law. See id. art. 2 (defining a "[t]reaty" as
.an international agreement concluded between States in written form and governed
by international law"); cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note
13, § 101 (defining "international law" as governing the relations between states as well
as relations between states and private persons); Arthur M. Weisburd, The Executive
Branch and International Law, 41 VAND. L. REv. 1205, 1206 (1988) ("Public interna-
tional law, through its rules regulating the dealings between independent nations,
purports to impose limits on the actions of... governments....").
71 The United States has not ratified the Vienna Convention on Treaties. The
Third Restatement of Foreign Relations Law nonetheless suggests that the interpretive
provisions of the Convention "represent[] generally accepted principles and the
United States has also appeared willing to accept them despite differences of nuance
and emphasis." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 13, § 325
cmt. a (referring to the substance of article 31(1) and (3) of the Vienna Convention
on Treaties that is restated in section 325). For an analysis of the role of the interpre-
tive provisions of that Convention in courts of this country, see Maria Frankowska, The




tion of the new generation of self-executing private law conventions
that is best characterized by the U.N. Sales Convention.7
For similar reasons, much of the jurisprudence of the Supreme
Court on treaty interpretation is inapposite in this context as it, too, is
premised largely on the public international law paradigm.75 One
thus commonly finds statements by the Court that "[i]n interpreting
an international treaty, we are mindful that it is 'in the nature of a
contract between nations.'"74 Because the subject of interpretation is
presumed to be the definition by sovereign actors of their own formal
obligations, the Court has traditionally placed particular emphasis on
the subjective intent of "the parties" in construing the provisions of
treaties. 75 In a similar vein, concerns about sovereignty and executive
72 See FPrrz ENDERLEIN & DIETRIcH MASKOW, INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW 55 (1992)
(arguing that the methods of classic public international law should not control the
interpretation of the substantive provisions in Parts I-III of the U.N. Sales Conven-
tion); HONNOLD, supra note 23, at 158-59 (arguing that rules of interpretation of the
1969 Vienna Treaty should not be applied to Parts -1II of the Sales Convention);
Frank Diedrich, Maintaining Uniformity in International Unform Law via Autonomous In-
terpretation: Software Contracts and the CIS, 8 PACE INT'L L. REV. 303, 313-14 (1996)
(arguing that the Vienna Convention's rules of interpretation are appropriate only for
Part IV of the U.N. Sales Convention, concerning the obligations of contracting states
under public international law, and not for Parts I-III, which address obligations aris-
ing out of private contracts); Rolf Herber, Article 7, in KOMMENTAR ZUM EIN-
HEITLICHEN UN-KAuFRECHT 86, 89 (Ernst von Caemmerer & Peter Schlechtriem eds.,
1990) [hereinafter KOMMENTAR] (arguing that the interpretive standards of public
international law are inappropriate for the U.N. Sales Convention). But cf. HONNOLD,
supra note 23, at 159 n.44 (suggesting that the provisions of the Vienna Convention
may be of relevance in some respects); Helen Elizabeth Hartnell, Rousing the Sleeping
Dog The Validity Exception to the Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods,
18 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 22-23 (1993) (concurring with Professor Honnold in this re-
spect).
73 Admittedly, it is accepted practice, even with the commercial law conventions
under consideration here, to refer to the member states as "contracting states." See,
e.g., CISG, supra note 7, art. 1(1). This formal designation does not, however, change
the substance of such conventions which are directed solely to the commercial rela-
tions of private entities.
7' Socidt6 Nationale Industrielle Arospatiale vs. United States Dist. Court, 482
U.S. 522, 533 (1987) (quoting Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466
U.S. 243, 253 (1984)); see also Washington v. Washington Commercial Passenger Fish-
ing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 675 (1979) ("A treaty... is essentially a contract be-
tween two sovereign nations."); Santovincenzo v. Egan, 284 U.S. 30, 40 (1931)
(explaining that "treaties are contracts between independent nations"). For a more
recent statement in the same vein, see Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., 516 U.S.
217, 226 (1996) (observing with regard to interpretation that a treaty is "an agreement
among sovereign powers").
"The Court emphasized the intent of the parties as early as 1796 in the case of
Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dal.) 199, 238 (1796) (considering the "great and principal
objects in view by both parties"). For a more recent emphasis of such intent in the in-
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control over foreign relations have led the Supreme Court to accord
76great deference to the interpretive views of the Executive Branch .
There is reason to doubt the dispositive effect of these considera-
tions even for the public international law obligations of the United
States.7 Whatever their merit in that context, they carry considerably
less weight for the interpretation of legal standards applicable only to
private entities. Even here, of course, the intent of the drafters will be
of relevance. 8 Nonetheless, because a "legislative treaty" such as the
U.N. Sales Convention imposes no formal obligations on the sover-
eign states in their conduct in the international arena, there is no
compelling reason to give controlling deference to the intent of the
"contracting" parties or to the views of the Executive Branch in inter-
preting its substantive provisions.7
terpretation of a treaty, see Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 399 (1985) (affirming the
.responsibility to give the specific words of the treaty a meaning consistent with the
shared expectations of the contracting parties" (citations omitted)); and Sumitomo
Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 185 (1982) (stating that in interpreting a
treaty, a court's "role is limited to giving effect to the intent of the Treaty parties"). See
also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 13, § 325 reporters'
note 4 ("Both the Vienna Convention [on Treaties] and the United States approach
seek to determine the intention of the parties; neither favors 'teleological interpreta-
tion' to achieve some purpose overriding that intention."); Bederman, supra note 69,
at 963, 970-71 (discussing the "basic" canon that "treaty interpretation should effectu-
ate the intent of the parties");.
76 See O'Connor v. United Sates, 479 U.S. 27, 33 (1986) (stating that executive ap-
plication of a treaty is entitled to "great weight"); Sumitomo, 457 U.S. at 184-85
("Although not conclusive, the meaning attributed to treaty provisions by the govern-
ment agencies charged with their negotiation and enforcement is entitled to great
weight."); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 13,
§ 326(2) (stating that courts will give "great weight to an interpretation made by the
Executive Branch"); Bederman, supra note 69, at 1016 ("Of the ten [treaty interpreta-
tion] cases considered by the Rehnquist Court, in all but one the holding followed the
express wishes of the executive branch of the government."); Weisburd, supra note 70,
at 1256-67 (canvassing the history of Supreme Court deference to the views of the Ex-
ecutive on the interpretation of treaties governed by public international law);.
n Indeed, one scholar has concluded that treaty interpretation in this country "is
bankrupt because of unbridled deference" to the views of the Executive. Bederman,
supra note 69, at 954.
78 See infra Part III.A.2 (discussing the importance of the drafting records of a con-
vention).
79 See Herber, supra note 72, at 89 (arguing that, with respect to the U.N. Sales
Convention, the interpretive standards of public international law "emphasize ... too
greatly the intent of the contracting states; they are, therefore, not appropriate for the
interpretation of normative private law provisions in the contracting states."
(translation by author)); cf. John 0. Honnold, Uniform Words and Uniform Application,
The 1980 Sales Convention and International Juridicial Practice in EINHEITLICHES
KAUFRECHT UND NATIONALES OBLIGATIONENRECHT 115, 139 (Peter Schlechtriem ed.,
1987) (arguing that "public law conventions restricting the sovereign power of States
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Stripped of these prudential considerations, we are left with the
question of the appropriate interpretive standards for the substance
of the international conventions themselves. Unfortunately, the
guidance from the Supreme Court has been cryptic on this score.
Most often, it has merely parroted the self-evident observation that
"when interpreting a treaty, we begin with the text of the treaty and
the context in which the written words are used.""0 And although the
Court has often referred to drafting records in interpreting a treaty, it
is difficult to discern any consistency in this practice.1
Beyond this, the Court has simply observed that the "'[g]eneral
rules of construction apply.' "82 More questions are raised by these
statements than are answered. For few issues have been as controver-
sial in modern scholarly debate as the identification of what "general
rules" a federal court may apply in interpreting legal standards estab-
lished by coequal branches of government.
We return, then, to the basic controversy with which this Article
began. I will ultimately argue in Part II that the paradigm established
in the U.N. Sales Convention will require the development of an
"autonomous" interpretive regime83 Nonetheless, the fundamental
tension over the judicial function in interpretive inquiries unavoida-
bly arises in this context as well. Indeed, we shall discover that the
construction of treaties in this country has itself been borne along by
the same jurisprudential currents that have influenced the debate
over statutory interpretation.84 To set the context for an analysis of
call for stricter construction than conventions articulating the obligations of parties to
a commercial contract").
8D Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 534-35 (1991) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694,
699 (1988) (quoting Socit6 Nationale Industrielle A6rospatiale v. United States Dist.
Court, 482 U.S. 522, 534 (1987) (quoting AirFranc4 470 U.S. at 397))) see also Itel Con-
tainers Int'l Corp. v. Huddleston, 507 U.S. 60, 65 (1993) ("Our interpretation must
begin.., with the text of the Conventions.").
8' For a more detailed review of the Court's approach to the use of drafting rec-
ords, see infra notes 228-30 and accompanying text.
82 Socit Nationale, 482 U.S. at 533-34 (quoting Trans World Airlines v. Franklin
Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 262 (1984)); see also Eastern Airlines, 499 U.S. at 535 (noting
that general rules of construction are applied in treaty interpretation); Volkswagenwerl
486 U.S. at 700 (noting that "general rules of construction may be brought to bear on
difficult or ambiguous passages"); Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 240-41 (1796)
(Opinion of Chase, J.) (applying rules of general construction in interpreting a
treaty).
See infra notes 179-82 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 143-54 and accompanying text.
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the interpretive methodology embraced in the U.N. Sales Convention
and its progeny, I turn to an analysis of this domestic debate.
3. The Jurisprudence of Statutory Interpretation in the United States
a. The Context for the Contemporary Controversy
The classical approach to statutory interpretation in this country
fastened on the statutory text as the sole depository of legislative in-
tent. In its practical manifestation, this formalist view took the form
of the "plain meaning rule."85 This familiar rule posits that when the
words of a statute are unambiguous, the interpretive inquiry should
come to an end, "regardless of the consequences." 6 On difficult is-
sues, classical theory turned to "canons of construction,"7 the most
potent of which is reflected in the well-known maxim that "a statute
in derogation of the common law is to be narrowly construed."88
This approach found its expression in the classic observation of Oliver Wendell
Holmes that "[w]e do not inquire what the legislature meant; we ask only what the
statute means." Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 HARV. L.
REV. 417, 419 (1899). In spite of this pithy statement, as William Eskridge has ob-
served, Justice Holmes himself often looked behind the statutory text to discover
meaning in the legislative history. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37
UCLA L. REV. 621, 647 n.100 (1990) ("The new formalists uniformly fail to mention
that Justice Holmes often relied heavily on legislative history to figure out 'what the
statute means.'" (quoting Holmes, supra, at 419)). Scholars interested in a more de-
tailed history of classical formalism in statutory interpretation in this country and in
England in the 1800s should see William S. Blatt, The History of Statutory Interpretation:
A Study in Form and Substance, 6 CARDOZO L. REV. 799, 805-23 (1985) (discussing the
19th-century tensions between interpreting the law in a liberal or strict manner), and
RobertJ. Martineau, Craft and Technique, Not Canons and Grand Theories: A Neo-Realist
View of Statutory Construction, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 6-9 (1993) (same).
86 Blatt, supra note 85, at 812. The apotheosis of this approach came in United
States v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co., in which Justice Butier observed: "[W]here the
language of an enactment is clear and construction according to its terms does not
lead to absurd or impracticable consequences, the words employed are to be taken as
the final expression of the meaning intended." 278 U.S. 269, 278 (1929). For a more
detailed analysis of this rule, see Arthur W. Murphy, Old Maxims NeverDie: The "Plain-
Meaning Rule" and Statutory Interpretation in the "Modem" Federal Courts, 75 COLUM. L.
REV. 1299, 1299 (1975).
87 Formalist courts employed these canons of construction as a surrogate for legis-
lative intent. See Martineau, supra note 85, at 8 ("The canons enabled the judge pur-
portedly to discover the intent of the legislature without consulting legislative his-
tory."). Prominent examples include rules that require an interpretation to avoid
surplusage and ineffective provisions, that the expression of one thing is an implied
exclusion of other possibilities within the same subject (the familiar expressio unius est
exclusio alterius), and that special terms should prevail over general ones. See id.
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRiCKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
LEGISLATION 242 (1988). At its core, this formalist approach reflected ajudicial hostil-
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When faced with an issue not clearly resolved on the face of a statute,
this "canon" authorized courts to disregard the statute entirely and
return to the familiar domain of the preexisting common law.
The forces of realism destroyed much of the false edifice of this
"mechanical"9° formalism in the early part of this century.9, For a
time, two other notable "grand theories"9 2 of statutory interpretation
emerged in an attempt to fill the void. The first advocated a return to
the strict formalist conception that a federal court merely "acts as the
enacting legislature's faithful servant, discovering and applying the
legislature's original intent." 3 More recent proponents of this new
ity to obstruction of the time-tested rules of the common law by "half-baked statutory
trespassers." Id. at 243. Justice Frankfurter once expressed similar sentiments. See
Pope v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co., 345 U.S. 379, 390 (1953) (FrankfurterJ., dissent-
ing) (explaining that in the Victorian days, legislation was regarded "as wilful and arbi-
trary interference with the harmony of the common law and with its rational unfold-
ing byjudges").
89 SeeBlatt, supra note 85, at 817-18 (discussing the role of this derogation canon in
statutory interpretation in the 19th century); see also Shaw v. Railroad Co., 101 U.S.
557, 565 (1879) ("No statute is to be construed as altering the common law, farther
than its words import. It is not to be construed as making any innovation upon the
common law which it does not fairly express.").
'0 See Roscoe Pound, MechanicalJurisprudenc4 8 COLUM. L. REv. 605, 606 (1908)
(analyzing the problems with "mechanical" formalism).
9, Inspired by a similar movement in Europe, scholars such as Max Radin and Karl
Llewellyn challenged the very premise of formalism that statutory rules (or common
law ones for that matter) could yield determinate results without the exercise of inter-
pretive discretion by judges. Radin, in particular, rejected the notion of a collective
legislative "intent," and argued that even if such a thing existed it should not bind
courts in their subsequent application of a statute. See Radin, supra note 2, at 870-71
("That the intention of the legislature is undiscoverable in any real sense is almost an
immediate inference from a statement of the proposition."). Llewellyn also convinc-
ingly demonstrated that the canons of construction appeared in "opposing pairs." See
Llewellyn, supra note 2, at 401 ("[T]here are two opposing canons on almost every
point."). As a result, not only do the canons fail to provide definite guidance on diffi-
cult questions of statutory interpretation, they also permit a judge to mask subjective
policy determinations behind the false veil of an "objective" rule of construction. See
id.; see also Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation-in the Classroom and in the Court-
room, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 807 (1983) (observing that"two inconsistent canons can
usually be found for any specific question of statutory construction").
For the origin of the term "grand theory," see Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 4,
at 321.
9L d. at 325-32 (discussing, but ultimately criticizing, intentionalism). The Su-
preme Court itself has variously suggested in more recent decisions that congressional
intent is a guiding criterion in statutory interpretation. See California Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 280 (1987) ("In determining [the scope of a statute,
the] sole task is to ascertain the intent of Congress."); Commissioner v. Engle, 464 U.S.
206, 214 (1984) (noting that a court's "sole task" in interpreting a statute is to ascer-
tain the intent of Congress).
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form of "intentionalism"94 have also elevated the debate to a constitu-
tional dimension. These commentators argue that principles of fed-
eralism and separation of powers preclude federal courts from devel-
oping substantive law without the consent of Congress.95 The second
unified theory suggests that the answers to difficult interpretive issues
should be found in the purposes that animate a particular statutory
scheme. This "purposivism"9 then posits that these broader objec-
tives of a statute can be employed to resolve issues addressed only im-
perfectly, or not at all.97  Neither purposivism nor intentionalism,
94 Identifying a legislature's collective "actual" intent, of course, will be a difficult
task in most cases. Effective intentionalism will thus typically require reliance on the
.conventional intent" that can be fashioned on the basis of a statute's legislative his-
tory. Where these means of identifying intent fail, Judge Richard Posner has sug-
gested an "imaginative reconstruction." Posner, supra note 91, at 817; see also RICHARD
A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS 286-93 (1985). This approach requires a judge to
imagine herself in the position of the enacting legislature and to resolve any interpre-
tive problems as the legislature most likely would have, if it had thought of them. Ab-
sent guidance on this score, the judge should apply a "reasonable result." Id. at 289.
But cf Richard A. Posner, Legislation and Its Interpretation: A Primer, 68 NEB. L. REV. 431,
445 (1989) (distancing himself somewhat from this position on imaginative recon-
struction).
93 See Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1, 12-27 (1985) (noting the grant of exclusive legislative power to Congress in Ar-
ticle I, Section 1 of the Constitution). Other articles in the intentionalist vein include
Richard A. Posner, The Jurisprudence of Skepticism, 86 MICH. L. REV. 827, 832 (1988)
(cautioning against the courts using their own "logic" in attempting to interpret legis-
lative rules), and Kenneth W. Starr, Of Forests and Trees: Structuralism in the Interpretation
of Statutes, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 703, 705 (1988) ("[T]he federal courts could well
benefit from a... set of self-imposed constraints [on their ability to interpret laws]
provided in our ancient legal culture by the common law.").
96 See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 4, at 332-39 (discussing "purposivism"). This
approach finds its foundation in the legal-process analysis developed in the 1950s by
Professors Henry Hart and Albert Sacks. See HART & SACKS, supra note 2, at 1376-80.
Scholars interested in a broader review of the legal-process materials of Professors
Hart and Sacks should see William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Legislation Schol-
arship and Pedagogy in the Post-Legal Process Era, 48 U. PITr. L. REv. 691, 693-700, 694
(1987) ("The legal process materials [developed by Hart and Sacks] were an ambitious
attempt to show how public policy evolves from the interaction of the various branches
of government....").
97 Purposivism proceeds from the general premise that every statute reflects "some
kind of purpose or objective" arrived at through some manner of a reasoned delibera-
tive process. See HART & SACKS, supra note 2, at 1378 (suggesting that judges should
assume "unless the contrary unmistakably appears, that the legislature was made up of
reasonable persons pursuing reasonable purposes reasonably"). This purposive ap-
proach influenced the drafters of the Uniform Commercial Code in this country. See
Julian B. McDonnell, Purposive Interpretation of the Uniform Commercial Code: Some Impli-
cationsforJurisprudenc=4 126 U. PA. L. REV. 795, 800 (1978) ("As drafting the Code gave
the realists a unique opportunity to legislate purposive interpretation, so experience
under the Code now provides a basis for evaluating this distinctive approach."). For a
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however, has succeeded in producing a convincing unified theory of
statutory interpretation.9s
The debate over statutory interpretation in this country in recent
years has been characterized instead by a tension between two other
principal jurisprudential views. One group of scholars, as we shall see
shortly, assimilates elements of both intentionalism and purposivism
in a more pragmatic approach to interpretive inquiries. In response
to a perceived excessive liberality in statutory interpretation, an op-
posing school of scholars and judges seeks refuge in a new, and per-
haps more resistant, strain of formalist restriction to statutory text.'
b. Dynamic Approaches
Continuing realist skepticism about the capacity of any one inter-
pretive theory to produce determinate results, either descriptively or
normatively, has given rise in recent years to a more pragmatic ap-
proach to statutory interpretation. The essence of this approach, as
aptly described by Professor Daniel Farber, is that in interpreting
statutes courts have at their disposal an "eclectic mix" of "text, statu-
tory purpose, public policy, and legislative history.""'0 In addition to
Professor Farber, the principal recent proponents of this "practical
reasoning" include Professors William Eskridge and Philip Frickey.' '
Practical reasoning, as described by Eskridge and Frickey, is
founded on three premises. The first is that statutory interpretation
"involves creative policymaking by judges and is not just the Court's
comparison of the approach of the U.C.C. with that contemplated by the paradigm of
CISG article 7, see infra Part III.B.2.
'3 See Eskridge, supra note 85, at 667 ("Intellectually, intentionalism (even as modi-
fied by legal-process theory) collapsed in the 1980s."). Echoing the realist attack of
the past, critics have questioned the ability ofjudges to reconstruct in any reliable way
the "intent" or "purpose" of a past legislature, challenged the notion that these theo-
ries are able to generate determinate results, and objected to their failure to embrace
other values of significance to our polity. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 4, at 326-
32 (criticizing intentionalism); id. at 332-39 (criticizing purposivism); Cass R. Sunstein,
Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 426-28 (1989)
(criticizing purposivism); id. at 431-34 (criticizing intentionalism).
9See infra Part I.C.
"o Daniel A. Farber, The Hermeneutic Tourist: Statutory Interpretation in Comparative
Perspectiv4 81 CoRNELL L. REV. 513, 522 (1996) (reviewing INTERPRETING STATUTES,
infra note 114).
10' See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 4, at 345-84 (advocating and elaborating on a
"practical reasoning" approach to statutory interpretation); Daniel A. Farber, The Inevi-
tability of Pradical Reason: Statutes, Formalism and the Rule of Law, 45 VAND. L. REv. 533,
534 (1992) (criticizing formalism and advocating an approach to statutory interpreta-
tion based on "practical reason").
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figuring out the answer that was put 'in' the statute by the enacting
legislature."'02 The second, closely related premise is that a judge's
task involves a choice among several possible meanings.'03 There is,
in short, no single "right" answer in interpretive inquiries. Finally, in
making choices, judges will be influenced by a variety of competing
values.1°4
As their own positive model of statutory interpretation, Eskridge
and Frickey propose a "funnel of abstraction." This funnel orders in-
terpretive sources from the concrete to the abstract; that is, from tex-
tual considerations to historical considerations (legislative history and
legislative purpose) to evolutive considerations (evolution of the stat-
ute and current policy).1 05 The proffered metaphor for interpretation
in this sense is a cable: The task of a judge is to identify which of the
competing values (threads) are the most important in a given circum-
stance, weigh the strength of each, and choose the interpretation that
reflects "the strongest overall combination of threads."
0 6
At the foundation of this approach to statutory interpretation is
the pragmatic notion that no single source is adequate for all inter-
102 Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 4, at 345. In light of the inherent indeterminacy
of legal standards, as well as the inevitable influence of the interpreter's own perspec-
tive, the process of interpretation, it is argued, requires more than uncovering the an-
swers already prescribed by the legislature. See id. at 346-47 ("Even if the interpretive
process were viewed as retrieving the answer Congress would have reached ... the
inquiry involves 'imaginative' work by thejudge.").
10$ See id. at 347 ("[B]ecause this creation of statutory meaning is not a mechanical
operation, it often involves the interpreter's choice among several competing an-
swers.").
104 Decisionmaking in this respect is "[not] linear and purely deductive," but
rather "spiral and inductive." id at 348; see also Farber, supra note 101, at 539
("[P]ractical reason rejects... the view that the proper decision in a case can be de-
duced from a preexisting set of rules."); Robert Weisberg, The CalabresianJudicialArtist:
Statutes and the New Legal Process, 35 STAN. L. REV. 213, 232-33 (1983) (criticizing the
premise of formalism that there is a single "right" answer in statutory interpretation).
'05 See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 4, at 353 (presenting a schematic of the
"funnel of abstraction" from the "most concrete" source (statutory text) to the "most
abstract" source ("current policy")); see also id. at 354-62 (analyzing the various sources
in more detail); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L.
REV. 1479, 1496-97 (1987) (advocating an "interpretive continuum" from textual con-
siderations to evolutive considerations).
"6 Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 4, at 351. As further illustrations, Eskridge and
Frickey employ the metaphors of "a web of intertwined beliefs," id. at 348, a
"hermeneutical circle" in which "[a] part can only be understood in the context of the
whole, and the whole cannot be understood without analyzing its various parts," id. at
351, and the use of justificatory arguments "'like the legs of a chair,'" id. at 352




pretive issues.' 7 Rather, "practical reasoning," like human decision-
making in general, is "polycentric, spiral, and inductive-not unidi-
mensional, linear, and deductive." ' Statutory interpretation is thus
best viewed as "problem-solving," in which the "practical reasoner"
weighs the strengths of the various justificatory arguments (text, legis-
lative history, current values) in applying the statute to the concrete
dispute in need of resoluion.0 9
The most innovative characteristic of this flexible, pragmatic ap-
proach to statutory interpretation is its "dynamic" element. Dynamic
statutory interpretation proceeds on the premise that, when interpret-
ing statutes, judges are not formally bound to the original value
judgments of the enacting legislature."0 That is, this view rejects the
notion that "the meaning of a statute is set in stone on the date of its
enactment."' Rather, it is argued, in the event of an evolution in the
relevant public values, federal courts have the authority to develop
new legal standards and even to adapt otherwise clear statutory text to
accommodate a changed societal and legal environment." 2 An apt
,07 See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIc STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 50 (1994)
(discussing "[p]ragmatic [d]ynamism" and grounding dynamic statutory interpreta-
tion on the pragmatic argument that "there is no 'foundationalist' (single overriding)
approach to legal issues").
3 Id. at 55.
'09 See id. at 50 (discussing statutory interpretation as consistent with pragmatism,
which "emphasizes the concrete over the abstract and is problem-solving in its orienta-
tion"); Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 4, at 354 (arguing that the interpreter should
.move up and down [their funnel of abstraction], evaluating and comparing the dif-
ferent considerations represented by each source of argumentation"). This order also
reflects a rough hierarchy. Thus, a compelling textual argument should prevail over
an equally convincing contrary argument based on statutory purpose. But, not surpris-
ingly, the hierarchy is not restrictive or prescriptive in any formalist sense. See id.; see
also ESKRIDGE, supra note 107, at 56 (acknowledging, for example, that even under dy-
namic statutory interpretation, "a clear text that does not yield unreasonable results
will not be undone simply because it is contradicted by some legislative history").
", For a detailed explanation of this contention, see ESKRIDGE, supra note 107, at
52-55 (arguing that "[blecause of gaps and ambiguities for issues unresolved or unan-
ticipated by the legislative process, statutes begin to evolve from the moment people
start applying them to concrete problems"), and Eskridge, supra note 105, at 1479
("Statutes... should.., be interpreted 'dynamically,' that is, in light of their present
societal, political, and legal context."). For a broader analysis of dynamic statutory in-
terpretation in light of various jurisprudential theories, see id. at 107-204 (discussing
"liberalism," "legal process theories," and "normativism").
.. T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating Statutori Interpretation, 87 MICH. L. REv. 20, 21
(1988).
112 See Eskridge, supra note 105, at 1483 (noting that, in dynamic interpretation,
courts should examine "the ways in which the societal and legal environment of the
statute has materially changed over time"); id. ("[A]n apparently clear text can be
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metaphor for this view, as advanced by Alexander Aleinikoff, is a nau-
tical one:
Congress builds a ship and charts its initial course, but the ship's ports-
of-call, safe harbors and ultimate destination may be a product of the
ship's captain, the weather, and other factors not identified at the time
the ship sets sail.... The dimensions and structure of the craft deter-
mine where it is capable of going, but the current course is set primarily
by the crew on board."
3
There is persuasive empirical evidence that the Supreme Court in
some respect has followed a flexible approach in interpreting stat-
utes." 4 But, as even one of its proponents has acknowledged, practi-
cal reasoning "is easier to invoke than define."" 5 And in its dynamic
dimension, this increased flexibility collides with the constitutional
concerns advanced by "intentionalist" scholars. If, in fact, constitu-
tional constraints exist on the lawmaking powers of federal courts,
then there also must be logical limits on the courts' authority to con-
struct legal additions to statutory structures (or destroy existing
wings) without a sufficient legislative foundation.
It is precisely these types of concerns that have provoked calls for
a return to a more formalist approach to statutory interpretation. As
rendered ambiguous by a demonstration of contrary legislative expectations or highly
unreasonable consequences."); Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 4, at 358-62
("[S)tatutory interpretation will consider current values ... ."); see also William N.
Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1007, 1009
(1989) (arguing that "public values" play a "substantial role" in statutory interpreta-
tion).
,,3 Aleinikoff, supra note 111, at 21; see also Eskridge, supra note 105, at 1480
(discussing the traditional premise "that the legislature fixes the meaning of a statute
on the date the statute is enacted"); Martineau, supra note 85, at 20-21 (analyzing Pro-
fessor Aleinikoff's observation in the context of dynamic statutory interpretation).
"' See Nicholas S. Zeppos, The Use ofAuthority in Statutory Interpretation: An Empirical
Analysis, 70 TEx. L. REV. 1073, 1091-120 (1992) (proffering empirical evidence that the
Supreme Court relies on a broad range of sources in statutory interpretation); see also
Eskridge, supra note 85, at 626-30 (describing the Court's present approach as a "soft
plain meaning rule"); Robert S. Summers, Statutory Interpretation in the United States, in
INTERPRETING STATUTES 407, 412-19 (D. Neil MacCormick & Robert S. Summers eds.,
1991) [hereinafter INTERPRETING STATUTES] (canvassing the interpretive practices of
the Supreme Court and identifying 22 separate justificatory arguments).
n5 Farber, supra note 101, at 539.
16 See, Merrill, supra note 95, at 12-32 (arguing that considerations of federalism,
separation of powers, electoral accountability, and the Rules of Decision Act deprive
federal courts of independent lawmaking power); supra note 95 and accompanying
text. Even Eskridge and Frickey acknowledge that "[elvolutive considerations" are
"highly abstract" and thus have "less authority in a democracy." Eskridge & Frickey,
supra note 4, at 358.
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we shall see in the next section, the answer to the indeterminacy of
statutory law for these "new textualists" is to be found not in increased
flexibility, but rather in a more restrictive adherence to the text actu-
ally adopted by the legislature.
C. The Rise of "New Textualism"
Statutory interpretation, like many collective social activities, ap-
pears to fall under the influence of trends. As one approach begins
to establish itself, a countertrend emerges. The response to the in-
creasing flexibility in interpretation in the last few decades thus
should not come as a surprise. The late 1980s witnessed the rise of a
new, and perhaps more powerful, species of formalism now com-
monly known as "new textualism." 7 The principal adherents to this
new approach are Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas,
18
and a number of appellate judges, most notably Frank Easterbrook of
the Seventh Circuit.119
New textualism posits that the role ofjudges in a democratic soci-
ety is to apply statutory text strictly as written, and in particular with-
out regard to notions of legislative intent or purpose. In this respect,
proponents of textualism return to the old formalist view that statu-
tory words are the best indication of legislative intent. O Indeed, in
his concurring opinion in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca,12 which signaled the
117 The term "new textualism" was coined by William Eskridge. See Eskridge, supra
note 85, at 623. Richard Pierce has termed this new strain of strict formalism
"hypertextualism." See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Supreme Court's New Hypertextualism:
An Invitation to Cacophony and Incoherence in the Administrative State 95 COLUM. L. REV.
749, 752 (1995) (using the term to describe the Court's new interpretive techniques).
"a See Bradford C. Mank, Is a Textualist Approach to Statutory Interpretation Pro-
Environmentalist?: Why Pragmatic Agency Decisionmaking Is Better than Judicial Literalism,
53 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1231, 1237 (1996) (suggesting thatJustice Thomas approves
ofJustice Scalia's textualist approach); Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Future of
the Chevron Doctrine 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 351, 351 (1994) (same).
"9 See Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 533 (1983)
[hereinafter Easterbrook, Statutes'Domains) (advocating a more limited role forjudges
in interpreting statutes); Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory
Interpretation, 17 HARV.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 61 (1994) [hereinafter Easterbrook, Text and
History] (cautioning against overuse of legislative history in interpreting statutes).
20 See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text (discussing the classical formalist
approach to statutory interpretation). The practical consequence of this approach is a
return to the "plain meaning rule" in statutory interpretation. See Eskridge, supra note
85, at 656-60 (suggesting that, as a result of the influence of new textualism, the Su-
preme Court's "old soft plain meaning rule has become 'harder'").
12, 480 U.S. 421, 452 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring). At issue in INS v. Cardoza-
Fonseca was the interpretation of the phrase "well-founded fear of persecution" in the
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rise of "new textualism," Justice Scalia cited cases dating back as far as
1820 for the "venerable principle that if the language is clear, that
language must be given effect-at least in the absence of patent ab-
surdity."122
Implicit in this approach is also a conservative premise about the
role of federal judges in the development of law. In a system founded
on legislative supremacy and separation of powers, it is argued, the
appropriate forum for policy making-for balancing the competing
societal interests in the creation of generally applicable legal stan-
dards-is the legislature. The function of the judiciary, in contrast, is
restricted to identifying and applying the objective meaning of those
legislative standards without the exercise of independent policy-
making discretion.123
This restrictive textualist philosophy thus has two principal corol-
laries, as discussed immediately below.
1. Rejection of Legislative History
The first principal corollary of new textualism is a rejection of ex-
trinsic sources, in particular legislative history, in resolving statutory
ambiguities.'24 Proponents have advanced a variety of arguments to
Immigration and Nationality Act with regard to requests for asylum. See id. at 423-25.
Interestingly, Justice Scalia objected to the majority's resort to legislative history that
revealed that the Congress intended the interpretation of this domestic statute to be
governed by an international treaty. See id. at 436-41 (deferring to the definition of
"refugee" in the 1967 United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees).
'Id. at 452-53 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing, inter alia, United States v.
Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 95-96 (1820) (Marshall, C.J.), and United States v.
Hartwell, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 385 (1868)); see also id at 452-53 (Scalia, J., concurring)
("Judges interpret laws rather than reconstruct legislators' intentions. Where the lan-
guage of those laws is clear, we are not free to replace it with an unenacted legislative
intent."). It should not come as a surprise, then, that in expanding this textualist ap-
proach to the interpretation of treaties in Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Justice Scalia
quoted from an 1821 opinion. See Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd., 490 U.S. 122, 135
(1988) (quoting The Amiable Isabella, 19 U.S. 1, 32, 6 Wheat. 1, 71 (1821)).
'n See Eskridge., supra note 85, at 646 (noting that the new "[f]ormalism posits that
judicial interpreters can and should be tightly constrained by the objectively deter-
minable meaning of a statute; if unelectedjudges exercise much discretion in these
cases, democratic governance is threatened").
124 See Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 422-23 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(criticizing the Court's reliance on legislative history over plain meaning in interpret-
ing a statute); H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 251-52 (1989)
(Scalia, J., concurring) (criticizing overreliance on legislative history in interpreting
the RICO Act); Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 527-30 (1989) (Scalia,
J., concurring) (criticizing overreliance on historical and legislative material in inter-
preting the term "defendant" in Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a) (1)); United States v.
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support this view. The prime argument carries forward the attack of
realists fifty years earlier on the very notion that legislatures have any
coherent collective "intent" at all.'25 Echoing Radin, 26 Judge Easter-
brook, for example, has contended that "[i]ntent is elusive for a natu-
ral person, fictive for a collective body."127 More recent support is
found in "public choice theory," which is skeptical of the effectiveness
of a legislative process influenced by powerful interest groups and the
idiosyncratic motivations of individual legislators.
Supporters of textualism further reject legislative history as lack-
ing utility in resolving statutory ambiguities. That is, textualists con-
tend that legislative history often proves more ambiguous than the
text itself.' The variety of often conflicting statements in drafting re-
cords, textualists argue, enables judges to hide their own preexisting
policy preferences behind a veil of citations to "legislative intent."'30
Taylor, 487 U.S. 326, 344-46 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (criticizing the resort to legislative history in interpreting the meaning of a statu-
tory phrase); see also Bradley C. Karkkainen, "Plain Meaning: Justice Scalia's Jurispru-
dence of Strict Statutory Construction, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 401, 433-39 (1994)
(discussing Justice Scalia's rejection of legislative history in favor of a plain meaning
approach); Mank, supra note 118, at 1237-38 (discussing textualism).
12 See supra note 91 and accompanying text (discussing criticism of the idea of a
collective legislative intent).
2 See Radin, supra note 2, at 870-71 (arguing that "the intention of the legislature
is undiscoverable in any real sense").
127 Easterbrook, Text and History, supra note 119, at 68 (concluding that "[ijntent is
empty"); see also Easterbrook, Statutes'Domains, supra note 119, at 547-48 (arguing that
statutes do not reflect any collective intent of the legislature). Other opponents of
"intentionalism" have pointed to the problems inherent in reconstructing the "intent"
of a past legislature. See Eskridge, supra note 85, at 644-46 (discussing historicist skep-
ticism about the ability of an interpreter to reconstruct a past event detached from the
influence of current values).
'2' Justice Stephen Breyer has offered perhaps the most concise summary of the
premise of public-choice theory: "[L]egislation simply reflects the conflicting interac-
tions of interest groups; the resulting law sometimes reflects their private, selfish in-
terests, and sometimes serves no purpose at all." Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legisla-
tive History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL L. REV. 845, 864 (1992); see also Eskridge,
supra note 85, at 642-44 (discussing the influence of public-choice theory on the value
of legislative history); Mank, supra note 118, at 1269-71 (reviewing textualist challenges
to the use of legislative history).
129 SeeANTONIN SCALIA, A MATrER OF INTERPRETATION 31-32 (1997) (resort to leg-
islative history "is much more likely to produce a false or contrived legislative intent
than a genuine one"); Easterbrook, Text and History, supra note 119, at 68 ("Laws lack
spirit Legislation is compromise. Compromises have no spirit; theyjust are.").
'm0 See SCAULA, supra note 129, at 17-18 (warning of the "practical threat.., that, un-
der the guise or even the self-delusion of pursuing unexpressed legislative intents,
common law judges will in fact pursue their own objectives and desires, extending
their lawmaking proclivities from the comon law to the statutory field").
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Consulting such a source thus amounts to little more than "looking
over a crowd and picking out your friends."""
A final argument against the use of statutory history is founded on
constitutional concerns. Textualists assert that a restriction to statu-
tory text is constitutionally mandated because it is only that text, and
not the legislative drafting records, that is voted on by Congress and
presented to the President. In a similar vein, proponents argue that
reliance on drafting records prepared by congressional staff (and in-
fluenced by interest groups) sanctions a usurpation of the legislative
power vested by the Constitution exclusively in the elected members
of Congress.'
2. Restrictive View ofJudicial Lawmaking Powers
The second principal corollary of new textualism is a limited view
of the role of judges in filling statutory gaps. Consistent with their
' This familiar statement has been attributed to former Judge Harold Leventhal
by his colleagues on the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.
See Abner J. Mikva, Statutory Interpretation: Getting the Law to Be Less Common, 50 OHIO
ST. L.J. 979, 982 (1989); Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative His-
tory in the 1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 IowA L. REv. 195, 214 (1983); see also Easter-
brook, Statutes'Domains, supra note 119, at 548 (arguing that attempts to determine
collective intent from legislative history involve nothing more than "wild guesses").
1 See Easterbrook, Text and History, supra note 119, at 68 ("The Constitution limits
what counts as 'law.'... [T]he structure of our Constitution ... requires agreement on
a text by two Houses of Congress and one President."); Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role
of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 59, 64-65 (1988)
(arguing the same); Jerry L. Mashaw, Textualism, Constitutionalism, and the Interpretation
of Federal Statutes, 32 WM. & MARY L. REv. 827, 843 (1991) (grounding textualism in
federalism); Kenneth W. Starr, Observations About the Use of Legislative History, 1987
DUKE L.J. 371, 375-76 (arguing that resort to legislative history impermissibly dilutes
the role of the Executive Branch and injects unelected courts into the legislative proc-
ess).
'-" See SCALIA, supra note 129, at 35 ("The legislative power is the power to make
laws, not the power to make legislators. It is nondelegable. Congress can no more
authorize one committee to 'fill in the details' of a particular law in a binding fashion
than it can authorize a committee to enact minor laws.");John F. Manning, Textualism
as a Nondelegation Doctrine; 97 COLUM. L. REv. 673, 706-37 (1997) (arguing that reliance
on legislative history violates the constitutional prohibition against delegation of law-
making power to entities under the exclusive control of Congress); Starr, supra note
132, at 375 (arguing that committee reports prepared by a congressional subdivision
are not indicative of Congress's intent); see also Breyer, supra note 128, at 862-64
(discussing the constitutional arguments of textualists); George A. Costello, Average
Voting Members and Other "Benign Fictions": The Relative Reliability of Committee Reports,
loor Debates, and Other Sources of Legislative History, 1990 DUKE L.J. 39, 41-44 (arguing
that although the Supreme Court often defers to committee reports as legislative his-
tory, these reports are not subject to bicameralism and presentment, and thus "may
not be accorded the force of law"); Mank, supra note 118, at 1270-71 (same).
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emphasis on legislative supremacy and the incoherence of legislative
"intent," many textualists argue that courts should not engage in an
active search for answers to questions a statute leaves unresolved. In
particular, they argue, judges should not seek to craft substantive so-
lutions from the broader spirit of a statutory scheme, nor from a dy-
namic adaptation of the meaning of the enacted text.
T
3
Instead, when faced with a gap, a court should disregard the stat-
ute, admit the limits on its lawmaking powers, and resort to whatever
law would otherwise apply to the issue in dispute.' 35 In the words of
Judge Easterbrook:
Hard questions have no right answers. Let us not pretend that texts an-
swer every question. Instead we must admit that there are gaps in stat-
utes, as in the law in general. When the text has no answer, a court
should not put one there... I Instead the interpreter should go to some
other source of rules, including administrative agencies, common law,
and private decision.
3 6
This aspect of new textualism, too, reflects a return to the restric-
tive approach of classical formalism.' 3' But these recent textualists
also find support in constitutional considerations. Proponents argue
that the prohibition on filling statutory gaps follows from the exclu-
sive grant of federal lawmaking power to the legislative branch. Be-
cause federal courts do not have independent power to create sub-
stantive law, recent textualists argue, they likewise have no power to
fill gaps in legislative standards. 'ss Textualists also see a derivative
"4 See Anthony D'Amato, The Injustice of Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 64 U. GIN.
L. REv. 911, 935 (1996) (criticizing dynamic statutory interpretation as unjust and un-
constitutional); Easterbrook, Text and History, supra note 119, at 69 ("Laws are de-
signed to bind, to perpetuate a solution devised by the enacting legislature, and do
not change unless the legislature affirmatively enacts something new.").
1s5 See Easterbrook, Statutes'Domains, supra note 119, at 544 ("Unless the party rely-
ing on the statute could establish either express resolution or creation of the common
law power of revision, the court would hold the matter... outside the statute's do-
main. The statute would become irrelevant, the parties.., remitted to whatever
sources of law might be applicable."); see also Karkkainen, supra note 124, at 474
(concluding, with regard to gap-filling, that "[f]orJustice Scalia... it is illegitimate for
a court to legislate by extending a statute's domain beyond what is clearly stated in the
statutory text").
"6 Easterbrook, Text and History, supra note 119, at 68.
137 See supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text. Indeed, Professor Daniel Farber
prefers to address new textualism under the label "new formalism." See Farber, supra
note 100, at 522.
"" See West Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 101 (1991) (Scalia, J.)
("'To supply omissions [in a statute] transcends the judicial function.'" (quoting Iselin
v. United States, 270 U.S. 245, 250-51 (1926))); Easterbrook, Text and History, supra
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utilitarian benefit in this approach: Limiting interpretation solely to
text, they urge, creates an incentive for Congress to draft statutes
carefully (thus avoiding gaps in the first place), and thereafter to be
diligent in amending them as they become outdated.'3 9
It is perhaps in this respect that textualism has most influenced
conventional approaches to statutory interpretation. References to
the traditional rule of strict construction of statutes in derogation of
the common law continue to abound in federal-court opinions.
140
The Supreme Court itself has often looked to common law rules as
guidance for the development of the law under federal statutes. 4' In
fact, even proponents of dynamic approaches to statutory interpreta-
tion do not challenge the continuing vitality of the preexisting com-
mon law in filling some statutory gaps."'
note 119, at 69 ("Only living Congresses, and not homunculi sitting in the minds of
judges, are authorized to make law."); see also SCALIA, supra note 129, at 13-14
(questioning the "attitude of the common lawjudge" in our "age of legislation," in par-
ticular in federal courts, "where, with a qualification so small it does not bear mention-
ing, there is no such thing as common law"); Eskridge, supra note 105, at 1497-501
(analyzing "[t]he formalist argument... that the creation of law by federal judges is
beyond the authority given them in the Constitution, for it trenches upon the lawmak-
ing power given to Congress").
139 See United States v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326, 345-46 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (arguing that recourse to legislative history subverts the
democratic process and the role of Congress as lawmaker); see also Farber, supra note
100, at 524 (summarizing the textualists' utilitarian argument that "[i]f Congress dis-
likes the results [of a textualist approach], it is always free to legislate again"). For a
comprehensive review of congressional action in response to interpretive decisions by
the Supreme Court, see William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory In-
terpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331 (1991).
14G See, e.g., May-Som Gulf, Inc. v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 869 F.2d 917, 921 (6th Cir.
1989) ("'Strict construction is particularly appropriate where, as here, the statute in
question is in derogation of common law rights.'" (quoting Checkrite Petroleum, Inc.
v. Amoco Oil Co., 678 F.2d 5, 8 (2d Cir. 1982))); Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n v.
Consolidated Rail Corp., 666 F. Supp. 1573, 1581 n.6 (Regional Rail Reorg. Ct. 1987)
(citing Checkrite for the same proposition). This applies in particular when federal leg-
islation encroaches on a field of law traditionally reserved to the states. See, e.g., BFP v.
Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 544 (1994) (Scalia, J.) ("To displace traditional
state regulation ... the federal statutory purpose must be 'clear and manifest.'"
(quoting English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990))).
141 See, e.g., Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 605 (1994) (construing a statute
"in light of the background rules of the common law"); Molzof v. United States, 502
U.S. 301, 306 (1992) (invoking the common law definition of "punitive damages" to
determine the term's statutory meaning); cf Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs.
Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 732 (1988) (utilizing the common law to demonstrate the dy-
namic nature of the term "restraint of trade" in the Sherman Act).
142 Eskridge, supra note 112, at 1051 (arguing that an "updated version" of the old
strict construction rule "is that the common law can be used to fill in statutory gaps,
unless it is inconsistent with the overall statutory policy").
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What is more significant for present purposes, however, is that
this new strain of formalism has even influenced the Supreme Court's
approach to the construction of treaties.1 3 For an illustration of this
point, let us return to the Court's opinion in Chan v. Korean Air Lines,
Ltd. with which this Article began.J At issue in that case was the ap-
plication of the Warsaw Convention on international air travel to the
shooting down of an airliner by the Soviet Union in 1983.145 The spe-
cific issue was whether the liability limitation defined in that Conven-
tion should be lifted if an airline fails to give adequate notice of the
limitation to its passengers.4
Finding no express provision to that effect in the Convention, the
Court quickly concluded that the interpretive inquiry was at an end.
Although the issue of airline liability clearly fell within the Warsaw
Convention's scope, the Court found that it had no authority to craft
a substantive solution to fill the gap. 147 The pure formalist spirit em-
braced in the penultimate paragraph of Justice Scalia's opinion for
the Court on this score is worthy of reemphasis here: "'[T]o alter,
amend, or add to any treaty, by inserting any clause, whether small or
great, important or trivial, would be on our part an usurpation of
power, and not an exercise ofjudicial functions. It would be to make,
and not to construe a treaty.'
1 4
'4 See Bederman, supra note 69, at 978-86 (discussing the impact ofJustice Scalia's
"pure textualism" on treaty interpretation); Michael S. Straubel, Textualism, Contextual-
ism, and the Scientific Method in Treaty Interpretation: How Do We Find the Shared Intent of
the Parties.? 40 WAYNE L. REV. 1191, 1191 (1994) (describing Justice Scalia's approach
to treaty interpretation as textualist); cf Bederman, supra note 69, at 1022-24
(lamenting that "[n] any of the treaty cases before the Rehnquist Court have been liti-
gated and decided as if they presented merely a slight variant on the problem of statu-
tory construction").
1' 490 U.S. 122 (1989).
14 See Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Transportation by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, 137 L.N.T.S. 3145, reprinted in 49
U.S.C. § 40105 note (1994).
14 See Chan, 490 U.S. at 125-26 (observing that the Convention specifies no penalty
for inadequate notice).
147 See id. at 134-35.
' Id. at 135 (alteration in original) (quoting The Amiable Isabella, 19 U.S. 1, 32, 6
Wheat. 1, 71 (1821)). In language strikingly similar to the "plain meaning rule" of clas-
sical formalism, the Court observed that "where the text is clear, as it is here, we have
no power to insert an amendment." Id. at 134. For a discussion of the "plain meaning
rule," see supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text. See also United States v. Stuart,
489 U.S. 353, 371 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing with regard to a tax treaty
that "[g]iven that the Treaty's language resolves the issue presented, there is no neces-
sity of looking further to discover 'the intent of the Treaty parties'" (quoting the ma-
jority opinion, id. at 366)); Bederman, supra note 69, at 979 (arguing that in Stuar
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Chan is not an anomaly. For more than a decade, the Court has
consistently applied a restrictive approach to the construction of in-
ternational conventions. In opinions such as Socigt Nationale Industri-
elle A~rospatiale v. United States District Court,49 Volkswagenwerk Aktienge-
sellschaft v. Schlunk,50 and Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines, Co.,"" the
Supreme Court has consistently refused to engage in an active inter-
pretive process to construct internal solutions for gaps in a conven-
tion's regulatory scheme. The implicit premise of this refusal is that
an international convention merely represents a limited skeleton of
rules. The consequence has been that the Court has resorted to oth-
erwise applicable domestic law even for questions clearly within an in-
ternational convention's sphere of application."' In short, although
"Justice Scalia was intent on extending his jurisprudence of statutory construction to
the treaty area"). Justice Blackmun expressed similar sentiments in a later case. See
Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 194 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("[A]
treaty's plain language must control absent 'extraordinarily strong contrary evi-
dence.'" (quoting Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 185 (1982))).
In the same vein, see also Maximov v. United States, 373 U.S. 49, 54 (1963) (noting
that the text of a treaty controls unless "application of the words of the treaty accord-
ing to their obvious meaning effects a result inconsistent with the intent or expecta-
tions of its signatories").
' 482 U.S. 522, 534 & nn.15-16 (1987) (construing the Hague Evidence Conven-
tion, supra note 35, as not precluding resort to discovery under domestic law). This
opinion of the Court, in particular, has sparked intense scholarly objection. See, e.g.,
James G. Dwyer & Lois A. Yurow, Taking Evidence and Breaking Treaties: A6rospatiale
and the Need for Common Sense, 21 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 439, 460-72 (1988)
(criticizing the majority opinion as "both analytically and practically unsound");
Russell J. Weintraub, The Need for Awareness of International Standards When Construing
Multilateral Conventions: The Arbitration, Evidence, and Service Conventions, 28TEX. INT'L
L.J. 441, 456-61 (1993) (criticizing the opinion as "unconvincing" and "problematic").
50 486 U.S. 694, 700 (1988) (construing the Hague Service Convention, supra note
35, as not precluding service of a corporate subsidiary under state law).
"' 516 U.S. 217, 229 (1996) (construing the Warsaw Convention as authorizing
resort to domestic law to determine the cognizable harm under the Convention and
holding that "the Convention itself contains no rule of law governing the present
question; nor does it empower us to develop some common law rule-under cover of
general admiralty law or otherwise-that will supersede the normal federal disposi-
tion").
152 The same conclusion obtains for the interpretation of treaties defining the pub-
lic international law obligations of the United States. In opinions such as the now-
infamous international abduction case of United States v. Alvarez-Machain, the Court has
consistently refused to search actively for the principles embodied in a treaty in the
absence of unambiguous direction by the treaty itself. See 504 U.S. 655, 663-70 (1992)
(construing an extradition treaty between the United States and Mexico as not prohib-
iting the trial of a Mexican national who had been forcibly kidnapped and brought to
the United States). For a criticism of this "parochial reading" of the Extradition
Treaty, see Bederman, supra note 69, at 1014 (arguing that the approach of the Court
in Alvarez-Machain "was in defiance of the first principle of the liberal interpretation
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sometimes liberal in rhetoric, 3 the common practical outcome of
treaty interpretation by the Supreme Court has been distinctly con-
servative and formalist.TM
To be sure, most proponents of textualism are not absolutists.
Even Justice Scalia has acknowledged the importance of reading
statutory text in its linguistic and structural context."5 Nonetheless,
in language reminiscent of the strict formalism of nearly one hun-
dred years ago, Judge Easterbrook has summarized textualism as a
"relatively unimaginative, mechanical process of interpretation."56
In domestic statutory interpretation, this "new textualism" appar-
ently has not found unquestioning converts in a majority of the pres-
canon: that the words and meanings of treaties should be understood against the
background of international, not domestic, law"). For an opinion in the same vein,
see Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 170-88 (1993) (restrictively inter-
preting the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, and its
1967 Protocol, as not prohibiting the United States from interdicting and forcibly re-
patriating Haitian refugees).
"' At times, the Supreme Court has stated that treaties should be interpreted
more "liberally" than "private agreements." See Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S.
530, 535 (1991); Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 700
(1987). This language traces its modern foundation to a 1943 opinion in which the
Court rejected the restrictive approach of classical formalism in the interpretation of a
treaty with a Native American tribe. See Choctaw Nation of Indians v. United States,
318 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1943) (stating that treaties are construed more liberally than
private agreements). Although the Supreme Court has since repeated this language
on occasion, it is difficult to determine its precise effect in modern treaty jurispru-
dence. See Bederman, supra note 69, at 967 (suggesting that the "liberal interpreta-
tion" canon merely seeks "to protect treaties from parochial readings that will result in
interpretations not consonant with international expectations"); see also Wolf, supra
note 69, at 1068 (stating that the norm that treaties should be interpreted "liberally
and in good faith ... may never have been the actual basis of a Supreme Court hold-
ing"). In any event, as noted in the text, the practical outcome of treaty interpretation
in the Supreme Court has been distinctly restrictive in nature.
154 See Martin A. Rogoff, Interpretation of International Agreements by Domestic Courts
and the Politics of International Treaty Relations: Reflections on Some Recent Decisions of the
United States Supreme Court, 11 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 559, 561 (1996) (concluding
that the Supreme Court has "consistently applied" a "restrictive method" for "the in-
terpretation of international agreements for the past decade").
"s See Eskridge, supra note 85, at 660-63 (analyzing Justice Scalia's "structural" in-
terpretive arguments); Karkkainen, supra note 124, at 445-50 (same). Consistent with
his strict formalism, Justice Scalia has also employed the traditional "canons of statu-
tory construction" to resolve textual ambiguities. See id. at 450-56 (discussing Justice
Scalia's reliance on clear statement principles, a set of traditional canons of statutory
interpretation). See generally Eskridge, supra note 85, at 663-66, 663, 663 (discussing
the "[r]evival of ([s]ome) [clanons of [s]tatutory [i]nterpretation").
"5 Easterbrook, Text and Histoy, supra note 119, at 67; see also supra notes 90-91 and
accompanying text (discussing the "mechanicaljurisprudence" around the turn of the
century).
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ent Supreme Court.5 7 As Chan illustrates in the context of an inter-
national convention, however, new textualism remains one of the
most potent jurisprudential forces in the contemporary debate over
the role of the judiciary in developing the law created by its coequal
branches of government. 58 It is in this atmosphere that we turn in
Part II below to the interpretation of "legislative" treaties in the form
of a new generation of international commercial law conventions.
II. INTERPRETING THE NEW GENERATION OF INTERNATIONAL
CONVENTIONS: THE ANIMATING PHILOSOPHY
A. Textual Considerations
Although in varying proportions, the entry into force of any com-
prehensive body of international legal norms creates a fundamental
tension with the prior legal order. This tension finds practical ex-
pression in two significant interpretive problems. The first is deter-
mining the extent to which the international convention should pre-
empt the various national legal regimes in the first place. The second
involves a concern that, however expansive the agreed preemption,
the national adjudicators charged with applying the new international
standards will nonetheless dilute their force through a covert reliance
on the preexisting domestic norms in "interpretive" inquiries.
Given the background of these significant challenges, the subject
of interpretation attracted intense interest as the law unification
movement took root after the upheavals of the Second World War.
The first ambitious effort in this direction, the ill-fated Hague Uni-
form Law in International Sales (ULIS),'59 aspired to a fully preemp-
'57 Only Justices Thomas and Kennedy (though with less enthusiasm) appear to
embrace Justice Scalia's strict textualism. See Karkkainen, supra note 124, at 401-02
("Only Justices Anthony Kennedy and Clarence Thomas can be called adherents of
Justice Scalia's plain meaning approach."); Merrill, supra note 118, at 363-65 (stating
that "some of the more recently appointed (Republican) Justices have been receptive
to [Scalia's textualist] views, especially Justice Thomas and to a lesser degree Justice
Kennedy"). For an insight into the views of the most recent addition to the Supreme
Court,Justice Stephen Breyer, see Breyer, supra note 128, at 861-69.
,58 Indeed, the potential force of new textualism led even one of its principal crit-
ics to observe that "the traditional [flexible] approach is in trouble." Eskridge, supra
note 85, at 641.
"9 See supra notes 22-26 and accompanying text (describing the undertaking, draft-
ing, and ultimate failure of ULIS).
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tive and comprehensive model.' 6 Article 17 of the Hague ULIS pro-
vided that all questions left unsettled in its express provisions were to
be resolved internally, specifically "in conformity with the general
principles on which [it was] based." 6
In the charged political climate of the 1970s, this comprehensive
displacement of national law quickly became a focus of controversy in
the subsequent drafting of the U.N. Sales Convention. The delibera-
tions over this issue coalesced around two fundamentally opposing
views. One group of delegates rejected altogether the notion of a self-
contained code of international legal standards; this nationalist camp
instead advocated a model of a limited skeleton of rules devoid of
unifying principles or values. 62 Others held higher aspirations.
These delegates conceived of the U.N. Sales Convention as a com-
prehensive body of integrated norms that would both entirely pre-
empt national law and be independent of its influence. Supporters of
this view thus advocated a retention of the pure "general principles"
approach of the Hague ULIS.63
In the early drafting stages, the Working Group adopted a com-
promise that appeared to evade the issue entirely. The resulting draft
provision on interpretation stated simply: "In interpreting and apply-
ing the provisions of this Law, regard shall be had to its international
character and to the need to promote uniformity."' Upon consoli-
"o See Michael Joachim Bonell, Interpretation of Convention, in COMMENTARY ON THE
INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW: THE 1980 VIENNA SALES CONVENTION 65, 66 (Cesare
Massimo Bianca & Michael Joachim Bonell eds., 1987) [hereinafter Bianca & Bonell]
("ULIS was intended to constitute a self-contained law of sales, to be construed and
applied... without any reference to or interference from the different national
laws.").
'" ULIS, supra note 23, art. 17. To bolster this policy, ULIS article 2 precluded
resort to conflict-of-laws principles (known by their civil law label, "private interna-
tional law") to fill gaps in the Convention. See id art. 2 ("Rules of private international
law shall be excluded for the purpose of the application of the present Law, subject to
any provision to the contrary in the said Law."). The Hague Convention on Formation
(ULF), interestingly, contained no such provisions. See ULF, supra note 24.
162 See Report on First Session, supra note 60, para. 57, reprinted in [1968-1970] 1 Y.B
Comm'n Int'l Trade L. 182. Adherents to this view sought to replace article 17 of
ULIS with a straightforward rule that "[p]rivate international law shall apply to ques-
tions not settled by [the present Law]." Id. para. 66.
'0 See id. para. 59 (noting that "these [general] principles can be gathered from
the provisions of the Uniform Law, from the legislative history of the 1964 Hague
Convention and from commentary of the Uniform Law"). A similar proposal would
have required that the Convention be "interpreted and applied so as to further its un-
derlying principles and purposes." Id. para. 63.
IrA The Working Group initially tentatively recommended this compromise in its
second session in 1970. See Report of the Working Group on the International Sale of Goods
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dation of the sales draft with the formation draft in 1978, the Work-
ing Group extended this provision to the formation provisions'5--
and incorporated language (of separate significance) that required
consideration of "good faith" in interpretive inquiries' t -- but other-
wise left the primary issue unresolved. The resulting ambiguity over
the preemptive effect of the Convention left room for advocates of
both the restrictive "nationalist" view16 and the ambitious "intern-
on the Work of Its Second Session, UNCITRAL Working Group on the International Sale
of Goods, 2d Sess., paras. 127, 137, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/52 (1970) [hereinafterReport on
Second Session], reprinted in [1971] 2 Y.B. Comm'n Int'l Trade L. 62, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.9/SER.A/1971 (discussing compromise recommendation). It then formally
adopted this lone provision in its sixth session in 1975 and confirmed the decision in
its seventh session in 1976. See Report of the Working Group on the International Sale of
Goods on the Work of Its Sixth Session, UNCITRAL Working Group on the International
Sale of Goods, 6th Sess., para. 54, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/100 [hereinafter Report on Sixth
Session], reprinted in [1975] 6 Y.B. Comm'n Int'l Trade L. 54, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.9/SERA/1975 (deciding to use the text of article 7); Draft Convention on the In-
ternational Sale of Goods, art. 13, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/116, Annex I, UNCrTRAL Working
Group on the International Sale of Goods, reprinted in [1976] 7 Y.B. Comm'n Int'l
Trade L. 90, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/SER.A/1978 (drafting this language into article 13).
16 See Report of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law on the Work of
Its Eleventh Session, UNCITRAL Working Group on the International Sale of Goods,
11th Sess., paras. 20-22, 41 U.N. Doc. A/33/17 (1978) hereinafter Report on Eleventh
Session], reprinted in [1978] 9 Y.B. Comm'n Int'l Trade L. 13-14, 34-35, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.9/SER.A/1978 (integrating the provision on interpretation into the formation
draft); see also Report of the Secretary-General: Incorporation of the Provisions of the Draft Con-
vention on the Formation of Contracts for the International Sale of Goods into the Draft Conven-
tion on the International Sale of Goods, UNCITRAL Working Group on the International
Sale of Goods, paras. 58-59, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/145 (1978), reprinted in [1978] 9 Y.B.
Comm'n Int'l Trade L. 125, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/SER.A/1978 (citing the Secretary-
General's observation that "there do not appear to be any reasons of policy" why the
requirement of international uniformity in interpretation should not apply to the
formation provisions).
"6 See Report on Eleventh Session, supra note 165, art. 6, para. 28, reprinted in [1978] 9
Y.B. Comm'n Int'l Trade L. 14-15. The role of "good faith" was among the most con-
troversial issues in the drafting of the U.N. Sales Convention. As we shall see below,
the compromise adopted on the role of "good faith" will, contrary to the contention of
some scholars, play a significant role in the future development of international law.
See infra notes 376-95 and accompanying text.
67 See Report of the First Committee U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/11 (1981), in Official Re-
cords, supra note 7, at 83, 87 (proposals for a gap-filling regime based on national law);
see also Summary Records of the First Committee; 5th Meeting U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.97/C.1/SR.5 (1980) [hereinafter First Committee Deliberations], in Official Re-
cords, supra note 7, at 255 para. 8 (describing the argument by the Bulgarian delegate
that "it was a costily illusion to imagine that all gaps in an international legal instru-
ment could be filled solely by means of the interpretation of its own provisions"); id.
para. 28 (describing the argument by the Argentinean delegate that a resort to "the
general principles of the Convention might lead in practice to excessive freedom on
the part of national courts in interpreting what those principles were"); id. para. 12
(describing similar comments by the Czechoslovakian representative).
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ationalist" view' 6s to press their cases at the Vienna Conference in
1980.
The position of the internationalists substantially prevailed in the
final draft of the Convention. The delegates to the Vienna Confer-
ence first determined to retain the draft provision on the interpreta-
tion of the Convention. That provision, which now appears as article
7(1) of the Convention, establishes the promotion of international
uniformity and the observance of good faith as the core policies of in-
terpretation: "In the interpretation of this Convention, regard is to
be had to its international character and to the need to promote uni-
formity in its application and the observance of good faith in interna-
tional trade."6'
But the delegates also decided to supplement these standards
with an express provision for filling in gaps in the Convention's regu-
latory scheme. It is here that those with higher aspirations for the
Convention as "a step towards the creation of a new jus commund
' 7°
substantially triumphed. That new provision, now embodied in arti-
cle 7(2), mandates as a prime policy that unsettled questions are to be
resolved on the basis of the principles reflected in the Convention it-
self; it is only when those principles fail to provide guidance that re-
sort may be had to national law:
Questions concerning matters governed by this Convention which are
not expressly settled in it are to be settled in conformity with the general
principles on which it is based or, in the absence of such principles, in con-
formity with the law applicable by virtue of the rules of private interna-
tional law.'
7 '
'3 See First Committee Deliberations, supra note 167, in Official Records, supra note 7,
at 255 para. 16 (describing arguments of Professor Michael Bonell of Italy that gaps in
the Convention "should be filled not on the basis of the rules taken from a particular
national law, but on the basis of those principles and criteria which reflected the letter
and spirit of the Convention itself"). For an analysis of these comments of Professor
Bonell in the context of the "rhetorical aspirations" of the U.N. Sales Convention, see
Amy H. Kastely, Unification and Community: A Rhetorical Analysis of the United Nations
Sales Convention, 8 Nw.J. INT'L L. & Bus. 574, 606-07 (1988).
'6' CISG, sura note 7, art. 7(1).
170 First Committee Deliberations, supra note 167, in Official Records, supra note 7, at
255 para. 16 (comment by Professor Bonell, the delegate from Italy). For the proposal
by Professor Bonell on which article 7(2) is based, see Documents Submitted During the
Conference to the First Committee, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/C.1/L.59 (1980), in Official Re-
cords, supra note 7, at 255.
'7' CISG, supra note 7, art. 7(2) (emphasis added). At first glance, this compro-
mise position appears to leave a noteworthy route for escape to national law. As we
shall see below, however, the confluence of the prime role of the Convention's gen-
eral principles and the core policy of international uniformity will leave little room for
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The consensus achieved in the drafting of the U.N. Sales Conven-
tion has also had more fundamental implications. Subsequent inter-
national commercial law conventions have seized upon the approach
of CISG article 7 as the paradigm for the interpretation and supple-
mentation of the law within their scope. The UNIDROIT Conven-
tions on International Financial Leasing,7n International Factoring,',
and Agency in the International Sale of Goods7 4 all incorporate lan-
guage on interpretation and gap-filling that is effectively identical to
that in CISG article 7.175
Drafting work on the next generation of unification efforts is pro-
ceeding on the same basis: Article 7 of the UNIDROIT Draft Conven-
tion on International Interests in Mobile Equipment v incorporates
the substance of CISG article 7, as does article 8 in the UNCITRAL
Draft Convention on International Receivables Financing.1 77 These
subsequent unification efforts, in short, not only have embraced the
principle of CISG article 7; most of them have adopted the provision
effectively verbatim.
The result that emerges from this commonality is what might be
termed "horizontal uniformity" in the commercial law unification
movement.78 That is, these international conventions have estab-
this escape for matters within the Convention's scope. See infra notes 427-28 and ac-
companying text.
'72 Convention on Financial Leasing, supra note 37, art. 6.
173 Convention on Factoring, supra note 38, art. 4.
,74 Convention on Agency, supra note 36, art. 6.
175 The first two of these Conventions (as well as the Draft Convention on Security
Interests) also add an instruction, which is implicit in the approach of the U.N. Sales
Convention, that in the interpretation of each, "regard is to be had to its object and
purpose as set forth in the preamble." Convention on Factoring, supra note 38, art.
4(1); Convention on Financial Leasing, supra note 37, art. 6(1); see also Draft Conven-
tion on Security Interests, supra note 42, art. 7(1).
'76 Draft Convention on Security Interests, supra note 42, art. 7. Significantly, the
most recent draft of this article deletes the reference to "good faith" in interpretation.
177 Draft Convention on Receivables Financing, supra note 43, art. 8. The
UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce has taken the approach of the U.N.
Sales Convention one step further. See UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Com-
merce, supra note 45, art. 3 (requiring resort to internal general principles in resolving
unsettled questions).
178 There are two noteworthy exceptions to this uniformity. The UNCITRAL Con-
vention on International Bills of Exchange and Promissory Notes, as well as the Con-
vention on Independent Guarantees and Standby Letters of Credit, lacks a provision
on gap-filling similar to CISG article 7(2). Both, however, have embraced the stan-
dards of interpretation defined in CISG article 7(1). See Convention on Bills of Ex-
change, supra note 40, art. 4; Convention on Guarantees, supra note 41, art. 5. The
latter convention also expressly adopts a less ambitious approach to the goal of inter-
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lished uniformity among themselves on the standards for their inter-
pretation and supplementation. What is significant from this is that
the interpretive philosophy embraced in the drafting of the U.N.
Sales Convention also carries an impact for the future development of
international private law in general. Before examining the substantial
experience gained in the judicial elaboration of that Convention, I
will turn first to an analysis of this underlying interpretive philosophy.
B. The Animating Philosophy and the Influence of
Civil Code Methodology
There is a deceptive simplicity in the interpretive standards set
forth in the paradigm of CISG article 7. At first glance, notions of in-
ternational uniformity and interpretation based on underlying prin-
ciples would appear to be simple truisms: The very purpose of the
commercial law conventions, after all, is to develop and bring uni-
formity to the law governing international transactions. Examination
with a more powerful lens reveals a deeper message. That message is
nothing less than a fundamental policy for the development of a truly
transnational, substantively independent body of law.
Dissection of the interpretive standards in our paradigm reveals
three separate elements. First, interpretation of a private law conven-
tion must proceed on the basis of its "international character."'7 This
directive serves a separating and elevating function. That is, it sug-
national uniformity in commercial law. Instead of the internal "general principles"
approach examined in the text, this convention contains express conflicts-of-law rules
that seek to determine the appropriate domeatic law to resolve gaps in its provisions. See
id. arts. 26-27. As I argue in Part II.C-D below, such a retreat to domestic law is ulti-
mately destructive of the promise of the international law unification movement. An-
other exception is the 1974 United Nations Convention on the Limitation Period in
the International Sale of Goods (as amended), which the United States ratified in
1994 as a complement to the U.N. Sales Convention. See Convention on the Limita-
tion Period in the International Sale of Goods, U.N. Conference on Prescription in
the International Sale of Goods, U.N. Doc. A/Conf./63/15, reprinted in 13 I.L.M. 952
(1974) [hereinafter Limitation Convention]; Protocol Amending the Convention,
Annex II, U.N. Doc. A/Conf/97/18, reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 696 (1980). Because of its
technical nature, the Limitation Convention, not surprisingly, has neither a "good
faith interpretation" provision nor a gap-filling provision similar to CISG article 7(2).
See Limitation Convention, supra, art. 7.
'79 See, e.g., CISG, supra note 7, art. 7(1); Convention on Factoring, supra note 38,
art. 4(1); Draft Convention on Receivables Financing, supra note 43, art. 8(1); Draft
Convention on Security Interests, supra note 42, art. 7(1). CISG article 7(1) also re-
quires that interpretation of a convention have regard for the needs of "good faith" in
international trade. For a detailed analysis of this requirement, see infra notes 377-96
and accompanying text.
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gests an "autonomous" interpretation"" free from the influence of na-
tional legal concepts and terminology,181 and even from the domestic
interpretive techniques themselveslee In doing so, this mandate
amounts to an express direction to interpreters to view a convention
as occupying an entirely different, elevated international dimension.
The second element requires that the interpretation of a conven-
tion have regard for "the need to promote uniformity in its applica-
tion."'83 The focus of this standard, interestingly, is not the substan-
tive provisions of the conventions, but rather the interpreters
themselves. Implicit in the required deference to uniformity is an in-
struction to adjudicators to give mutual deference to prior interpre-
tive decisions by courts of other member states, a point I will explore
in greater detail below. 1' At its core, this directive thus reflects a rec-
ognition that interpretation is a social process and that effective unifi-
cation of the law on an international level will require cooperation
among the formally independent national courts.
Viewed in this light, the second element of our paradigm oper-
ates in a symbiotic relationship with the first. It bolsters the interna-
tional character of a convention by requiring cooperation among
'go This "autonomous" interpretation is a well-recognized requirement of the in-
terpretive regime embraced in CISG article 7. See, e.g., Franco Ferrari, Uniform Interpre-
tation of the 1980 Uniform Sales Law, 24 GA. J. INT'L COMP. L. 183, 200 (1994) (noting
that the commission opted for an autonomous interpretation); Honnold, supra note
62, at 208 (same).
'8' See Bonell, supra note 160, at 72-73 (arguing against reliance "on the rules and
techniques traditionally followed in interpreting ordinary domestic legislation");
Ferrari, supra note 180, at 200-02 (noting that proper regard for a convention's inter-
national character precludes "recourse to interpretive techniques employed under
domestic law"); see also HONNOLD, supra note 23, at 136 ("To read the words of the
[U.N. Sales] Convention with regard for their 'international character' requires that
they be projected against an international background."); Honnold, supra note 62, at
208 (warning against the tendency to view international conventions "through the
lenses of domestic law"). An "autonomous" interpretation of international provisions
implies disregarding accepted domestic law interpretations even, indeed particularly,
where the terminology in the two systems overlaps in capturing the same concepts (for
terms such as "reasonable," "good faith," and the like). See Bonell, supra note 160, at
74 ("[I]t is very likely that [these] terms .... no longer expressed in their original ver-
sion, fail to evoke any traditional meaning.").
182 Properly appreciated, this implicit instruction to avoid domestic interpretive
techniques amounts to a delegation of authority to participate in the creation of an
international common law of "convention interpretation." I develop this point more
fully in Part III.A.1 infra.
' See, e.g., CISG, supra note 7, art. 7(1); Convention on Factoring, supra note 38,
art. 6(1); Draft Convention on Receivables Financing, supra note 43, art. 8(1); Draft
Convention on Security Interests, supra note 42, art. 7(1).
184 See infra notes 410-28 and accompanying text.
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domestic courts on an international level. At the same time, the re-
quired regard for a convention's international character promotes
uniformity by precluding recourse to nonuniform domestic norms in
the interpretation of its substantive provisions.
The final element of CISG article 7 is perhaps the most signifi-
cant. The second paragraph of that paradigm directs that, as a pri-
mary matter, questions left unresolved in a convention's express pro-
visions must "be settled in conformity with the general principles on
which it is based."'as The function of this element is to complete the
interpretive system. That is, even where the inevitable substantive
gaps appear, article 7(2) directs an adjudicator to seek answers on an
international level, specifically in the values reflected in the conven-
tion itself. Implicit in this approach is thus a conception of a conven-
tion as an integrated system whose cohesion arises from a set of unify-
ing principles. 6
Each of these three elements of CISG article 7 carries an impor-
tant message on its own plane. But it is in their interaction with the
broader preemptive effect of an international convention that the
animating spirit of that interpretive paradigm fully emerges. The very
purpose of a true international convention (as opposed to a simple
model law that operates as a mere guideline for domestic legisla-
tion) 1s1 is to supersede national legal norms within its defined scope.
The interpretive standards of CISG article 7 give full force to this pre-
emptive effect. Beyond the displacement of domestic law, that provi-
sion establishes a means for interpreters to develop the law under an
international convention in a manner entirely free from the influence
of domestic legal norms.
This goal of creating a truly independent body of law has a
prominent historical antecedent: the adoption of comprehensive
civil codes by the new nation-states of continental Europe in the nine-
" CISG, supra note 7, art. 7(2); see also Convention on Factoring, supra note 38,
art. 4(2); Convention on Financial Leasing, supra note 37, art. 6(2); Convention on
Agency, supra note 36, art. 6(2); Draft Convention on Security Interests, supra note 42,
art. 7(2); Draft Convention on Receivables Financing, supra note 43, art. 8(2).
"6 Admittedly, the final clause of the paradigm of CISG article 7(2) permits resort
to domestic law if this active search for relevant general principles yields no results. As
I will explain in detail below, however, this possibility exists under the more powerful
influence of the needs for international uniformity. See also infra notes 427-28 and ac-
companying text.
,87 See supra note 45 (discussing international model laws).
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teenth century." Though different in their drafting styles and the
historical context of their enactment, these codes shared the prime
purpose of displacing all prior law within their scope.I9 A corollary to
preemption was a claim to comprehensive coverage. Concurrent with
the abolishment of all relevant prior law, the civil codes established a
new and authoritative foundation for all legal standards governing
the private legal relations within their scope.190
Even a code, however, cannot escape the affliction of indetermi-
nacy. As with other forms of legislation, circumstances will arise for
which the articulated standards are ambiguous, or for which no provi-
sion exists at all. 9 Civil codes thus share a final characteristic: a sys-
tem or method governing the interaction and supplementation of
their component parts. 92 To fulfill the aspiration of a self-contained,
comprehensive body of law, in other words, the civil codes expressly
or impliedly define an internal methodology for the future expansion
of the law within their scope.9
188 "Codification" refers to an attempt to establish through legislative enactment
an exclusive and definitive source of legal norms for an entire field of law. A "true
code," Professor William Hawkland has observed, "is a pre-emptive, systematic, and
comprehensive enactment of a whole field of law." William D. Hawkland, Uniform
Commercial "Code"Methodology, 1962 U. ILL L.F. 291, 292.
189 The French Code civil of 1804 is illustrative. In the spirit of the revolution in the
last decade of the 18th century, Article 7 of the Law of the 30th of Ventose, year XII
(1804), the act which consolidated the various parts of the new code, provided that
"[a]s of the day when these laws shall become effective," all prior laws, ordinances, us-
ages, and regulations "shall cease to have the force and effect of general or particular
laws with regard to the topics which are the object of... the present code." SeeAngelo
Piero Serini, The Code and the Case Law, in THE CODE NAPOLEON AND THE COMMON-
LAW WORLD 55, 76 n.2 (Bernard Schwartz ed., 1956) (translating and quoting this
provision). For a history of the promulgation of the Code civil, seeJohn H. Crabb, In-
troduction to CODE CIVIL at xx-xxv (John H. Crabb trans., 1995).
" Some commentators have distilled this characteristic into two separate ele-
ments: (1) comprehensiveness, which means that the code "states all of the leading
rules" on the subject; and (2) "unifi [cation]," implying that it "speaks completely on a
given subject." John L. Gedid, U.C. C. Methodology: Taking a Realistic Look at the Code, 29
WM. & MARY L. REV. 341, 355 (1988) (citing 1 STATE OF NEW YORK LAW REVISION
COMMISSION, STUDY OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 37, 81 (1955)).
191 See supra notes 57-62 and accompanying text.
192 Commentators have variously described codes in this sense as being "sys-
tematic," see Hawkland, supra note 188, at 292, or "orderly," see Gedid, supra note 190,
at 355.
19' This goal can be achieved in one or both of two principal ways. The first is by
implication from the consistency and coherence of a code's provisions. Although
widely different in their respective drafting styles, the prime examples of this approach
are the French Code civil and the German Bilrgerliches Ceetzzbuch. Their skilled ar-
rangement and coordination of provisions, as well as their consistent concepts and
terminology, reflect an integrated whole and thus impliedly sanction an internal
[Vol. 146: 687
DYNAMIC TREATY INTERPRETATION
It is no coincidence that the codification movement first arose as
modem nation-states coalesced in the nineteenth century. The lead-
ers of that age of statism and positivism realized that the process of
nation-building would require a common legal culture. The new
states, such as France, Germany, and Italy, that arose out of the con-
vulsions of the period did not, however, have the luxury of the slow
accretion of private law norms that characterized the formation of a
shared legal culture in England (and in its progeny, such as the
United States).'9' One of the first projects undertaken in these newly
unified nations, therefore, was the establishment of a commission of
legal experts to draft a civil code to govern the private relations
among their citizens. 95 The unmistakable goal of this process was to
displace the old order with a new foundation for the development of
a new system of shared legal values' 9
method of interpretation and gap-filling. As an alternative or complement, a code can
incorporate an express instruction to the same effect. In this vein, a code will set forth
in a special provision a requirement that unsettled matters be resolved on the basis of
analogous provisions or the "general principles" of the law. Although precise meth-
odologies vary, examples of this approach abound. See, e.g., C6DIGO CIVIL [C6D. CIV.]
art. 16 (Arg.); ALLGEMEINES BORGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [ABGB] art. 7 (Aus.); CODICE
C1viLE [C.c.] art. 1.4 (Italy); C6DIGO CIVIL [C.C.] art. 4 (Spain). For a full quotation of
these provisions, see infra note 202.
'9 Although Germany lacked a central political authority at the time, the need for
a uniform regime for commercial relations led to the preparation of a "German Gen-
eral Commercial Code" as early as 1871. In a process similar to that in the United
States, all of the various states of Germany adopted this code as a type of Uniform
Commercial Code. Upon the political unification of the country, the central govern-
ment amended and repromulgated the code; it was later superseded entirely by the
entry into effect of the comprehensive German Civil Code in 1900. See Ruggero J.
Aldisert, Rambling Through Continental Legal Systems, 43 U. PITT. L. REV. 935, 951 (1982)
(comparing the German and American legal systems and giving the history of the
Commercial Code in Germany).
195 These attempts to break with the legal order of the past did not, of course, oc-
cur in a vacuum free of legal culture and tradition. The accumulated legal wisdom of
the time, as reflected in the extant principles, notions, and norms, significantly. influ-
enced the substance of the resulting legislative product. Indeed, under the influence
of the "historical school" led by Karl von Savigny, the 30-year process leading to the
creation of the German Biirgerliches Gesetzbuch of 1900 principally involved an analysis
and distillation of the accepted legal principles of the past. See William Ewald, Com-
parativeJurisprudence (I): What Was It Like to Try a Rat?, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1889, 2043
(1995) (discussing the influence of the historical school in the German codification
movement). But this fact only serves to bring into focus the essential point here.
Notwithstanding their similarity to the codified principles, the legal norms of the past
derived their authority not from their prior acceptance, "but from their incorporation
and reenactment in the codified form." JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW
TRADITION 27 (2d ed. 1985); see also Serini, supra note 189, at 55, 57 (noting the same).
6 See MERRYMAN, supra note 195, at 26-30; see also Crabb, supra note 189, at xx-xxv
(discussing the history of the preparation of the Code civil in France); FRANZWIEACKER,
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The defining characteristic of these comprehensive civil codes is
their internal development methodology. When faced with gaps and
ambiguities, a true code approach requires interpreters to seek the
answers within the codes themselves; the specific targets for exclusion
in this approach are the norms of the preexisting legal order.9 7 This
does not mean that the civil codes necessarily define all answers to all
questions in a strict formalist sense. 8 Rather, as we shall later see in
more detail,'9 modern civil law courts have seized upon certain ab-
stract values reflected in the codes as delegations of broad authority
to develop the law within their scope and to adapt the codes to ac-
commodate changes in the regulated field of human activity."'
Indeed, the inherent indeterminacy of law will mean that the
questions left unsettled-ambiguities about scope and effect, the un-
foreseen cases-will often take on a greater practical significance than
the express code provisions themselves. The corrosive effect of time
will also cause the express code rules to wane in relevance as social
and technological changes in the regulated field of human activity re-
veal unresolved questions with greater frequency. The fissures in the
law, in other words, will gradually become chasms. The civil code so-
lution to this problem was to establish a common source not only for
PRIVATRECHTSGESCHICHTE DER NEUZErr 458-62 (2d ed. 1967) (examining the history
of the preparation of the Civil Code in Germany).
'9' Professor Grant Gilmore distilled this basic code proposition in this way:
A "code"... is assumed to carry within it the answers to all possible questions:
thus when a court comes to a gap or an unforeseen situation, its duty is to
find, by extrapolation and analogy, a solution consistent with the policy of the
codifying law; the pre-Code common law is no longer available as an authori-
tative source.
Grant Gilmore, Legal Realism: Its Cause and Cure 70YALE LJ. 1037, 1043 (1961). The
suggestion that a code contains "all" the answers may overstate the proposition. As
shown in Part III.C.2 infra, the interpretive process embraced in CISG article 7 also
permits the dynamic growth of the law based on values that may not have been directly
contemplated by its drafters.
"" For a time, a strict positivism animated the codification movement. Modern
civil law courts, however, have adopted a substantially more dynamic approach to the
interpretation of the civil codes. See infra notes 315-16 and accompanying text.
'99 See infra notes 315-24 and accompanying text.
20 For a broader examination of this "true code" methodology, see Jean Louis
Bergel, Principal Features and Methods of Codification, 48 LA. L. REV. 1073, 1079 (1988)
("[A] codification has for its object the creation of a permanent framework and direc-
tion of the evolution of the law."); Bruce W. Frier, Interpreting Codes, 89 MICH. L. REV.
2201, 2202 (1991) (stating that judges have seized upon general morals presented in
codes to achieve judicial legislation); and Steve H. Nickles, Problems of Sources of Law
Relationships Under the Uniform Commercial Code-Part I: The Methodological Problem and
the Civil Law Approach, 31 ARK. L. REV. 1 (1977) (investigating methods for resolving
borderline cases under codes).
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the legal rules to resolve known problems, but also for the broader,
foundational values that would guide the future development of the
law.
The paradigm established in CISG article 7 for the unification of
the law on an international level proceeds on the same fundamental201
course. Indeed, many civil codes contain an express requirement
that an interpreter resort to internal "general principles" for the reso-
lution of ambiguities in their express provisions.20 It should thus not
surprise that the analytical journey arrives at the same destination:
The paradigm of CISG article 7, in particular its second paragraph,
endorses a code-like interpretive methodology.
203
Part III will examine the implications of this implicit endorse-
ment of a civil code interpretive methodology. The practices estab-
lished under any one civil code will not, to be sure, control the inter-
pretation of an international convention, nor will even their collective
experiences necessarily be dispositive. Nonetheless, as we shall see
below, the dynamic jurisprudence that has animated much of modem
interpretation of the European civil codes will provide inspiration for
the parallel interpretive philosophy embraced in the new generation
of international commercial law conventions.
2 0 Even on an international level one can expect a process of gradual approxima-
tion of values among the different legal systems. Increased communication and cross-
fertilization of ideas will undoubtedly spawn increased similarity in the principles rele-
vant to a particular field of law. Like the 19th-century codifiers, however, those who
will benefit from uniformity in international transactions cannot await the results of
this gradual equalization process.
See Bonell, supra note 160, at 76 ("Referring to general principles of law as a
means for gap-filling is a well-known technique in civil law systems."); see also, e.g.,
ABGB art. 7 (Aus.) ("Where a case cannot be decided either according to the literal
text or the plain meaning of a statute, regard shall be had to the statutory provisions
concerning similar cases and to the principles that underlie other laws governing simi-
lar matters."); C.C. art. 12 (Italy) ("If a controversy cannot be decided by a precise pro-
vision [i.e., a law precisely in point], consideration is given to provisions that regulate
similar cases or analogous matters; if the case still remains in doubt, it will be decided
according to the general principles of the legal order of the state."); C.C. art. 1(1)
(Spain) ("The sources of the Spanish legal order are legislation, custom and the gen-
eral principles of law."); id. art. 4(1) ("Norms [in the code] may be applied by analogy
when they do not regulate a specific situation but do regulate a similar one, and there
is an identity of reason between the two.").
20s SeeHONNOLD, supra note 23, at 149 ("[Article 7(2)] reflects the approach estab-
lished for civil law codes."); Bonell, supra note 160, at 78 ("Article 7(2) ... is clearly
modelled on similar provisions in the Codes of the civil law systems.").
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III. THE MANDATE FOR A DYNAMICJURISPRUDENCE IN AN AGE OF
TRANSNATIONAL STATUTES
Courts in the United States do not have extensive experience with
the interpretation of true codes. 4 While the term abounds in our le-
gal lexicon,0 5 legislative enactments in this country2°6 have tradition-
ally not aspired to the preemptive, comprehensive, and systematic na-
ture of the civil codes common in Europe and South America.07
Instead, even comprehensive enactments styled as "codes" typically
have adhered to a less ambitious "perpetual index" model, which or-
ganizes and adjusts the preexisting legal order, typically state com-
208mon law, but nonetheless remains under its influence.
M Dean Roscoe Pound observed this problem in the early stages of the drafting of
the Uniform Commercial Code. See Roscoe Pound, Sources and Forms of Law, 22 NOTRE
DAME LAw. 1, 76 (1946) ("The most serious objection to a code in a common law ju-
risdiction is that we have no well developed common law technique of developing leg-
islative texts. Our technique of statutory interpretation is not adequate to the applica-
tion of a code.").
205 Consider, for example, the "Model Penal Code," the "Bankruptcy Code," and
the "Uniform Probate Code." For an analysis of the "code-like" nature of the Uniform
Commercial Code, see infra Part III.B.2.
The one qualified exception to this rule may be the civil code of Louisiana. For
an explanation of this codification effort, seeJulio C. Cueto-Rua, The Civil Code of Lou-
isiana IsAlive and We4 64TUL. L. REV. 147, 152 (1989), andJames L. Dennis, Interpreta-
tion and Application of the Civil Code and the Evaluation ofJudicial Preceden 54LA. L. REV.
1, 16 (1993).
20 As early as 1811, in a letter to President James Madison, the famous English
scholarJeremy Bentham offered to draft a comprehensive code for the United States.
See Letter fromJeremy Bentham to James Madison (Oct. 1811), in PAPERS RELATIVE TO
CODIFICATION AND PUBLIC INSTRUCTION 1, 30-33 (London, Jeremy Bentham 1817). A
later codification movement in the latter half of the 19th century (propelled princi-
pally by New Yorkjurist David Dudley Field) failed to find broad acceptance. For an
introduction to the contentious debates over the codification issue at the time, com-
pare 3 DAVID DUDLEY FIELD, Codification, in SPEECHES, ARGUMENTS AND MISCEL-
LANEOUS PAPERS OF DAVID DUDLEYFIELD 258 (Titus Munson Coan ed., 1890), with the
opposing arguments ofJames Carter (then President of the American Bar Association)
in James Carter, The Proposed Codification of Our Common Law, EVENING POST 1-91
(1884), reprinted in THE LIFE OF THE LAW 115 (John Honnold ed., 1964). The move-
ment took hold only in a few states. See Edgar Bodenheimer, Is Codfication an Out-
moded Form of Legislation 2, 30 AM. J. COMP. L. 15, 16 (Supp. 1982) (discussing the codi-
fication movements in California, Montana, Georgia, Idaho, New York, and the Dakota
Territory). Even these "codes" have not sought to foreclose the development of the
law on the basis of the preexisting common law. See, e.g., CAL CIV. CODE § 5 (West
1982) ("The provisions of this Code, so far as they are substantially the same as exist-
ing statutes or the common law, must be construed as continuations thereof, and not
as new enactments.").
For a comprehensive analysis of the impact of codification efforts in the United
States, see Mark D. Rosen, Wat Has Happened to the Common Law?-Recent American
Codifications, and Their Impact on Judicial Practice and the Law's Subsequent Development,
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Most federal legislative enactments do not employ the "code" la-
bel, and it is likely that Congress pays little heed to the nominal dis-
tinction. But it is precisely because of their diversity in substance that
doubt arises about the nature and scope of any particular congres-
sional enactment. The problem inherent in developing a model of
interpretation, in other words, is that not all legislative enactments
are the same. Some are more complex than others. Some reflect a
comprehensive solution to the whole complex of social ills within a
field of human activity. Others pursue less ambitious goals.
The resultant ambiguity has served as the principal fuel for the
controversy between textualists and dynamicists over the role of the
judiciary in the interpretation of statutes. At the risk of oversimplifi-
cation, this controversy can be distilled into two main dimensions,
which for ease of reference might be termed "procedural" and
"substantive." The procedural dimension relates to the appropriate
techniques (or "evidence") an adjudicator may use in interpretive in-
quiries. The substantive dimension, on the other hand, addresses
how courts should proceed where this "procedural" interpretation re-
veals that the legislative standards do not provide definitive guidance
on the particular question presented.2°
This Part will argue that the code-like methodology embraced in
the paradigm of CISG article 7 for international conventions rejects
the restrictive textualist approach on both levels. Part III.A will first
demonstrate that CISG article 7 endorses an expansive view of the
permissible repertoire of interpretive techniques. The impact of code
methodology, as Part III.B explains, will be most profound in the sub-
stantive dimension of interpretation-the role of adjudicators in fill-
ing normative gaps. I argue there that the internal development ap-
proach of CISG article 7(2) amounts to a delegation of lawmaking
authority to the judiciary when confronted with such gaps in a con-
vention's regulatory scheme. Part III.C-D will then explore the full
implications of this delegation for the development of the law within
the scope of an international commercial law convention.
1994 WIS. L. REv. 1119, 1199-252 (reviewing primarily the Federal Rules of Evidence,
the Uniform Commercial Code, and the Model Penal Code).
In the actual process of interpretation, the line between these two dimensions
may be blurred substantially. In particular, an interpreter who turns to notions of leg-
islative intent and purpose may find it difficult to determine where the interpretation
of individual provisions leaves off and gap-filling begins.
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A. Rejection of Textualism (I): Expansion of the Repertoire of
Interpretive Techniques
1. The Search for the Elusive "Plain Meaning"
"Throughout the work on uniform laws realists have told us: Even
if you get uniform laws you won't get uniform results."210 With these
brief words, Professor John Honnold captured the fundamental chal-
lenge facing the transnational unification of the law. Whatever rules
are chosen, uniform words risk remaining empty shells without a uni-
form methodology for their interpretation. The first element of the
interpretive paradigm of CISG article 7 is directed to this challenge:
Recall that the required regard for a convention's "international
character" precludes resort to purely domestic techniques of statutory
211interpretation. Properly appreciated, then, the interpretive para-
digm of CISG article 7 requires the creation of a form of an interna-
tional common law of "convention interpretation."
Unfortunately, the three elements of our paradigm largely define
only the goals, and not the specific standards, to be applied in inter-
pretive inquiries. Nonetheless, CISG article 7 did not arise in a vac-
212uum, nor does it mandate some magical new formula. Indeed, we
have already seen that this paradigm was born under the influence of
civil code methodology.21s Moreover, substantial agreement already
exists among domestic systems on the core elements of an interpre-
214tive process. Admittedly, this domestic harmony may not be dis-
positive on an international level. It nonetheless confirms the intui-
210 Honnold, supra note 62, at 207.
211 See supra notes 179-82 and accompanying text.
212 For general reviews of the interpretive approach of the U.N. Sales Convention,
see Ferrari, supra note 180; Phanesh Koneru, The International Interpretation of the UN
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods: An Approach Based on General
Principles, 6 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 105 (1997); Mark N. Rosenberg, The Vienna Con-
vention: Unifomity in Interpretationfor Gap-filling-An Analysis and Application, 20 AUSTL.
Bus. L. REV. 442 (1992); and V. Susanne Cook, Note, The Needfor Uniform Interpretation
of the 1980 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 50 U.
PrrT. L. REv. 197 (1988).
213 See supra notes 188-203 and accompanying text.
21' A recent comprehensive study of statutory interpretation in nine separate coun-
tries reveals a noteworthy degree of uniformity in the accepted interpretive tech-
niques. See INTERPRETING STATUTES, supra note 114; see also Farber, supra note 100, at
516 (concluding in a review of Interpreting Statutes that the "common core" of interpre-
tive techniques in these countries "is an indication ... that there really is some similar
activity called statutory interpretation that is taking place in all of these systems").
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tion that certain justificatory arguments are inherent in any rational
attempt to determine the meaning of legal texts.
For instance, even in the transnational context there can be little
disagreement on where the interpretive process should begin. Not
surprisingly, recent comparative reviews across a number of jurisdic-
tions have revealed that the ordinary meaning of statutory language is
215the prime source of interpretive argumentation. Even the most de-
vout adherents to dynamic interpretation in this country acknowledge
the primary authoritative force of statutory text.2 6  Textualists, of
217course, would quickly join in the chorus.
There is also little potential for disagreement over the role of
context. Comparative studies have revealed a near-universal accep-
tance of linguistic and systemic context as a means to ascertain a
technical or specialized meaning of an ambiguous statutory provi-
sion.2s No objection on this score is likely from new textualists either.
Justice Scalia himself would apparently consider "structural argu-
ments" such as how an ambiguous statutory term "is used elsewhere in
the same statute, or... in other statutes," and how "the possible
meanings fit in the statute as a whole."
219
215 See D. Neil MacCormick & Robert S. Summers, Interpretation and Justification, in
INTERPRETING STATUTES, supra note 114, at 511, 533 (surveying nine countries and
concluding that in all of the legal systems under study "the linguistic aspect of inter-
pretative justification has greatest prominence in the sense of nearly always coming
first in order of consideration").
216 See Eskridge, supra note 105, at 1483-84 ("When the statutory text clearly an-
swers the interpretive question... it normally will be the most important considera-
tion."); Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 4, at 354-56 (noting that "textual arguments
carry the greatest argumentative weight").
217 See supra Part I.B.3.a.
218 See MacCormick & Summers, supra note 215, at 513 (observing acceptance in all
nine countries surveyed of arguments from "contextual-harmonization"); Honnold,
supra note 79, at 131-34 (explaining that many countries look to the legislative history
to determine the purpose and object underlying a statute). This seemingly universal
consensus on the value of context is hardly surprising. Just as words in general take on
meaning only in context, so do legal expressions in the environment of their use.
Standard rules of grammar, logic, and consistency thus have force in legal interpreta-
tion as well. In the absence of limiting language, for instance, a term used in two
separate provisions is likely to have the same meaning in both.
219 See Eskridge, supra note 85, at 661 (discussing Justice Scalia's opinions in Pierce
v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 564-68 (1988), Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 770
(1988), and United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 449-51 (1988)); see also O'Connor v.
United States, 479 U.S. 27, 31 (1986) (Scalia, J.) (relying on the "overwhelmingly con-
vincing... contextual case" for resolving a textual ambiguity in an international
treaty). Justice Scalia also has indicated a willingness to consider the interaction of
different statutory schemes in resolving statutory ambiguities. See Eskridge, supra note
1998]
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Even on this basic textual level, however, one confronts the neces-
sity for a more active interpretive process in an international context.
This necessity emerges for two principal reasons. First, international
conventions appear in not only one, but typically several, authoritative
languages.20 In what might seem an oxymoron, therefore, there are
several potential "plain meanings." Reference to these other lan-
guages may thus reveal an ambiguity otherwise hidden behind an ap-
parent "plain meaning" in any single text. The ambiguity in the Eng-
lish language text of the "good faith" provision in the U.N. Sales
Convention offers a prime example of this.2'
The role of a convention's broader "general principles" presents a
second argument for a more active interpretive process even for ap-
parently clear text. CISG article 7(2) requires reference to such prin-
ciples for all "questions" not "expressly settled" in a convention's pro-
visions.2 The reasoned view of this directive holds that resort to such
principles can uncover an ambiguity or gap even where an express
provision appears to cover the matter in dispute.2 The scope of the
(apparently unqualified) provisions of the U.N. Sales Convention
governing contract formation and notice requirements, for instance,
will be limited by an application of the Convention's foundation
"general principles.", 4
The message here is that even with this most basic of interpretive
tools, interpreters must hold themselves out to a more active search
for meaning. Beyond even the doubts about a "plain meaning" of
words in any one language alone, therefore, the international dimen-
sion of a private law convention mandates a healthy skepticism about
85, at 662; see also supra note 155 and accompanying text (discussing Scalia's interpre-
tive arguments).
22 Conventions developed under the auspices of UNC1TRAL have fully six official
language texts: English, French, Spanish, Chinese, Russian, and Arabic. SeeJay Law-
rence Westbrook, Creating International Insolvency Law, 70 AM. BANKR. L.J. 563, 570
(1996) (noting the use of six official languages); Courtney Parrish Smart, Comment,
Formation of Contracts in Louisiana Under the United Nations Convention for the International
Sale of Goods, 53 LA. L. REV. 1339, 1343 (1993) (same). For a more detailed analysis of
the interpretive difficulties posed by multilingual treaties, see Dinah Shelton, Recon-
ciliable Differences? The Interpretation of Multilingual Treaties, 20 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP.
L. REV. 611 (1997).
22, See infra notes 393-95 and accompanying text (discussing the good faith provi-
sion).
CISG, supra note 7, art. 7(2).
See infra Part III.C.1 (examining these functions of general principles in detail).
24 See infra notes 345-53, 356-61 and accompanying text.
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the textualists' celebration of the value of objectively determinable
meaning.
2. The Important Role of Drafting History
One of the most controversial issues in the debate over statutory
interpretation in recent years has been the role of legislative history.
Proponents of this source for interpretation argue that the drafting
records of a statute may reveal an underlying legislative intent (so-
called historical justifications)2 or legislative purpose (teleological
justifications) . These sources can then illuminate the meaning of,
or give positive life to, the text of a statute. New textualists attack the
very foundation of these arguments. Recall that adherents to new
textualism argue that notions of legislative intent and purpose are in-
coherent, unhelpful, or downright misleading, and that the use of
legislative history raises constitutional concerns in any evenL2
7
This dispute over the role of drafting records (travaux pripara-
toires) has also played itself out in the practice of the Supreme Court
in the construction of treaties. At times, the Court has relied ex-
pressly on such records on difficult issues of treaty interpretation.ns
Unfortunately, it is difficult to discern any coherence in the Court's
approach on this score.2 Indeed, in Chan, for example, the Court, in
an overtly textualist manner, concluded that it was inappropriate to
resort to treaty drafting records where "the text is clear."23
For an analysis of "intentionalism" as a unified theory of statutory interpreta-
tion, see supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text.
M For an analysis of "purposivism" as a unified theory of statutory interpretation,
see supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text.
2 See supra notes 124-33 and accompanying text.
See Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., 516 U.S. 217, 224-27 (1996) (stating that
resort to the travaux prparatoires is appropriate in treaty interpretation); Eastern Air-
lines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 535 (1991) (same); United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S.
353, 366-68 (1989) (same); Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S.
694, 700-02 (1987) (stating that it is appropriate to consider the drafting history of a
convention); Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 400 (1985) (same).
See Bederman, supra note 69, at 996 (concluding that "[r]eferences to travaux
priparatoires in the Rehnquist Court cases do not appear to follow any predictable pat-
tern").
Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd., 490 U.S. 122, 134 (1989). In an accompanying
footnote, the Chan majority also castigated the concurrence for "performing the ex-
amination [of the drafting history] that we consider inappropriate." Id. at 134 n.5.
For a more detailed analysis of the use of travauxpriparatoires by the Rehnquist Court,
see Bederman, supra note 69, at 992-96.
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The interpretive provisions of the Vienna Convention on Treaties
likewise embrace a distinctly textualist approach.23 Under those
standards, resort to such extrinsic interpretive evidence "is meant to
be only an exceptional occurrence. " n
The arguments advanced by textualists against the use of drafting
records hold little force in the active interpretive process contem-
plated by CISG article 7. At least four separate reasons support this
conclusion. The first emerges from the very purpose of the enter-
prise: achievement of international uniformity. On a domestic level,
and in particular in civil law countries, recourse to drafting records in
resolving statutory ambiguities is a well-accepted practice.m It is not
surprising, then, that civil law scholars,2 as well as courts and arbitral
2"1 See Vienna Convention on Treaties, supra note 70, art. 32 (permitting resort to
drafting records only if the text "[l]eaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure;
or... [l]eads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable").
2 Bederman, supra note 69, at 973; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS, § 325 cmt. e, supra note 13 ("Article 32 of the Vienna Convention [on
Treaties] reflects reluctance to permit the use of materials constituting the develop-
ment and negotiation of an agreement (travaux pr paratoires) as a guide to the inter-
pretation of the agreement."); Bederman, supra note 69, at 973-75 (discussing the
"higher threshold of ambiguity" necessary for resort to drafting records under the Vi-
enna Convention on Treaties); Frankowska, supra note 71, at 331 (observing as to the
interpretive provisions of the Vienna Convention on Treaties that "[ n ] o one seems to
question that the provisions favor the textual approach"). This textualist bias was
adopted over the strenuous objections of supporters of the flexible "New Haven
School" of treaty interpretation (most notably, Professors Myres McDougal and Harold
Lasswell). For an elaboration on this approach, see MYRES S. MCDOUGAL ET AL., THE
INTERPRETATION OF AGREEMENTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER passim, 40-41 (1967)
(advocating a "policy oriented and configurative approach" in which interpretive deci-
sions are affected not only by the "genuine shared expectations of the parties," but
also by "deliberate efforts to further the realization of the basic pattern of value distri-
bution and the fundamental institutions that are compatible with the preferred system
of public order"). See also Richard A. Falk, On Treaty Interpretation and the New Haven
Approach: Achievements and Prospects, 8VA.J. INT'LL. 323, 330-54 (1968) (analyzing the
"New Haven Approach" to treaty interpretation).
23 SeeFerrari, supra note 180, at 207 ("In civil law countries the possibility of resolv-
ing an interpretive problem by making reference to the legislative history has never
been doubted .... "); Honnold, supra note 79, at 133 (noting the use of travaux
priparatoires in civil law countries); see also Robert S. Summers & Michele Taruffo, Inter-
pretation and Comparative Analysis, in INTERPRETING STATUTES, supra note 114, at 461,
476-78 (observing widespread acceptance in nine countries of the use of legislative
history). Since this report, even the United Kingdom has joined the consensus in fa-
vor of the use of drafting history. See Pepper v. Hart, 3 W.L.R. 1032 (H.L. 1992)
(relaxing the rule that excluded reference to parliamentary material as an aid to statu-
tory construction).
See Bonell, supra note 160, at 90 ("Possible doubts about the precise meaning
and effect of a single provision may well be resolved by reference to the travaux
priparatoires.. . ."); Ferrari, supra note 180, at 206-10 (arguing that the travaux prpara-
[Vol. 146: 687
DYNAMIC TREATYINTERPRETATION
tribunals,3 5 quickly embraced the same standard for the U.N. Sales
Convention. In its practical effect, therefore, the mandated defer-
ence to the needs of international uniformity amounts to a direction
to courts in the United States to be open to a similar interpretive ap-
proach.
The adoption process of an international private law convention
likewise dilutes constitutional concerns about the use of drafting his-
tory.2"; Like all formal international treaties, such conventions are
negotiated by representatives of the Executive Branch.237 Concerns
about unconstitutional "self-delegation" by Congress thus simply do
not arise.2 Moreover, the official drafting records of the conventions
become publicly available long before the Senate is able to take up
the issue of ratification.r 9 This fact, together with the express direc-
toires is an appropriate source for interpreting the U.N. Sales Convention); Herber,
supra note 72, at 91-92 (same). Some U.S.-American scholars have come to the same
conclusion. See HONNOLD, supra note 23, at 136-42 (noting the relevance of legislative
history to interpretation of the 1980 U.N. Sales Convention); Hartnell,upra note 72,
at 22-25 (discussing the use of travauxpr paratoires in treaty interpretation).
See, e.g., Oberlandesgericht [OLG] [Court of Appeals] Frankfurt am Main, Case
No. 13 U 51/93 (F.R.G.), reprinted in 2 UNILEX, Int'l Caselaw & Bibliography on UN
Convention on Cont. for the Int'l Sale of Goods (Transnational Publishers, Inc.)
(Michael Joachim Bonell ed., 1996), E.1994-10, at 317 (Apr. 20, 1994) [hereinafter
UNILEX].
The argument of textualists here would presumably be the "presentment" ar-
gument in reverse. See supra notes 132-33 and accompanying text. Instead of doubt
about whether the President "signed" the legislative history along with the statute, the
concern would be whether the Senate gave its "advice and consent" to the drafting re-
cords when it ratified a private international law convention. See U.S. CONST. art. II,
§ 2, cl. 2.
2"The specific delegates are attorneys with the Office of Legal Advisor of the U.S.
Department of State and their appointees. For a comprehensive analysis of the work
of this Office in the area of private international law, see Pfund, supra note 44, at 51-
75.
See Manning, supra note 133, at 706-31 (arguing that the use of legislative his-
tory sanctions a "self-delegation" of lawmaking authority by Congress in violation of
notions of separation of powers and the requirements of bicameralism and present-
ment).
2 In the course of the drafting efforts, UNCrTRAL prepares and publishes--in
the form of annual yearbooks-extensive materials documenting the drafting history
of the conventions prepared under its auspices. The records of the ratification of the
U.N. Sales Convention, for instance, reveal that the Senate was well aware of the po-
tential use of such drafting records in interpretive inquiries. See Message from the
President of the United States to the Senate Transmitting the United Nations Conven-
tion on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Sept. 21, 1983, S. TREATY DOC.
No. 98-9 (1983) (noting in recommending that the Senate give its advice and consent
to the U.N. Sales Convention that "[t]he legislative history of the Convention is readily
available in English").
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tion given by the conventions themselves to courts to defer to the in-
terests of uniformity, disperses substantially the constitutional anxie-
ties about the imprimatur of the Senate on the use of drafting history.. . .. 240
in interpretive inquiries.
The utilitarian arguments of textualists against the use of drafting
records are likewise unconvincing in this context. Recall that some
proponents have argued that textualism enhances democracy by dis-
ciplining Congress to draft more carefully and to be more diligent in
amending outdated legislation.24 This argument simply holds no wa-
ter for international conventions. First, the heterogeneity of the par-
ticipants in the drafting of such conventions makes increased inde-
242terminacy unavoidable. More important, after broad international
acceptance, corrective amendment to a convention is effectively
impossible,24s and unilateral amendatory action is also fore-
240 There is a substantial dispute about whether the "legislative history" of the rati-
fication process by the Senate itself is relevant in interpretive inquiries. See Bederman,
supra note 69, at 997-1002 (noting the debate among Supreme CourtJustices on the
weight of legislative history in treaty interpretation); Wolf, supra note 69, at 1034
(arguing that the intent of the Senate upon the ratification of a treaty "normally
should not be substituted for [the] negotiators' purpose"); see also United States v.
Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 373 (1989) (ScaliaJ., concurring) (stating that the majority's use
of Senate ratification records in interpreting a treaty was "unprecedented"); RE-
STATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 314 & cmts. b, d, supra note 13 (stating
that the Senate's statement of understanding of a treaty upon ratification is binding
on courts); Detlev F. Vagts, Senate Materials and Treaty Interpretation: Some Research Hints
for the Supreme Court, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 546, 546-50 (1989) (disagreeing with Justice
Scalia's statement in Stuart). Whatever their force in the public international law con-
text, the use of Senate ratification records is particularly problematic for the interpre-
tation of the private law conventions under consideration here. These conventions
preclude reservations by a contracting state other than those expressly permitted. See,
e.g., CISG, supra note 7, art. 98 ("No reservations are permitted except those expressly
authorized in this Convention."); Convention on Financial Leasing, supra note 37, art.
22 (same); Convention on Factoring, supra note 38, art. 20 (same).
241 See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
242 See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
243 SeeJ.S. Hobhouse, Note, International Conventions and Commercial Law: The Pur-
suit of Uniformity, 106 LAW Q. REV. 530, 534 (1990) ("[International] conventions also
suffer in an aggravated form from one of the main problems of all codes-how to
amend and update them. This is difficult enough to achieve with municipal legisla-
tion; in the international field the problems are formidable and most unlikely to be
satisfactorily overcome."). Indeed, the extant conventions do not even define a
mechanism for their formal amendment. With regard to the U.N. Sales Convention,
see Arthur Rosett, Critical Reflections on the United Nations Conventions on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 265, 294-96 (1984) (noting Congress's in-
ability to change any provision of the Convention), and Peter Winship, The Scope of the
Vienna Convention on International Sales Contracts, in INTERNATIONAL SALES: THE
UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF
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closed.2" Precluding resort to drafting history notwithstanding ineq-
uitable or unjust results is thus unlikely in the extreme to achieve the
utilitarian goals advanced by textualists.
A final argument for the use of drafting records flows from the
consequences of the previous one. In light of the increased indeter-
minacy of international legal standards, as well as the improbability of
a legislative rescue in the form of corrective amendment, drafting re-
cords simply are more important to an effective interpretation and
245application of international conventions. In addition, more than is
the case with domestic legislation, international unification efforts are
characterized by a variety of necessary, if sometimes illusory, com-
246promises. The written product thus reflects, at best, an odd amal-
gam of legal philosophies and systems.
An active resort to drafting records increases the font of available
interpretive material on these foreign concepts, as well as on the
247meaning of the related compromises among the drafters. In this
way, paradoxically, an active interpretive process promotes uniform-
ity. It does so by diminishing the risk that domestic interpreters will
GOODS 1-1, 1-49 (Nina M. Galston & Hans Smit eds., 1984) [hereinafter INTERNA-
TIONAL SALES] (noting this deficiency in the U.N. Sales Convention).
244 See, e.g., CISG, supra note 7, art. 98 (precluding reservations by ratifying states);
Convention on Financial Leasing, supra note 37, art. 22 (same); Convention on Factor-
ing, supra note 38, art. 20 (same). The U.N. Sales Convention and its progeny also do
not provide for a body, similar to the Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform
Commercial Code in the United States, that is charged with responsibility to review
international conventions for necessary correction or clarification.
24 See JOHN 0. HONNOLD, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY FOR THE UNIFORM LAW ON
SALES at vii (1988) ("A 'plain meaning' theory that rejects legislative history (whatever
its justification when judges and parliamentary drafters share the same legal and lin-
guistic conventions) becomes absurd in handling legislation prepared by an interna-
tional multi-cultural body and finalized in six authentic languages.").
246 For a discussion of the number and degree of necessary compromises in the
drafting of the U.N. Sales Convention, see E6rsi, supra note 61, at 346, 353-56, and
Garro, supra note 61, at 468-80. See also Gabrielle S. Brussel, Comment, The 1980 United
Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods: A Legislative Study of the
North-South Debates, 6 N.Y. INT'LL. REV. 53 (1993).
247 In this respect, the travaux priparatoires fulfill (albeit imperfectly) the function
of the official comments appended to the provisions of the Uniform Commercial
Code. See Robert H. Skilton, Some Comments on the Comments to the Uniform Commercial
Code, 1966 WIs. L. REV. 597 (analyzing the role of the official comments to the U.C.C.).
For a discussion of similarities between uniform international law and the Uniform
Commercial Code in this regard, see infra Part III.B.2.
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fail to appreciate ambiguities or even affirmatively misunderstand the
international nature of the conventions.248
Drafting records, of course, are not dispositive in interpretive in-
quiries. The realist skepticism about collective intent4 retains valid-
ity in the international context as well. Even when interpreting the
drafting records of an international commercial law convention,
therefore, adjudicators should proceed with caution in weighing the
value of a statement by any particular delegate reproduced there.
M
The proper role of the drafting records is, rather, as one considera-
tion in a broader weighing of all relevant evidence, as interpretive ad-
jectives in a field of substantive nouns.25 Within their limited field of
operation, however, the records can be a valuable source for uncover-
ing the motivations behind a solution to a particular normative prob-
lem; and in some cases a clear intent or purpose can even give sub-
stance to the determinative "general principles" under the inter
pretive paradigm of CISG article 7.2 .
In short, there are compelling grounds to support the growing
consensus on the use of travaux priparatoires in the interpretation of
international private law conventions. The arguments of new textual-
ists against this source of interpretive material in domestic statutory
interpretation provide no convincing reason to deviate from this
253course.
2's As ProfessorJohn Honnold has aptly described it, the use of the travauxpripara-
toires thus serves as an "antidote" to a bias toward divergent domestic interpretations of
uniform international law. Honnold, supra note 62, at 208-09.
219 See supra notes 125-27 and accompanying text.
50 For critical views on this subject, see Arthur Rosett, The International Sales Con-
vention: A Dissenting View, 18 INT'L LAW. 445, 446-47 (1985) (criticizing the U.N. Sales
Convention for the frequency of ambiguous compromises in its drafting), and Note,
Unification and Certainty: The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International
Sale of Goods, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1984, 1986-95 (1984) (suggesting that the consensus
reflected in the drafting of certain provisions of CISG "may be misleading"). See also
Ferrari, supra note 180, at 206-07 (arguing that "recourse to [the travaux prsparatoires]
must not be overestimated in interpreting the Vienna Sales Convention (or any other
convention)").
2" The order of discussion of interpretive techniques in the text-text, context,
drafting history-thus also suggests a relative hierarchy. A clear meaning in linguistic
context may be more persuasive than a legislative intent that can be constructed only
from drafting reports. The process suggested here, in other words, is an active and
flexible one in which the interpreter weighs an interpretive technique's relative clarity
against the others' persuasiveness. For a more detailed analysis of this hierarchy in the
context of a dynamic interpretation, see infra notes 397-400 and accompanying text.
252 For an analysis of the implications of this contention, see infra Part III.C.1.
2s Similarly, no compelling ground necessitates adopting the more restrictive ap-
proach of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties in this regard. SeeBederman,
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3. Expansion of the Interpretive Process
Often, interpretation of the express provisions of a convention
will fail to supply the answer for the specific issue in need of judicial
resolution.2 However liberal an interpreter is in her search for rele-
vant evidence (even after employing historical and teleological justifi-
catory methods), the process will frequently reveal that the drafters
were unable to agree on the appropriate resolution of the issue, or
that the issue escaped their attention entirely.2
5
Here we depart the realm of interpretation in the narrow sense of
meaning and enter under the influence of the broader philosophy
for the development of the law. Here, too, the internal "general
principles" methodology assumes its full significance.
On a small scale, the process of identifying principles of a more
general character implies resolution of unsettled questions by use of
analogies.25 This interpretive method involves discerning the values
reflected in the resolution of one normative problem and applying
those values to a separate, but analogous, situation. A provision re-
quiring payment of the purchase price at the seller's place of busi-
ness, for example, can be applied analogically to the place for the
payment of damages for breach of contract.27 This method may be of
limited value, however, for the result is only a specific solution to a
supra note 69, at 972-75, 1024-26 (discussing the higher threshold of ambiguity neces-
sary for a resort to drafting records under the interpretive standards of that Conven-
tion, but ultimately supporting-incorrectly in my view-the adoption of the Vienna
Convention approach, apparently without regard to the substantive nature of the
treaty at issue); Frankowska, supra note 71, at 326-52 (discussing the impact of the in-
terpretive provisions of the Vienna Convention on decisions by courts in the United
States). Even apart from its limitation to the public international law obligations of
the United States, see supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text, this restrictive ap-
proach is inappropriate for conventions that regulate purely commercial law relations.
See also Honnold, supra note 79, at 139 (arguing that "public law conventions restrict-
ing the sovereign power of States call for stricter construction than conventions articu-
lating the obligations of parties to a commercial contract").
25 The potency of the various interpretive techniques is inversely proportional to
the likelihood that the participants in a corresponding controversy will resort tojudi-
cial assistance. That is, as the clarity of a particular statutory provision increases, the
need forjudicial interpretation in an actual controversy will decrease.
25 See supra notes 57-62 and accompanying text.
2 See Bonell, supra note 160, at 78 ("In the case of a gap in the [U.N. Sales] Con-
vention the first attempt to be made is to settle the unsolved question by means of an
analogical application of specific provisions."); Ferrari, supra note 180, at 221-22
(stating that interpreters should first seek to resolve gaps by the use of analogies).
2 See OLG Dfisseldorf, Case No. 17 U 73/93, reprinted in 2 UNILEX, supra note
235, E.1993-21, at 261-62 (July 2, 1993) (concluding as a result that the court had ju-
risdiction to hear the claim under German law).
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specific problem. Although important in its limited sphere, an anal-
ogy provides no broader basis for developing substantive standards to
accommodate new social and technological trends.m
The more significant implication of the active interpretive process
mandated by CISG article 7 is that it sanctions judicial recognition of
entirely new substantive principles of general application. In rare
cases, such principles may emerge from the distillation of a single
provision. That is, a specific provision may reflect a value of such a
force and breadth as to permit recognition of a "general principle" on
that basis alone. Let us refer to these as "deductive general princi-
ples."
Consider, for example, the principle of "party autonomy" defined
by CISG article 6.s9 That provision broadly elevates the agreement of
the parties over even the express provisions of the Convention itself.
26
0
The potency of this provision alone gives rise to a "deductive general
principle" of party autonomy that may be applied to formulate sub-
stantive solutions to questions left unresolved elsewhere in the Con-
261vention. Other examples of such deductive general principles un-
der the U.N. Sales Convention might include the required
262consideration of international trade usages, the absence of form re-
quirements, 263 and (more controversially) the principle of "good
faith."
264
Even this country's Uniform Commercial Code appears to support this limited
form of resolving substantive statutory gaps. See U.C.C. § 1-102 official cmt. 1 (1972);
see also infra Part III.B.2 (comparing the interpretive methodology under the U.C.C.
with that under CISG article 7).
29 See CISG, supra note 7, art. 6 ("The parties may exclude the application of this
Convention or... derogate from or vary the effect of any of its provisions.").
2W For a detailed examination of the drafting history and significance of the prin-
ciple of party autonomy under the U.N. Sales Convention, see Michael P. Van Alstine,
Consensus, Dissensus and Contractual Obligation Through the Prism of Uniform International
Sales Law, 37 VA.J. INT'LL. 1, 36-42 (1996).
261 Part III.C.l.b infra examines the role of the general principle of party autonomy
for one such unresolved question under the U.N. Sales Convention, contract forma-
tion in the case of conflicting standard forms. See infra notes 344-51 and accompany-
ing text.
212 See CISG, supra note 7, art. 9 (stating that parties' agreements are subject to in-
ternational trade usages, unless otherwise agreed); see also Ferrari, supra note 180, at
224 (noting the principle set out in article 9).
See CISG, supra note 7, art. 11 (stating that no form requirements govern the
formation of international sale of goods contracts); id. art. 29(1) (stating that no form
is required to modify or terminate such a contract); see also Bonell, supra note 160, at
80 (noting the lack of formal requirements); Ferrari, supra note 180, at 224 (same).
2 See CISG, supra note 7, art. 7(1) (requiring that in the interpretation of the U.N.
Sales Convention, regard is to be had to good faith in international trade). Part
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Most often, the identification of the determinative general prin-
ciples will require a more searching analysis. On a structural level,
this analysis involves discerning the general from the shared values of
the specifics. As commonalities emerge, these shared values may then
be applied to solve unsettled matters falling within their logical range
of effect. What is at work here is a form of inductive reasoning. A
German legal scholar long ago described the foundation for this rea-
soning in this way:
A rule of law may be worked out either by developing the consequences
which it involves, or by developing the wider principles which it presup-
poses .... The more important of these two methods of procedure is the
second, i.e. the method by which, from given rules of law, we ascertain
the major premisses [sic] which they presuppose. For having ascer-
tained such major premisses [sic], we shall find that they involve, in
their logical consequences, a series of other legal rules not directly con-
tained in the sources from which we obtained our rule.r26
Implicit in the "general principles" approach is thus a require-
ment that an interpreter look beyond the face of the relevant conven-
tion's narrow constitutive provisions. Each such provision reflects a
value judgment, a resolution or balancing of the interests of the par-
ties in a particular way. Inductive reasoning requires an adjudicator
to probe these value judgments and seek out common threads of
principle. In doing so, broader policies and purposes may emerge.
These "inductive general principles" can then provide guidance on
the resolution of interpretive issues, and even in filling gaps within
the convention's regulatory scheme.
Take, for example, the concept of "reasonableness" under the
U.N. Sales Convention. The Convention nowhere imposes on the
parties a general requirement of reasonable action.2  In a number of
individual provisions, the Convention nonetheless variously measures
the parties' conduct from the perspective of a "reasonable person," 67
defines rights or obligations with reference to what is "reasonable" or
III.C.2 infra will examine the evolution of "good faith" into a general principle, even
though article 7(1) appears to limit its role to interpreting the convention alone.
RUDOLPH SOHM, THE INSTITUTES: A TEXTBOOK OF THE HISTORYAND SYTEM OF
ROMAN PRIVATE LAW 30 (photo. reprint 1994) (James Crawford Ledlie trans., 3d ed.
1907), quoted in Frier, supra note 200, at 2210.
This example of an inductive general principle is also discussed by Professor
Michael Bonell in Bonell, supra note 160, at 80-81 (interpreting the Convention as im-
posing a requirement that parties act reasonably).
2" CISG, supra note 7, arts. 8(2), 8(3), 25.
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"unreasonable,"2s and requires certain actions or notices within a
"reasonable" time.26 Although the Convention imposes no such ex-
press requirement, the frequency and breadth of this substantive
value of "reasonableness" permits the extraction of a principle of
broader application.2 The result is that an adjudicator may in an
appropriate case impose a more general obligation of reasonable
conduct on the parties to discipline an inequitable exercise of a right
or performance of an obligation.
Applying this form of reasoning, scholars and adjudicators have
suggested other examples of what are referred to here as "inductive
general principles" under the U.N. Sales Convention. These include
a duty to communicate relevant information,271 a principle of full
compensation in the event of breach,27 a form of traditional estop-
pel,2  and a duty to take reasonable measures to mitigate losses. 4
26 Id. arts. 34, 35(2) (b), 37, 48(1), 60(a), 75, 77, 79(1), 79(4), 85, 86(l), 86(2), 87,
88(2), 88(3).
269 Id. arts. 18(2), 33(c), 39(1), 43(1), 47(1), 49(2)(a), 49(2)(b), 63(1), 64(2)(b),
65(1), 72(2), 73(2), 88(1).
270 See, e.g., Bonell, supra note 160, at 80-81 (discussing a general principle of rea-
sonableness); Ferrari, supra note 180, at 225 (arguing that reasonableness is a general
principle of the Convention); Kastely, supra note 168, at 595-97 (arguing that reason-
ableness must be read into the Convention to protect the expectations of the parties,
an important goal of the Convention).
271 See HONNOLD, supra note 23, at 155 (noting the "general principle calling for
communication of information"); Herber, supra note 72, at 94 (same); Kastely, supra
note 168, at 595-97 (discussing the requirement of "honest communication between
the parties"); see also Filanto, S.p.A. v. Chilewich Int'l Corp., 789 F. Supp. 1229, 1240
(S.D.N.Y. 1992) (recognizing a duty of adequate communication under CISG).
See Arbitral Award of the Internationales Schiedsgericht der Bundeskammer
der gewerblichen Wirtschaft (No. SCH-4366), reprinted in 2 UNILEX, supra note 235,
E.1994-14, at 331, 333 (June 15, 1994) (referring to the values underlying CISG arti-
cles 74 and 78); Arbitral Award of the Internationales Schiedsgericht der Bun-
deskammer der gewerblichen Wirtschaft (No. SCH-4318) (same), reprinted in 2
UNILEX, supranote 235, E.1994-13, at 327, 330 (June 15, 1994).
27 This concept is commonly known in the civil law world under the Latin label
venire contrafactum proprium See HONNOLD, supra note 23, at 153-54 (noting the possi-
bility of a general principle of estoppel); Bonell, supra note 160, at 81 (referring to
CISG articles 16(2) (b) and 29(2)); Ferrari, supra note 180, at 225 (noting the similarity
to estoppel); Herber, supra note 72, at 84.
274 See HONNOLD, supra note 23, at 155 (referring to CISG articles 77, 85, and 86);
Bonell, supra note 160, at 81 (noting the general principle of mitigation). For a more
comprehensive identification of the general principles of the U.N. Sales Convention,
see Ferrari, supra note 180, at 225-26, and Ulrich Magnus, Die allgemeinen Grundsdtze im
UN-Kaufrecht, 59 RABELSZ 469 (1995).
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Use of this type of reasoning is a common feature of civil code in-
terpretive methodology. 5 Similar to these civil codes, CISG article 7
calls upon interpreters to conceive of an international convention as
reflective of an overall design. In contrast to the inevitable doubt on
this score regarding legislation in the United States, in other words,
interpreters are to begin with a presumption of consistency and co-
herence.276 As uncovered issues emerge, one must look through the
superstructure for the supporting principles below, and, failing these,
to the very values that animated the structure's original design.
Upon completion of this process, the interpreter can then apply these
underlying principles to correct unforeseen defects in the construc-
tion of a particular convention, and even to fashion additions to ac-
commodate the unexpected needs of its inhabitants.
One should note here, however, that it would be error to view the
paradigm of CISG article 7 as merely embracing a narrow strain of
formalism. As Part III.C will demonstrate in greater detail, develop-
ing a convention's general principles does not involve solely
"uncovering" any specific intent the drafters "embedded" in the con-
278vention. What is at work here, rather, is a holistic form of reasoning
in which text, context, and drafting history all provide the guideposts
for a casuistic development of the law by domestic courts on an inter-
national level.2
B. Rejection of Textualism (II): Delegation of Lawmaking Power
1. The Delegation of Authority to Participate in International
"Common Lawmaking"
The examination of the expansive interpretive techniques con-
templated by the paradigm of CISG article 7 leads the analysis directly
to the second, "substantive," dimension of the controversy between
2 See Frier, supra note 200, at 2210 (noting that codes lend themselves to the in-
ductive process); Summers & Taruffo, supra note 233, at 471 (summarizing the reports
of scholars from seven civil law countries); see also KARL LARENZ & CLAUS-WIHELM
CANARIS, METHODENLEHRE DER RECHTVISSENSCHAFT 366-75 (3d ed. 1995) (discussing
the inductive process in the interpretation of the German Civil Code in terms of a
"comprehensive analogy" ("Gesamtanalogie")).
26 See generally Sunstein, supra note 98, at 425-26 (criticizing structural approaches
to statutory interpretation because they are based on the questionable assumption
"that statutes are in fact internally consistent and coherent").
zn I discuss these functions of general principles infra Part III.C.1.
278 See infra notes 376-97 and accompanying text.
27 For a discussion of this process, see infra Part III.D.
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textualists and dynamicists. At issue in this dimension is the appro-
priate role of courts in supplementing and adapting a statute where
210interpretation in the narrow sense reveals a substantive gap.
Recall that textualists advocate a restrictive view on this score: Be-
cause federal courts have no independent lawmaking power, the tex-
tualist argument runs, a judge faced with a statutory gap lacks a con-
stitutional foundation on which to craft a substantive solution.28'
Instead, she has no choice but to apply the value system of the preex-
isting legal order (often state law) to fill the gap in the federal legisla-
tion.28"2 This view thus carries forward the traditional judicial hostility
to the preemptive scope of statutes, in particular where they encroach
283on an area of well-developed common law.
It is in this dimension that the endorsement of a code-like meth-
odology in CISG article 7 has its most potent impact. Arguments
based on internal general principles have been "developed to a high
art" in civil law countries as a foundation for developing statutory
law.84 Indeed, this remains perhaps the principal difference between
the civil law and common law approaches to statutory interpreta-
285tion. Consonant with the civil code methodology, the paradigm of
CISG article 7 instructs interpreters to seek the values for the devel-
opment of law on an international level, specifically in the "general
principles" on which the relevant convention is based. The paradigm
280 See supra notes 137-38 and accompanying text.
28' See supra notes 134-36 and accompanying text.
212 Grant Gilmore described this standard characteristic of a "statute" as follows:
[When a case arises [that] is not within the precise statutory language, which
reveals a gap in the statutory scheme or a situation not foreseen by the
draft[ers] (even though the situation is within the general area covered by the
statute), then the court should put the statute out of mind and reason its way
to decision according to the basic principles of the common law.
Gilmore, supra note 197, at 1043.
2" See supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
28' Summers & Taruffo, supra note 233, at 471 (summarizing the reports of schol-
ars from seven civil law countries).
2s5 See id. (observing, after a review of statutory interpretation in seven civil law and
two common law countries, that "systemic arguments based on general legal princi-
ples.., are deployed very extensively and, indeed, developed to a high art in all coun-
tries except for the UK and the USA," and noting the traditional tendency of courts in
the latter two countries to fall back on the preexisting common law to fill statutory
gaps); see also Eskridge, supra note 112, at 1011-12 (contrasting the traditional ap-
proach in this country with the civil law tradition of"draw[ing] principles and public
values from the statutes themselves"). For an analysis of the historical antecedents of
this divergence between civil and common law systems, see Hans W. Baade, The Casus
Omissus: A Pre-History of Statuto-y Analogy, 20 SYRACUSEJ. INT'LL. & COM. 45 (1994).
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thus directly rejects the new textualists' restrictive approach to the
role of courts in filling substantive statutory gaps.286
This express instruction to courts to develop the law addresses the
constitutional concerns of textualist and intentionalist commentators
alike. Recall that the principal-and highly controversial -argu-
ment of these commentators is that federal courts have no independ-
ent lawmaking authority.2ss The interpretive methodology of CISG
article 7 dilutes these arguments entirely. It does so by delegating
authority to federal courts to engage in what is, in effect, interna-




See Bonell, supra note 160, at 73 (arguing that CISG article 7 rejects the tradi-
tional narrow interpretive approach of common law courts); Ferrari, supra note 180, at
202 & n.103 (concurring with Bonell).
27The subject of the common law powers of federal courts has itself been one of
the most animated themes of modem legal scholarship. For an introduction to this
highly charged debate, see Bradford R. Clark, Federal Common Law: A Structural Reinter-
pretation, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1245, 1247 (1996) ("In this century... federal courts have
found it increasingly appropriate in many areas to disregard state law in favor of so-
called federal common law."); Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Com-
mon Law, 99 HARV. L. REV. 881, 883 (1986) ("When an issue of law is not governed by a
federal enactment-constitutional or statutory--there is always a potential question
whether the state law will govern or whether federal common law will be developed to
displace state law."); Paul Lund, The Decline of Federal Common Law, 76 B.U. L. REV. 895,
899 (1996) ("This Article addresses another way in which the Supreme Court has al-
tered dramatically the balance between state and federal power during the 1990s: by
restricting the federal common law making powers of the federal courts."); Merrill,
supra note 95, at 2 ("Writing about federal common law has slowed to a mere
trickle.... [T]here is a tendency to dismiss questions about the legitimacy of federal
common law as inconsequential." (footnote omitted)). For a comprehensive review of
the common law powers of federal courts in the international arena, with special ref-
erence to the enforcement of foreign judgments, see Ronald A. Brand, Enforcement of
Foreign Money-Judgments in the United States: In Search of Uniformity and InternationalAccep-
tance, 67 NOTRE DAMEL. REV. 253, 257 (1991).
See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text (arguments of intentionalists); su-
pra notes 136-38 and accompanying text (arguments of new textualists).
29 See Merrill, supra note 95, at 40-46 (describing congressional authorization to
courts to develop substantive law as "delegated lawmaking"); see also Sunstein, supra
note 98, at 421-22 (criticizing textualism for failing to accommodate such instances of
delegated lawmaking authority). The Supreme Court has itself often concluded that,
absent congressional authorization, the common law powers of federal courts are lim-
ited to the narrow cases in which there is a "significant conflict between some federal
policy or interest and the use of state law." O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79,
87 (1994); see alsoAtherton v. FDIC, 117 S. Ct. 666, 670-74 (1997) (canvassing Supreme
Court precedent on federal common law); Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 313
(1981) (noting that federal common law is limited to a "few and restricted instances");
Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 641 (1981) ("[A]bsent some
congressional authorization to formulate substantive rules of decision, federal com-
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The significance of this delegation only increases when one con-
siders that such "general principles" are nowhere expressly identified
in the extant international conventions, and that many of those prin-
ciples whose existence may be more evident ("good faith,"
"reasonableness," and the like) have neither a predetermined nor an
immutable content in any event. CISG article 7 thus contemplates an
active role for courts in seeking out and giving content to the substan-
tive principles that will guide the future development of the law.
Properly appreciated, then, the "general principles" methodology
reflects an instance in which "Congress has given the courts the
power to develop substantive law."90 In this respect, the paradigm of
CISG article 7 can be likened to the Sherman Antitrust Act,2 ' section
301 (a) of the Labor Management Relations Act,22 or (more contro-
versially) Tide VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 . In each of these
mon law exists only in such narrow areas as those concerned with the rights and obli-
gations of the United States, interstate and international disputes implicating the con-
flicting rights of States or our relations with foreign nations, and admiralty cases."
(citations omitted)).
2' Texas Indus., 451 U.S. at 640.
2" See National Soc'y of Prof'l Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978)
(concluding that the Sherman Act delegates authority to federal courts to develop
substantive federal law); see also Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. 365,
385 n.1 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing National Society and noting that
"[c]onstruing the statute in light of the common law concerning contracts in restraint
of trade, we have concluded that only unreasonable restraints are prohibited"). Even
Justice Scalia acknowledges that the Sherman Act authorizes the courts to develop the
law to reflect changed circumstances. See Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp.,
485 U.S. 717, 732 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("The Sherman Act adopted the term
.restraint of trade' along with its dynamic potential. It invokes the common law itself,
and not merely the static content that the common law had assigned to the term in
1890.").
212 See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 451 (1957) (holding
that section 301 (a) of the Labor Management Relations Act "authorizes federal courts
to fashion a body of federal law for the enforcement of... collective bargaining
agreements"); see also International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Hechler, 481 U.S. 851, 855
(1987) (same).
21 See Sunstein, supra note 98, at 421-22 (arguing that "the Sherman Act and Title
VII are closely analogous"); J. Hoult Verkerke, Note, Compensating Victims of Preferential
Employment Discrimination Remedies, 98 YALE LJ. 1479, 1491 (1989) (stating that
"Congress affirmatively delegated to federal courts the task of developing an equitable
system of remedies" under Title VII); see also Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 966 (1994)
(Stevens, J., concurring) (arguing that in both Title VII and the Sherman Act
"Congress has legislated in general terms," and that both Acts thus require the courts
to formulate their own theories of implementation). Similar arguments have been
advanced with regard to the remedial goals of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. SeeJack M. Beermann,
A Critical Approach to Section 1983 with Special Attention to Sources of Law, 42 STAN. L. REV.
51, 88 & n.197 (1989) (arguing that Congress has delegated to the federal courts
"broad discretion in interpretation" under § 1983); Kit Kinports, The Buck Does Not Stop
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cases, examination of the statute at issue reveals that, implicitly or ex-
plicitly, Congress has delegated to the federal courts the power to en-
gage in the kind of substantive lawmaking traditionally reserved to
common law courts.
The authority delegated by CISG article 7 is, admittedly, more
circumscribed than the power transferred by these domestic statutes.
In contrast to these open-ended delegationsY the text, context, and
drafting history of the new generation of international conventions
will provide substantial guidance to courts on many issues within their
scope. The important point is one of principle: Courts have author-
ity on the basis of CISG article 7 to construct substantive solutions for
gaps that emerge in a convention's regulatory scheme.2 5 The signifi-
cance of this authority will only increase as the corrosive effect of time
reveals such gaps with greater frequency. 6
CISG article 7 thus rejects the restrictive approach that is evident
in much of the recent Supreme Court treaty jurisprudence. In con-
trast to the Court's approach in cases such as Chan, Zicherman, and Ai-
rospatiale Nationale,27 the interpretive paradigm of CISG article 7 em-
powers courts to construct substantive solutions to unresolved
questions within the scope of an international commercial law con-
vention. This alone is a noteworthy development. But as I will exam-
ine in greater detail below, the special significance of the methodol-
ogy of CISG article 7 is that it contemplates the development of an
Here: Supervisory Liability in Section 1983 Cases, 1997 U. ILL. L. REv. 147, 157 (arguing
that "Congress delegated to the federal courts the task of developing the law" under
§ 1983).
See National Socy, 435 U.S. at 688 (finding a delegation of lawmaking power in
the area of antitrust law based on the broad, indefinite nature of the Sherman Act);
Lincoln Mills 353 U.S. at 451 (finding an implied delegation of lawmaking power from
the open-ended nature of a single provision, section 301(a), in the Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act).
2 See Rosett, supra note 243, at 299 (stating that "[a] rticle 7 seems to express the
wish that the broad terms of the Convention be filled in over time by a world common
law, a shared body of interpretation that would supply a gloss on the text," but object-
ing to the lack of textual guidance for the process). In the case of CISG article 7, this
authority comes with important strings attached. I examine these "strings"-in the
form of deference to the needs of international uniformity-infra Part III.D.
2'6 For a discussion of a "dynamic" interpretation of an international commercial
law convention, see infra Part III.C.2.
27 See supra notes 144-54 and accompanying text. The contrast with the reasoning
of the Court in Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co. is particularly striking. There, Justice
Scalia refused to craft a solution to an unresolved issue in the Warsaw Convention be-
cause "[t]he Convention neither adopted any uniform rule of its own nor authorized
national courts to pursue uniformity in derogation of otherwise applicable law." 516
U.S. 217, 230-31 (1996).
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"international common law" through the cooperation of the formally
independent national courts and arbitral tribunals.2s
2. Contrast with the Uniform Commercial Code
The impact of the methodology contemplated by CISG article 7 is
also illustrated by a contrast with what can best be described as the
schizophrenic approach of the Uniform Commercial Code. At one
location, the U.C.C. suggests that it adopts a civil code-like approach
to the supplementation and elaboration of its provisions. Section 1-
102 instructs that the U.C.C. "shall be liberally construed and applied
to promote its underlying purposes and policies."2 In language that
should be reminiscent of the above discussion of civil code method-
ology, the comments to that section then proceed to propose some-
thing very much like an inductive method to fill gaps in the U.C.C.'s
provisions:
This Act is drawn to provide flexibility so that, since it is intended to
be a semi-permanent piece of legislation, it will provide its own machin-
ery for expansion of commercial practices. It is intended to make it
possible for the law embodied in this Act to be developed by the courts
in the light of unforeseen and new circumstances and practices.
The Act should be construed in accordance with its underlying pur-
poses and policies. The text of each section should be read in the light
of the purpose and policy of the rule or principle in question, as also of
the Act as a whole, and the application of the language should be con-
strued narrowly or broadly, as the case may be, in conformity with the
purposes and policies involved.Soo
Unfortunately, the very next section dilutes this apparent clarity
of purpose. Contrary to section 1-102's suggested "internal" devel-
opment, section 1-103 provides that supplementation of the U.C.C.
should proceed on the basis of external sources of law, specifically the
preexisting common law: "Unless displaced by the particular provi-
sions of this Act, the principles of law and equity, including the law
merchant and the law relative to capacity to contract, principal and
agent, estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mistake,
2m See infra Part III.D.
U.C.C. § 1-102(1) (1994).
0 Id. § 1-102 official cmt. 1. The comment to U.C.C. section 1-104 then appears
to state expressly what section 1-102 suggests: "This Act [is] carefully integrated and
intended as a uniform codification of permanent character covering an entire 'field'
of law." Id. § 1-104 official cmt.
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bankruptcy, or other validating or invalidating cause shall supplement
its provisions."'
The comments to this section then affirmatively state that section
1-103 "indicates the continued applicability to commercial contracts
of all supplemental bodies of law except insofar as they are explicitly
displaced" by the U.C.c.
302
This internal conflict on supplementation of the U.C.C. has pro-
duced no small amount of ambiguity. Some commentators have
seized on the language of section 1-102 to argue that the U.C.C.
adopts a "true code" methodology.3 3 Others have emphasized that
section 1-103 expressly endorses the continued vitality of the external
common law principles, except where displaced by the "particular
provisions" of the U.C.C. °4 Some have even argued that the equitable
principles of the common law can "carve exceptions from or other-
wise modify" the express provisions of the U.C.C. °
On the whole, courts have been open to a flexible approach to
the interpretation and supplementation of the U.C.C., including
"0 Id. § 1-103. Many of the express matters contained in this list would also fall
within the clause excluding issues of "validity" from the scope of the U.N. Sales Con-
vention. See CISG, supra note 7, art. 4; infra note 327. The basic notion of U.C.C. sec-
tion 1-103 goes much further, however. The section itself makes clear that all
"principles of law and equity" continue to apply under the U.C.C. Moreover, the
comments to the section also provide that the required reference to the external
common law for principles of "validity" broadly "extends to cover any factor which at
any time or in any manner renders or helps to render valid any right or transaction."
U.C.C. § 1-103 official cmt. 1.
U.C.C. § 1-103 official cmt. 1.
8. See Gedid, supra note 190, at 354-59, 376-83 (noting that "[t]he Code," and in
particular section 1-102, contain "statements about the use of purpose and policy in
interpretation and application"); Hawkland, supra note 188, at 302-05, 313-20
(concluding that the U.C.C. is a "true code" which "states its own aims"); see also
McDonnell, supra note 97 (emphasizing the "purposive" aspect of interpretation un-
der the U.C.C.).
SeeJAMEsJ. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 19 (3d
ed. 1988) (arguing that preexisting "general equitable principles remain largely in-
tact" under the U.C.C.); Robert S. Summers, General Equitable Principles Under Section 1-
103 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 72 NW. U. L. REV. 906, 908-13 (1978) (discussing the
continuing significance of common law principles under the U.C.C.); see also Steve H.
Nickles, Problems of Sources of Law Relationships Under the Uniform Commercial Code-Part
II: The English Approach and a Solution to the Methodological Problem, 31 ARK. L. REV. 171,
227-30 (1977) (arguing that the principles of law and equity should supplement provi-
sions of the Code "in any case where their application more definitely will promote
the orderly conduct of commercial affairs and transactions regulated by the Code").
WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 304, at 19; see also Summers, supra note 304, at
908-13 (analyzing the appropriate circumstances for application of such a standard).
1998]
760 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
through the use of internal statutory analogies."6 Nonetheless, cases
continue to abound in which courts have looked to external sources
to resolve questions clearly within the scope of the U.C.C.0 7 The
short of the matter is that a fair amount of confusion remains in rec-
onciling the role of preexisting common law principles with the pre-
emptive effect of the U.C.C. provisions.
The code methodology embraced in principle in CISG article 7
proceeds on a different course. As we have seen, that paradigm re-
quires as a primary matter an internal search for the principles neces-
sary to resolve interpretive inquiries within the scope of the relevant
international convention.3 8 A clear implication of this approach is a
broader displacement of preexisting law than is suggested by U.C.C.
section 1-103. In contrast with that national law unification effort, the
paradigm of CISG article 7 reflects a fundamental policy goal to re-
place the prior legal order with a new foundation of shared interna-
tional values, both legal and equitable.5 9
To be sure, CISG article 7(2), like U.C.C. section 1-103, permits
resort to otherwise applicable law in some circumstances.310 But, sig-
nificantly, article 7(2) inverts the priority of its domestic counterpart.
Under section 1-103, common law legal and equitable principles con-
For examples of the use of analogies under the U.C.C., see WHrE & SUMMERS,
supra note 304, at 18 n.88 (citing, inter alia, Irving Leasing Corp. v. M & H Tire Co., 475
N.E.2d 127 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984), as an example of a court analogizing U.C.C. section
2-302 to a lease); Frier, supra note 200, at 2211-14 (describing the case of County Fire
Door Corp. v. C.F. Wooding Co., 520 A.2d 1028 (Conn. 1987), as an example of inductive
reasoning under the U.C.C.); and DonaldJ. Rapson, A "Home Run"Application of Estab-
lished Principles of Statutory Construction: U.C.C. Analogies, 5 CARDOZO L. REV. 441, 445
(1984) (discussing the use of analogies under the U.C.C.)).
W Indeed, Professors Hillman, McDonnell, and Nickels devote an entire book of
nearly a thousand pages (as well as a supplement) to the continuing influence of
.common law and equity" under the U.C.C. See ROBERT A. HILLMAN ET AL., COMMON
LAW AND EQuITy UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (1985 & Supp. 1991); see
also Rosen, supra note 208, at 1182-84 (citing cases in which courts have filled gaps in
the U.C.C. by reference to the common law). Professors Hillman, McDonnell, and
Nickels ultimately argue, however, that the issue of displacement of the common law
should "initially be stated in terms of whether the pre-Code doctrine has been ex-
pressly or impliedly overturned by the Code, bearing in mind the purposive reading of
the Code invited by Section 1-102." HILLMAN ETAL, supra, at 1-7.
See supra notes 170-71, 185-86 and accompanying text.
SeeWHrrE & SUMMERS, supra note 304, at 19 (arguing that while section 1-103 of
the U.C.C. may "displace prior legal principles," "general equitable principles remain
largely intact"); Summers, supra note 304, at 936-37 (same).
" See CISG, supra note 7, art. 7(2) (stating that in the absence of governing
.general principles," unsettled questions are to be settled "in conformity with the law
applicable by virtue of the rules of private international law").
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tinue to apply unless displaced by "particular" U.C.C. provisions. The
paradigm of CISG article 7(2), in contrast, suffers a retreat to domes-
tic law only after an active search for relevant values within the inter-
national convention itself.311
This more preemptive approach of CISG article 7 should not
312come as a surprise. The variety of legal and cultural traditions gov-
erned by an international convention must be contrasted with the
relative harmony in the common law of the various states of the
United States. '3 Resort to the common law by state courts thus does
not greatly imperil the goal of uniformity. Retreat to the preexisting
national law, in contrast, may be fatal to an international law unifica-
tion effort. The risks of destructive nonuniformity are apparent in
the very statement that recourse to national law would mean applica-
tion of legal standards of countries as diverse as the United States,
Singapore, Jordan, and Ghana. It is precisely this need for detach-
ment from the preexisting legal order(s) that animates the internal,
"general principles" methodology of CISG article 7.
C. Dynamic Jurisprudence in the Development of an
International Common Law
At its heart, the interpretive paradigm of CISG article 7 reflects a
single unifying aspiration: to initiate a process for the development
of a truly independent, international body of law. If a specific con-
vention's express provisions are the corporal frame, then its "general
principles" represent the moral values that will guide this new entity's
growth to maturity. And to ensure the true independence of this
process, the paradigm mandates that these values be fashioned free
from the influence of the convention's numerous and disparate do-
mestic parents.
3, See infra notes 427-28 and accompanying text (discussing the interaction be-
tween the general principles methodology and the needs of uniformity).
312 This preemptive effect is particularly clear with the U.N. Sales Convention. See
Gyula Errsi, General Provisions, in INTERNATIONAL SALES, supra note 243, at 2-1, 2-5, 2-6
("CISG is not a law complementary to national laws but is meant to be an exhaustive
regulation." (footnote omitted)); Rosett, supra note 243, at 294-95 ("Subject to the
limited exceptions of the first five articles, the [U.N.] Convention fully occupies the
field, excluding all national law in [international sales) transactions.").
313 See E. Allan Farnsworth, A General Survey of Article 3 and an Examination of Two
Aspects of Codi fication, 44 TEx. L. REV. 645, 656 (1966) (citing U.C.C. section 1-103 and
observing that "the [Uniform Commercial] Code recognizes that there may be in-
stances when it is not all inclusive .... Unlike a code in a civil law country, the Code is
not written on a tabula rasa but rather against the background of prior case law.").
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In these general principles, therefore, we find the foundation for
the development of the law under an international commercial law
convention. On the basis of the impressive body of interpretive case
law that already exists under the U.N. Sales Convention, this section
will demonstrate how the general principles fulfill that function. It
will show that such principles can provide the conceptual tools to fill
substantive gaps in a convention, coordinate the interaction of its
constitutive parts, and even ameliorate the rigidity in its express pro-
visions.
1. The Function of General Principles
The model for the aspirations of CISG article 7, as we have seen,
was the adoption of comprehensive civil codes by the new nation-
states of continental Europe in the nineteenth century.31 4 It should
thus not come as a surprise that much of the vitality of these civil
codes has derived from an expansive interpretation of their founda-
tion values. A common feature of civil codes is the so-called "general
clause," a broad, abstract provision of an undefined moral or equita-
ble content. After an early phase of extreme formalism,s15 modern
civil law courts and scholars have seized on these general clauses as
314 See supra notes 188-203 and accompanying text.
' Ironically, the codification movement, as originally conceived, sought to pro-
hibit an active jurisprudence in the development of the law. The positivist ideology
that animated the civil codification process was premised to a large extent on a distrust
of the judiciary as a source of lawmaking. The drafting of the codes thus proceeded
with the goal of defining legal standards so clear, concise, and coherent that a judge
would be relegated to a mere mechanical role. In the words of Montesquieu, one of
the foremost proponents of this view, "[j ] udges are no more than the mouth that pro-
nounces the words of the law, mere passive beings, incapable of moderating either its
force or rigor." CHARLES DE SECONDAT MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAws 159
(Thomas Nugent trans., 1949) (1748); see also EUGEN EHRLICH, FREIE RECHTSFINDUNG
UND FREIE RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT 2 (1903) (criticizing the traditional view that "[a] ju-
rist does not create law, he has to find it" (translation by author)). Frederick the Great
of Prussia took this point to the extreme. In an effort to make legislation "judge-
proof," the Prussian General State Code, Allgemeines Landerecht, contained in excess of
17,000 provisions designed to prescribe the solution to all conceivable factual disputes.
The code then forbade judges, under threat of punishment, even to "interpret" its
provisions. See MERRYMAN, supra note 195, at 39 ("[T]he doctrine of separation of
powers, when carried to an extreme, led to the conclusion that courts should be de-
nied any interpretive function .... "); Douglas Lind, Free Legal Decision and the Interpre-
tive Return in Modern Legal Theory, 38 AM.J.JuRIs. 159, 163 (1993) ("[The Prussian State
code] included express language directing judges to follow the solutions and to not
independently interpret the code provisions.").
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expansive delegations of authority to develop the law within the scope
of the civil codes. 16
There is perhaps no better example of this than the standard pro-
vision in civil codes requiring the performance of legal obligations in
"good faith," or, more broadly, in "equity."3 17 These clauses do not
have a defined target or content; they are, rather, "super control
norm [S] ",,I8 that.pervade all legal relationships within the scope of the
civil codes. In the poetics of John Dawson, such general clauses
"could be described as roving search lights, supplied with beams that
could penetrate anywhere in private law."
3 1 9
The courts of Germany have been at the forefront of the dynamic
jurisprudence licensed by the moral force of general clauses. Seizing
on such abstract clauses as a "good faith" requirement ("Treu und
Glauben") 2 in legal relations and a nullification of contracts contrary
to "good morals" ("die guten Sitten") , together with principles de-
316 See WIEACKER, supra note 196, at 377 (explaining that general clauses are
"guidelines in the form of maxims addressed to the judge, designed both to control
and to liberate him" (translation by author)); Frier, supra note 200, at 2202 ("In the
present century, European judges have seized upon.., general clauses as a legislative
derogation to them of a general 'moral' authority and supervision in administering
the codes .... ").
317 See, e.g., CODE CIVIL [C. civ.] art. 1134 (John H. Crabb trans., 1977) (Fr.)
(declaring that agreements legally made "must be executed in good faith"); BOfR-
GERuCHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] art. 242 (F.R.G.) ("The obligor is bound to effect per-
formance according to the requirements of good faith .... " (translation by author));
C.C. art. 1375 (Italy) ("The contract shall be performed according to good faith.");
NIEUW BURGERLIJK WETBOEK [NBW] bk. 6, tit. 1, art. 2(1) (Peter Haanappel & Ejan
MacKaay trans., 1990) (Neth.) ("A creditor and debtor must, as between themselves,
act in accordance with the requirements of reasonableness and equity.");
SCHWEIZERISCHES ZIVILGESETZBUCH [ZGB], CODE CIVIL SUISSE [CC], CODICE CIVILE
SVIZZERO [CC] art. 2(1) (Switz.) ("Every person is bound to exercise his rights and ful-
fill his obligations according to the principles of good faith." (translation by author)).
On the application of these provisions in general, see Arthur Hartkamp, The Concept of
Good Faith in the UNIDROIT Principles for International Commercial Contracts, 3 TUL J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 65, 67 (1994).
3s NORBERT HORN ET AL., GERMAN PRIVATE AND COMMERCIAL LAW 135 (Tony Weir
trans., 1982); see also RENE DAVID & JOHN E.C. BRIERLY, MAJOR LEGAL SYSTEMS IN THE
WORLD TODAY 150-54 (3d ed. 1985) (discussing the role of "super-eminent principles"
under civil codes).
3'9 John P. Dawson, The General Clauses, riewedfrom a Distance, 41 RABELsZ 441, 442
(1977).
520 See BGB art. 242. For a detailed analysis of the growth of this provision into the
"sovereign paragraph" of the German Civil Code, see Ralph Weber, Entwicklung und
Ausdehnung des § 242 BGB zum "kiniglichen Paragraphen", 1992 JURISTISCHEN SCHRIFT
631.
12, See BGB art. 138(1) ("A legal transaction that violates good morals is void."
(translation by author)).
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rived from inductive reasoning, modem German courts have devel-
oped a whole variety of legal institutions that are nowhere to be
found in the civil code's more detailed provisions. For example,
courts have in this manner restricted the misuse of legal rights, rec-
ognized a power to adjust legal relations to changed social or eco-• 322
nomic circumstances, and created entirely new forms of liability.32 3
Even the French judiciary (although in form continuing to adhere to
a formalist approach) has developed in this manner vast areas of sub-
stantive law free from an express foundation in the Code civilX24
The drafters of CISG article 7 gained their insights from these de-
velopments. The gap-filling regime of CISG article 7(2) establishes a
core aspiration that the unsettled questions in a convention should be
resolved in conformity with the general principles on which it is
based.3 2 5 The only serious limitation on this goal is that the unre-
solved question must fall within the "matters governed by" the con-
vention.3 26 This limitation refers to issues that are otherwise logically
22 See ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESGERICHTSHOFES IN ZMLSACHEN [BGHZ]
[Supreme Court] 47, 48 (51-52) (F.R-G.) (granting the right to terminate a construc-
tion contract based on a form of frustration of purpose ("Wegfall der Geschdftsgrund-
lage") where an expected building permit was denied).
322 Prominent examples of this active jurisprudence by German courts include the
creation of new legal institutions, such as: liability for precontractual conduct ('culpa
in contrahendo," which is an analog for promissory estoppel in this country), see, e.g.,
BGHZ 71, 386 (392-400) (holding a municipality liable for failing to discuss essential
information in negotiations over a hauling contract); BGHZ 60, 221 (224-25)
(discussing the doctrine of culpa in contrahendo), and liability for an "impermissible"
exercise of a right ("unzuldssige Rechtsausidbung), see BGHZ 44, 367 (371-72) (applying
this doctrine to preclude a party from challenging the validity of a contract that the
party knew was void when it was concluded). A summary of the active jurisprudence of
German courts based on "good faith" alone runs to almost 200 pages. See Gfinter H.
Roth, Article 242, in 2 MONCHENER KOMMENTAR ZUM BfiRGERLICHEN GESETzBUCH 95-
290 (Helmut Heinrich ed., 3d. ed. 1994).
3 See Farber, supra note 100, at 525-28 (discussing the substantive activism of
French courts); Michael Wells, French and AmericanJudicial Opinions, 19 YALEJ. INT'L L.
81, 99-100 (1994) (arguing that "'it would be hard to find a single article of the
[French] Civil Code to which there have not been added depths of meaning and ma-
jor restrictions and extensions that could not have been foreseen in 1804'" (quoting
JOHN P. DAWSON, THE ORACLES OF THE LAw 401 (1968))); see also RENt DAVID &
HENRY P. DE VRIES, THE FRENCH LEGAL SYSTEM 15 (1958) (noting that as a conse-
quence of social and economic forces in France at the end of the 19th century, "the
legislative positivist view began to wane, opening the way to the increasingly dominant
role of the courts"); Michel Troper et al., Statutory Interpretation in France in MacCor-
mick & Summers, supra note 214, at 171, 177 (arguing that "French judges tend to dis-
guise the filling of gaps [in statutes] as interpretation").
32 See supra notes 185-86 and accompanying text.
s26 CISG, supra note 7, art. 7(2). In order for the gap-filling regime of CISG article
7(2) to apply, a transaction must, of course, also fall within the relevant convention's
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within a convention's regulated field of activity, but are nonetheless
expressly excluded from its scope. The most common example of
these so-called "gaps intra legem" is the exclusion of transactions with
327consumers.
Apart from this (obvious) condition, the interpretive process
founded on general principles is expansive indeed. "Unsettled ques-
tions" can arise in different substantive contexts and even at different
times in the life of a convention. '  In the substantive dimension,
gaps may appear either when no express provision governs a particu-
lar issue (let us call these "true" gaps) or, if a relevant provision exists,
when its precise scope and appropriate application are in doubt (let
us refer to these as "hidden" gaps).S In the temporal dimension, un-
settled questions may be present from a convention's very adoption,
general international sphere of application. See, e.g., Convention on Factoring, supra
note 38, art. 2 (stating the scope of the Convention); Convention on Financial Leas-
ing, supra note 37, art. 3 (same); CISG, supra note 7, art. 1(1) (describing CISG's
sphere of application).
227 See, e.g., CISG, supra note 7, art. 2(a) (excluding "goods bought for personal,
family, or household use"); Convention on Financial Leasing, supra note 37, art. 1(4)
(excluding personal transactions); Draft Convention on Receivables Financing, supra
note 43, art. 4(a) (same). For political or policy reasons, international private law
conventions likewise commonly exclude from their scope specific types of substantive
transactions (such as sales of ships and aircraft under the U.N. Sales Convention). See,
e.g., CISG, supra note 7, art. 2(b)-(f) (excluding enumerated types of sales); Conven-
tion on Agency, supra note 36, art. 3 (excluding certain types of agency); Draft Con-
vention on Receivables Financing, supra note 43, art. 4(c) (excluding certain assign-
ments). The U.N. Sales Convention also contains an expansive exclusion of issues
relating to the "validity" of a sales contract or any of its provisions. CISG, supra note 7,
art. 4(a) (explaining that the Convention is not concerned with "the validity of the
contract"). For a detailed analysis of CISG article 4(a), see Hartnell, supra note 72. See
also Peter Winship, Commentary on Professor Kastely's Rhetorical Analysis, 8 Nw. J. INT'L
L. & Bus. 623, 636 (1988) (describing CISG article 4's validity exception as a potential
"black hole" for the Convention). Similarly, a particular provision of a convention
may expressly refer to the continued applicability of domestic law for the matter
within its scope. See, e.g., CISG, supra note 7, art. 28 (providing that a court is not
bound to order specific performance of a contract under the U.N. Sales Convention
"unless the court would do so under its own law in respect of similar contracts of sale
not governed by [CISG]").
328 These types of unresolved questions within a convention's scope are commonly
referred to as gaps praeter legem. See Ferrari, supra note 180, at 217 (explaining that the
rule that questions concerning matters governed by the Vienna Sales Convention that
are not expressly settled in it must be settled "in conformity with its general principles"
applies to gaps praeter legem).
329 A form of this typology for statutory gaps appears in LARENZ & CANARIS, supra
note 275, at 362-66 (referring to "open" and "hidden" gaps--"'offene' [und]
'verdeckte' Regelungslficken").
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or may first emerge in light of later developments in the field of regu-
lated activity. s °
a. General Principles and "True Gaps"
General principles perform their most patent function in resolv-
ing true gaps. Behind such gaps lies a failure of the drafters either to
foresee an issue at all or to achieve a consensus on its resolution (or,
occasionally, an affirmative decision that the matter is best left to a
casuistic development by the courts). Because the issue nonetheless
falls within a convention's scope, a substantive rule must be con-
structed to fulfill the convention's regulatory scheme.
As an illustration of this function of general principles, consider
the practically significant issue of the appropriate interest rate for
amounts due under the U.N. Sales Convention. CISG article 78 pro-
vides a right to interest for any sum in arrears.33 But no provision de-
fines the rate at which the interest is to be calculated.3 2 This issue is
significant precisely because it arises in every disputed case, and be-
cause the wide substantive divergence in domestic solutions often ele-
vates the interest rate issue to equal prominence with the underlying
claim itself. Indeed, the interest rate issue alone has already gener-
ated well over one hundred reported decisions.
333
Unfortunately, this "true gap" also provides an example of a fail-
ure of some interpreters to appreciate fully the unifying function of
general principles. Finding no express "general principle" on the
subject, a number of courts and arbitral tribunals have disregarded
the Convention entirely; instead, they have retreated to the vagaries
of conflict-of-law rules to identify domestic law solutions to the is-
I examine the role of a dynamic interpretation of an international private law
convention in Part III.C.2.
-"' CISG, supra note 7, art. 78 ("If a party fails to pay the price or any other sum
that is in arrears, the other party is entitled to interest on it....").
M The issue of the proper interest rate for sums in arrears was among the most
controversial issues in the drafting of the Convention. Because of the significant dif-
ferences of opinion on the issue, the best the drafters were able to achieve was the
statement of principle in CISG article 78 which leaves the interest rate issue unre-
solved. SeeHONNOLD, supra note 23, at 523-24 (discussing the drafting history of CISG
article 78); Barry Nicholas, Interest, in Bianca & Bonell, supra note 160, at 568, 568-70
(same).
-" These decisions are listed at CISG W3 Database, Pace University School of Law (last
updated Feb. 9, 1998) <http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/> [hereinafter CISG Database],
as well as at I UNILEX, supra note 235, art. 78, at 160-61.
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sue.sss The consequence has been an application of divergent sub-
stantive norms precisely in the manner the adoption of the Conven-
tion was designed to prevent.
Other adjudicators, in contrast, have appreciated the significance
of the issue. These tribunals have seized upon the general principle
of "full compensation"3 as the basis for applying a uniform rule of
the bank credit rate applicable at the injured party's place of busi-
ness.3 Such is the proper function of the interpretive paradigm of
CISG article 7. By applying an internal solution, these interpreters
have given effect to the potential of general principles to unify the
law, even on matters left altogether unsettled in the Convention's ex-
press provisions.3 7
Not all instances of silence necessarily reflect a "true gap," how-
ever. Examination of related provisions in a convention in light of
'm See, e.g., OLG Hamm, Case No. 11 U 206/93 (F.R.G.), reprinted in 2 UNILEX,
supranote 235, E.1995-2, at411-12 (Feb. 8,1995); OLG Munich, Case No. 7 U 4419/93
(F.R.G.), reprinted in 2 UNILEX, supra note 235, E.1994-7, at 309 (Mar. 2, 1994);
Landsgericht [LG] [Trial Court] Aachen, Case No. 41 0 111/95 (F.R.G), reprinted in 2
UNILEX, supra note 235, E.1995-18, at 482 (July 20, 1995); cf Delchi Carrier SpA v.
Rotorex, 1994 WL 495787, at *7 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 1994) (applying, without analysis,
the statutory interest rate set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1961 (a) in a case governed by the
U.N. Sales Convention), aff"d inpart and reu'd inpart, 71 F.3d 1024 (2d Cir. 1995).
See supra note 272 and accompanying text (discussing the full-compensation
principle).
See, e.g., Arbitral Award of the ICC Court of Arbitration-Paris (No. 7660/JK),
reprinted in 2 UNILEX, supra note 235, E.1994-20, at 351, 353 (Aug. 23, 1994) (citing
CISG article 74); Arbitral Award of the Internationales Schiedsgericht der Bun-
deskammer der gewerblichen Wirtschaft-Wien (No. SCH-4366), reprinted in 2 UNILEX,
supra note 235, E.1994-14, at 331, 333 (June 15, 1994) (citing CISG article 78); Arbitral
Award of the Internationales Schiedsgericht der Bundeskammer der gewerblichen
Wirtschaft-Wien [Arbitral Centre of the Austrian Federal Economic Chamber] (No.
SCH-4318), reprinted in 2 UNILEX, supra note 235, E.1994-13, at 327, 330 (June 15,
1994) (explaining that the "full compensation" principle underlies the CISG). A more
refined approach would interpret the principle of "full compensation" to require ap-
plication of the bank lending rate in effect for the currency of payment at the place of
payment. For an elaboration on this approach, see infra note 405.
SS7 For a similar conclusion, see HONNOLD, supra note 23, at 525-26 (arguing that
the general principles of the Convention require application of the current price of
credit); Koneru, supra note 212, at 123, 125-26 (arguing for a similar result on the basis
of the general principle of full compensation under CISG). Admittedly, a clear major-
ity of commentators support a retreat to otherwise-applicable domestic law on this is-
sue. See, e.g., ENDERLEIN & MASKOW, supra note 72, at 313 (arguing that an internal
resolution of the interest rate issue improperly meshes "interest" with "damages");
Franco Ferrari, Uniform Application and Interest Rates Under the 1980 Vienna Sales Conven-
tion, 24 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 467, 476-77 (1995) (concluding that the tendency of
courts is to apply domestic law to resolve this issue); Nicholas, supra note 332, at 570
("The rate to be applied is... a matter.., for the domestic law.").
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their drafting history may reveal an affirmative decision by the draft-
ers to reject a particular normative solution to a disputed issue. Con-
sider, for example, the case of the effect of a written "confirmation"
of contract negotiations under the U.N. Sales Convention. The well-
established rule in one domestic legal system (Germany) holds that a
merchant's failure to reply to such a confirmation amounts to assent
to the contract terms set forth therein (whatever the actual results of
the negotiations).3ss The Convention has no provision that addresses
this issue. Examination of its drafting history nonetheless makes clear
that the drafters expressly refused to grant effectiveness to such con-
firmations without some affirmative act indicating assent on the part
of the recipient.339
b. General Principles and "Hidden Gaps"
The role of general principles in resolving "hidden" gaps presents
a more delicate problem. Textualists might emphasize that the gap-
filling regime of CISG article 7(2) only becomes relevant for ques-
tions that are "not expressly settled" in a convention.34 From this,
one might conclude that if a provision on its face provides an answer
for a disputed issue, there is no relevant breach in the regulatory
scheme. The convention's general principles thus never come into
play.
&M As a result of the insistence of the German delegation, the Hague Convention
on Formation gave effect to such confirmations, in principle, through the recognition
of a corresponding normative trade usage. See PETER SCHLECHTRIEM, EINHEITLICHES
UN-KAUFRECHT 44 (1981); Ernst von Caemmerer, Die Haager Konferenz fiber die Interna-
tionale Vereinheitlichung des Kaufrechts, 29 RABELsZ 101, 125-26 (1965).
3" The Convention contains an express provision that "[s]ilence or inactivity does
not in itself amount to acceptance." CISG, supra note 7, art. 18(1). Moreover, a sig-
nificant limitation on the scope of trade usages in CISG article 9 clearly amounted to a
refusal to give effect to written confirmations. See Peter Schlechtriem, Vorbemerkungen
zu Artt. 14-24, in KoMMENTAR, supra note 72, at 121, 124; see also Report of the Working
Group on the International Sale of Goods on the Work of its Eighth Session, [1977] 8 Y.B.
Comm'n Int'l Trade L. 82, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/SERA/1977 [hereinafter Report on
Eighth Session] (setting aside for later consideration a proposal by the UNCITRAL Sec-
retariat to give automatic effect to nonmaterial terms in such confirmations); Report of
the Working Group on the International Sale of Goods on the Work of its Ninth Session, [1978]
9 Y.B. Comm'n Int'l Trade L. 78, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/SERA/1978 (deleting a corre-
sponding provision, proposed article 7(3), because "it was generally considered that
any modifications to the contract after its conclusion should require agreement of the
parties in accordance with the provisions of [what is now article 29]").
340 See CISG, supra note 7, art. 7(2) (permitting resort to general principles for
"[q]uestions ... not expressly settied" in the Convention).
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A more principled analysis reveals the flaws in this type of formal-
ism. On a simple textual level, the "general principles" methodology
defined by CISG article 7(2) broadly applies to all "questions" left un-
settled by a convention's express provisions. Since the application of
article 7(2) is not limited to unintentionally omitted substantive rules,
an unresolved "question" can arise from uncertainty about the ap-
propriate application of a general norm in a specific factual circum-
stance. Moreover, as we have seen, the dynamic approach embraced
in the paradigm of CISG article 7 rejects the formalism of traditional
common law statutory interpretation; instead, it instructs interpreters
to probe not only the intent and purpose behind express provisions,
but also their role in a convention's broader regulatory scheme.3
"General principles" can take on relevance, therefore, even where
an express standard purports to provide a definitive answer to a dis-
puted issue. Such "hidden" gaps can arise in three main situations.
The first involves the preemptive scope of an express standard or set
of standards. Suppose a provision defines specific rights or specific
obligations in a given circumstance. In the absence of language of
exclusivity, the hidden, "unsettled" question is whether the express
standards preclude recognition of more expansive rights or obliga-
,42tions or different means by which to achieve the defined end.'"
Consider, for example, the significant matter of contract forma-
tion under the U.N. Sales Convention.m3 The Convention's express
4' See supra Part III.A.
342 An examination of express provisions in light of their drafting history may of
course lead to the opposite conclusion. See HONNOLD, supra note 23, at 156-57
(distinguishing, with regard to gap-filling, between cases in which the drafters
"deliberately rejected the extension of [a] specific provision[]" and cases which the
drafters failed to "anticipate and resolve"). Take the case of a buyer's declaration of
avoidance of a contract under CISG article 49(1) (b). That provision identifies only
one situation (nondelivery) in which the buyer may exercise such a right in absence of
a "fundamental breach" by the seller. The question that arises is whether other forms
of breach (a defect in the goods, for example) may form the basis of a right to declare
avoidance. Examination of the language of the provision in light of an unequivocal
rejection of suggestions to expand the list in the drafting stage reveals that no corre-
sponding "hidden" gap exists in this provision. See Ulrich Huber, Article 49, in
KOMMENTAR, supra note 72, at 477, 491; Michael Will, Right to Avoid Contract, in Bianca
& Bonell, supra note 160, at 359, 363-64 (discussing CISG article 49). For a similar
conclusion in the case of a potential "true gap" in a convention, see supra notes 338-39
and accompanying text. Even in cases in which the drafters expressly rejected a par-
ticular normative resolution of an issue, however, the effects of future social and tech-
nological change may reveal a gap that did not originally exist. See infra Part III.C.2
(discussing dynamic interpretation).
m Formation principles are of particular significance because the Convention
permits the parties to exclude its application. See CISG, supra note 7, art. 6 ("The par-
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provisions adhere to the traditional notion that contractual obliga-
tions arise through a formal acceptance of a formal offer. No men-
tion is made of any other formation processes. What remains unclear
is whether the defined traditional method precludes the recognition
of contractual relations formed by other means.
This issue becomes particularly significant when the parties pro-
ceed to perform in the face of an obvious conflict between their stan-
dard business terms.34 5 Some commentators fail to recognize a "gap"
in this instance at all. In their view, the Convention leaves no option
but to apply the traditional rigid notions of "mirror image" and "last
shot" to impose a formal agreement on the parties. Others suggest
that the Convention entirely lacks guiding principles on this score.
Because the matter is insoluble within the Convention, they argue,
courts must retreat to nonuniform national law as the rule of deci-
sion.3 47
Both of these schools fail to see the full potential of the "general
principles" methodology. Neither the Convention's express provi-
sions nor the required analyses of their drafting history reveal a man-
ties may exclude the application of this Convention .... "). The plural form of this
provision makes clear that one party cannot, through clever drafting of standard busi-
ness terms or otherwise, exclude application of the Convention. Within its sphere of
application, in other words, the Convention's formation principles will apply as an ini-
tial matter, and there is little that one party can do, by unilateral action, to avoid that
result. For an analysis of this issue, see Van Alstine, supra note 260, at 11-13.
34 See CISG, supra note 7, arts. 14-24 (governing the formation of the contract).
'- CISG article 19 addresses the treatment of a purported acceptance that deviates
from the terms of the offer. See CISG, supra note 7, art. 19. In its practical effect, this
provision adopts the outmoded "mirror image rule" familiar to common lawjurists. It
does not, however, adequately address the common case in which the parties proceed
to perform in the face of an express objection by both to the effectiveness of the stan-
dard terms of the other. For an analysis of this issue, see Van Alstine, supra note 260,
at 28-33 (discussing this issue in terms of a "partial dissensus" between the parties).
46 See E. Allan Farnsworth, Modified Acceptance, in Bianca & Bonell, supra note 160,
at 175, 179 (arguing that performance of the contract operates as an acceptance of the
"last shot" proposed before such performance); Burt Leete, Contract Formation Under
the United Nations Convention on Contractsfor the International Sale of Goods and the Uniform
Commercial Code: Pitfalls for the Unwary, 6 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 193, 214 (1992)
(same); J. Clark Kelso, Note, The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the Interna-
tional Sale of Goods: Contract Formation and the Battle of Forms, 21 COLUM. J. TRANs. L.
529, 554 (1983) (same).
37 SeeHuber, supra note 26, at 444-45; Francois Vergne, The "Battle of the Forms" Un-
der the 1980 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 33
AM. J. COMP. L. 233, 256-57 (1985) (noting that the failure of the Convention to ad-
dress "'contracts by conduct'" may leave courts with "no alternative other than to refer
to a domestic solution").
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date of exclusivity for the defined traditional method of formation. 3
It is precisely in such situations that the Convention's "general prin-
ciples" fulfill their essential function.
I have argued elsewhere that the principle of party autonomy
permits adjudicators to accommodate the reasonable expectations of
both parties in the case of conflicting standard business terms.39 In
this way, the "general principles" methodology mitigates the rigidity
of a formation scheme that would otherwise impose an arbitrary fic-
tion of assent to the standard terms of one party in disregard of the
other party's express intent to the contrary.50 At the same time, the
use of iriternal principles to resolve such a "hidden gap" precludes a
destructive retreat to domestic law on an issue central to the fulfill-
ment of the Convention's goal of international uniformity.
A "hidden" gap also may be present in a second, more direct
form: conflict between two provisions on the same subject matter.
This type of indeterminacy in legal standards results when the draft-
ers either fail to recognize the significance of the conflict or are un-
able to agree on how to resolve it. The conflict between the price
provisions of the U.N. Sales Convention illustrates this unfortunate
phenomenon. In order for an offer to be valid, article 14(1) requires,
3's UNCITRAL formed a special working group to address this issue in the drafting
of the U.N. Sales Convention. The group proposed a provision that would have rec-
ognized a contract based on "the mutual assent of the parties to form it, even though
it is not possible to establish an offer and an acceptance." Summary of Deliberations of the
Commission on the Draft Convention on the Formation of Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods, 33d Sess., para. 100, Annex I, U.N. Doc. A/33/17 [hereinafter Formation
Deliberations], reprinted in [1978] 9 Y.B. Comm'n Int'l Trade L. 39, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.9/SER.A/1978. The Commission discussed this proposal and subsequent revi-
sions in its 192nd, 193rd, 195th, and 200th meetings between June 1 andJune 7, 1978.
See Summary Records, U.N. Does. A/CN.9/SR.192, 193, 195, and 200. The records of
the deliberations reveal that the delegates were simply unable to agree so late in the
drafting process on the proper wording of a corresponding provision. See Summary
Records of the 200th Meeting, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/SR.200, at 5 (noting the announcement
of the United Kingdom representative "that his delegation was withdrawing its request
for the inclusion of the additional article in order to spare the Commission further
time and trouble"); Formation Deliberations, supra, para. 104, reprinted in [1978] 9 Y.B.
Comm'n Int'l Trade L. 39 ("The proposals were withdrawn because of the extreme
difficulties of formulating an acceptable text.").
'9 SeeVan Alstine, supra note 260, at 84-92.
"0 One German court has already recognized the potential of this general princi-
ple of party autonomy. See Local Court of Kehl, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift-RR
[NJW-RR] No. C 925/93 (1996) 565, 565 (F.R.G.) (holding, in the alternative, that
performance by the parties operated as an implied mutual assent only to the terms on
which their standard forms agreed).
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at a minimum, an "implicitly" determinable price;35' article 55, how-
ever, provides a standard for determining the price for a "validly con-
cluded" contract that does not "expressly or implicitly" include a pro-
352vision for determining the price.
"General principles" methodology also resolves this type of hid-
den flaw. The principles of party autonomy and reasonableness per-
mit a court to recognize an enforceable contract, even without an im-
plicitly determinable price, when it appears from the perspective of a
reasonable personm3 that the parties intended to establish binding ob-
ligations.35 In this way, general principles can operate to coordinate
the interaction between a convention's express constituent elements.
The final principal form of a "hidden" gap is the most challeng-
ing. In this form, there is no doubt that an express provision pur-
ports to define the solution for the legal issue in dispute. The friction
arises when the application of the standard in the specific factual cir-
cumstance runs contrary to broader notions of equity and fairness.
Consider, for example, a statutory provision that requires a buyer of
goods to give timely notice of a breach of contract. Then suppose
G51 CISG, supra note 7, art. 14(1) (requiring that an offer must, at a minimum,
"make [] provision for determining... the price").
3,2 Id. art. 55 (providing for the price "generally charged" under comparable cir-
cumstances at the time of conclusion of the contract). Not surprisingly, scholars disa-
gree over how to reconcile these two conflicting provisions. Compare HONNOLD, supra
note 23, at 199-203 (arguing that article 55 permits the recognition of a contract with-
out an implicit identification of the price), and Schlechtriem, supra note 339, at 132-33
(same), with E. Allan Farnsworth, Formation of Contract, in INTERNATIONAL SALES, supra
note 243, at 3-1, 3-8 to 3-10 (arguing that article 55 becomes applicable only if the par-
ties have first made an implicit identification of the price), Barry Nicholas, The Vrienna
Convention on International Sales Law, 105 L.Q.R. 201, 213 (1989) (same), and Kelso,
supra note 346, at 537-38 (same).
353 See supra notes 266-70 and accompanying text. See in particular CISG, supra
note 7, art. 8(2), which requires interpretation of party statements and conduct ac-
cording to the understanding of a "reasonable person" in the position of the other
party.
,5, SeeJohn E. Murray, Jr., An Essay on the Formation of Contracts and Related Matters
Under the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 8J.L. &
COM. 11, 17 (1988) (concluding that "[if a reasonable person would regard the deal
as binding, the interpretation of the parties' manifestations requires recognition of
that agreement"); cf. Oberster Gerichtshof [OGH] [Supreme Court], No. 2 Ob
547/93 (Aus.) (finding an enforceable contract where a reasonable person would have
been able to determine the price under the given circumstances, although avoiding
the specific interaction of articles 14(1) and 55), reprinted in 2 UNILEX, supra note
235, E.1994-29, at 387-90 (Nov. 10, 1994).
m- SeeCISG, supra note 7, art. 39(1) ("The buyer loses the right to rely on a lack of
conformity of the goods if he does not give notice to the seller specifying the nature of
the lack of conformity within a reasonable time after he has discovered it or ought to
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that in a particular case notice of a breach is not timely forthcoming,
but the seller either caused the delay herself or later induced detri-
mental reliance by the buyer through a failure to assert the defense of
lack of notice. If mechanically applied, the notice provision would
preclude recovery of damages. An unsettled question nonetheless ex-
ists regarding the extent to which equitable values can ameliorate the
rigidity in the specific notice rule.
A recent opinion of an international court of commercial arbitra-
tion in Vienna illuminates how "general principles" can function as
an equitable modulation of rights and obligations in such circum-
stances.56 In that arbitration, a buyer's notice of defects in the goods
failed to comply with an express time requirement in the parties' con-
tract s57 In subsequent dealings between the parties, however, the
seller for a significant period did not assert his contractual rights.? s
Finding no express provision on the subject, the arbitral tribunal cor-
rectly probed the general principles of the U.N. Sales Convention for
guidance. The tribunal concluded that the general notions of estop-
pel and "good faith" implicit in the Convention's provisions pre-
cluded the seller from asserting even the rights expressly defined in
the parties' contract.3 59
Similar concepts operate in many legal systems.360 But it is pre-
have discovered it."); cf U.C.C. § 2-607(3) (a) (1991) (requiring notice of breach
within a reasonable time).
Arbitral Award of the Internationales Schiedsgericht der Bundeskammer der
gewerblichen Wirtschaft-Wien [Arbitral Centre of the Austrian Federal Economic
Chamber] (No. SCH-4366), reprinted in 2 UNILEX, supra note 235, E.1994-14, at 331,
333 (June 15, 1994).
M See id. at 328.
M See id. at 329.
39 See id. at 329-30; see also OLG Karlsruhe, Case No. 1 U 280/96 (June 25, 1997)
(F.R.G.), available in CISG Online (last modified Feb. 20, 1998) <http://www.jura.uni-
Freiburg.de/iprl/cisg/>, at 4 [hereinafter CISG Online] (concluding that the principle
of Treu und Glauben [good faith] operates as a limitation on the exercise of contractual
rights in a transaction governed by the U.N. Sales Convention).
See, e.g., supra note 317 and accompanying text (citing and discussing the no-
tion of "good faith" in a variety of civil law systems). The Uniform Commercial Code
in this country contains an express provision on good faith. See U.C.C. § 1-203 (1994)
("Every contract or duty within this Act imposes an obligation of good faith in its per-
formance or enforcement."). As we have seen, however, the U.C.C. directs that most
such equitable principles are to be found in external sources, namely in the preexist-
ing common law. See id. § 1-103 ("Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this
Act, the principles of law and equity... shall supplement its provisions."). For a de-
tailed examination of the role of equitable principles under the U.C.C., see Summers,
supra note 304.
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cisely because of the variety of domestic approaches36 that the general
principles methodology holds a particular significance for an interna-
tional law unification effort. By rejecting a restrictive textualist ap-
proach and sanctioning an active use of equitable principles, CISG
article 7 empowers adjudicators to do overtly what they are likely to
do covertly anyway. In the international context, the almost unavoid-
able consequence of such a covert application of equitable values is a
reliance on potentially idiosyncratic domestic notions of fairness and
justice.
The dynamic jurisprudence advocated here attacks this hidden
strain of homesickness by promoting transparency. That is, it licenses
an open articulation and elaboration of equitable principles on an in-
ternal, and thus an international, level. Consonant with the primary
goal of international uniformity, this dynamic jurisprudence will thus
initiate the necessary casuistic process of consensus formation on the
appropriate circumstances for the application of equitable princi-
362ples. As a result, the implicit adoption of the internal development
methodology of the civil codes will secure in a particular way the long-
term success of an international law unification effortss
6 Consider, for example, the divergence on the role of "good faith" between two
western legal systems. German courts, as we have seen above, have expanded the no-
tion of Treu und Glauben into a "super control norm" for the German Civil Code. See
supra notes 317-23 and accompanying text. The corresponding provision in the
U.C.C. in the United States (section 1-203), in contrast, is expressly limited to the
"performance or enforcement" of extant obligations. Moreover, within the U.C.C.,
the contours of the good faith obligation are defined differently in the various con-
stituent articles. CompareU.C.C. § 1-203, withid. § 2-103(1) (b) (defining good faith for
merchants as "honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards
of fair dealing in the trade"), id. § 3-103(a) (4) (defining good faith with respect to ne-
gotiable instruments as "honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial
standards and fair dealing"), id. § 5-102(a) (7) (defining good faith with respect to let-
ters of credit as "honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned"), and id.
§ 8-102(a) (10) (defining good faith with respect to investment securities as "honesty in
fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing").
32 The equitable function of general principles does not vest unfettered discretion
in adjudicators. Examination of the text, context, and drafting history of a provision
may reveal an express determination not to permit a particular normative resolution.
See supra notes 339-40, 343 and accompanying text. For instance, the express rejection
of automatic effectiveness for "letters of confirmation" should preclude recognition of
a broad substantive principle to the contrary. See supra note 340 and accompanying
text (discussing the relevance of CISG article 7(2) to questions "not expressly settled"
in a convention).
Another notable means of flexibility under the U.N. Sales Convention is found
in trade usages. CISG article 9 expressly gives effect to international trade usages that
are "widely known to, and regularly observed" by parties "in the particular trade con-
cerned." CISG, supra note 7, art. 9(2). For an analysis of this issue, see Garro, supra
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Admittedly, the extant international commercial law conventions
may not reflect the level of comprehensiveness and systematization of
a civil code."" The implicit adoption of code methodology in the
paradigm of CISG article 7 nonetheless requires adjudicators to un-
dertake an active search for applicable general principles to fill the
inevitable gaps in a convention's express provisions. To be sure,
CISG article 7 permits a retreat to national law where this active
search fails to yield relevant general principles. As I will explain in
greater detail in Part III.D, however, the mandatory deference to the
needs of international uniformity will mean that this route of escape
to domestic law should be a narrow one indeed .
2. Dynamic Interpretation in the International Context
When examined carefully, the expansive interpretive function of
"general principles" advocated above creates a potential tension in
the paradigm of CISG article 7. As we have seen, that paradigm con-
templates an interpretive process founded on both textual analysis
and an active probe for intent and meaning in a convention's drafting
history.36 In Part III.C.1, however, I argued that general principles
can become relevant in interpretive inquiries even when a provision
purports to define the rights or obligations in dispute (that is, in the
case of a "hidden" gap).
This potential for a disconnect between an express general norm
and its application in a particular factual circumstance will grow with
the passage of time. Even comprehensive efforts such as the U.N.
Sales Convention will show increasing signs of age under the effect of
changes in the regulated field of activity. The unresolved tension,
therefore, is the extent to which the actual expectations of the draft-
ers operate to constrain the future development of the law under an
international convention.
Recall that this tension is among the principal subjects of dispute
in the debate over statutory interpretation in the United States. True
formalists argue that the substantive content of a statute-as deter-
note 61, at 476.80 (discussing the role of trade usages under the Convention); Van Al-
stine, supra note 260, at 46-49 (same).
Indeed, as we have seen, the extant conventions commonly exclude from their
scope certain matters (such as transactions with consumers) that affect core public
policy concerns of member states. See supra note 327 and accompanying text
(discussing such "gaps intra legem" in a Convention).
See infra notes 427-28 and accompanying text.
"6 See supra Part III.A.1-2.
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mined by its text or the original legislative intent, depending on the
particular strain of formalismm7--is fixed as of the date of enact-
ment.m If a statute becomes outdated, it is argued, the responsibility
for needed corrections falls to the legislature. 69
In contrast, proponents of dynamic statutory interpretation argue
that "interpretation" should also include consideration of changes in
societal values and in a statute's legal context subsequent to its adop-
tion. The metaphor for this view, once again, is a nautical one in
which the legislature "builds a ship and charts its initial course," but
the "current course" is set primarily by judicial interpreters-"the
crew on board" a statutory vessel .
The paradigm of CISG article 7, in my view, embraces this latter,
dynamic approach to interpretation. The animating philosophy of
the "general principles" methodology, as we have seen in Part III.C.1,
is that interpreters must play an active role in filling substantive gaps
and ameliorating the rigidity in an international commercial law con-
vention.
For three principal reasons, the course of this dynamic jurispru-
dence is not rigidly anchored to the specific expectations of the
original designers. The first reason flows from the very nature of
"general principles." Notions such as "reasonableness," "coopera-
tion," and "good faith" mean little in isolation. They take on substan-
tive meaning only through a consensus in the relevant interpretive
community on the appropriate context for their application. Even if
it were possible to reconstruct the drafters' original suppositions,
there is little to suggest that the drafters intended the "meaning" of
"good faith" and its conceptual cousins to be frozen as of their adop-
tion.
The content of these concepts is fluid and mutable, their mean-
ing subject to change with evolution in the consensus. Nevertheless,
CISG article 7 instructs adjudicators to employ such principles to re-
s7 See supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text (discussing "intentionalism"); su-
pra notes 134-39 and accompanying text (discussing "textualism"); see also Eskridge,
supra note 105, at 1480-81 (describing these approaches as "originalist").
See supra notes 134-39 and accompanying text. See in particular Easterbrook,
Text and History, supra note 119, at 69 (arguing that "[lI]aws ... do not change unless
the legislature affirmatively enacts something new"). Supporters of a "purposivist" ap-
proach similarly would "use[] the original purpose of the statute as a surrogate for
original intent." Eskridge, supra note 105, at 1480.
3'9 See supra note 139 and accompanying text (describing the textualist argument
that Congress should'be the body that updates outdated legislation).
370 Aleinikoff, supra note 111, at 21.
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solve "unsettled" questions that emerge in the future. As the aging of
a convention reveals such questions with greater frequency, these
fluid values will increase in prominence. It would be pure fiction to
suggest that their future content could be controlled by the "original
intent" of the drafters.
The second reason emerges from the implicit endorsement of a
code-like interpretive methodology in CISG article 7. We have seen
that civil law courts have developed the codes' general clauses into
"super control norms" far beyond anything contemplated by their
drafters 1.37 These norms have operated to give the codes the flexibil-
ity necessary to adapt to circumstances unforeseen at the time of their
adoption. The experiences of the various codes have differed, of
course, and nothing requires that an international convention steer
the same course as any one of them. The "general principles" meth-
odology nonetheless makes clear that the flexible navigational phi-
losophy of the civil codes animates the interpretive paradigm of CISG
article 7 as well.
Finally, a dynamic interpretation of an international convention
is, perhaps paradoxically, also compelled by the needs of interna-
tional uniformity. Without a means for adaptation, the inevitable so-
cial and technological changes in the relevant field of commerce will
make any formal unification of legal standards fleeting. In addition,
legal and practical obstacles effectively make a formal amendment of
an international commercial law convention impossibles
To paraphrase Judge Friendly's coincidental use of a similar nau-
tical metaphor thirty years ago, therefore, only an active judicial in-
terpretation of a convention can "keep the ship afloat," because there
is little hope "that [legislative] rescue will arrive. ss The long-term
consequence of a rigid formalist approach, in contrast, would be an
inevitable increase in reliance on nonuniform national legal concepts
371 See supra notes 315-23 and accompanying text (discussing the use of general
principles in the courts of Germany and elsewhere).
s7 See supra note 243 and accompanying text (discussing the difficulty of amend-
ing an international convention).
s7s HenryJ. Friendly, The Gap in Lawmaking-Judges Who Can't and Legislators Who
Won't, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 787, 799 (1963) (lamenting the failure of Congress to
amend outdated statutes and arguing that "generally, the best the judge can do is to
keep the ship afloat, in better shape or worse, in the hope that rescue will arrive"). For
a skeptical spin on the nautical metaphor in the context of the U.N. Sales Convention,
see Rosett, supra note 243, at 270-71 (arguing that "the interpreter of the Convention
is left at sea without an anchor of a coherent conceptual framework in which to un-
derstand specific provisions of the Convention").
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to resolve the increasing indeterminacy in a convention's provisions.
Such a result would run directly contrary to the primary goal of estab-
lishing and maintaining uniformity in the relevant field of interna-
tional private law. 74
The initial identification of the general principles themselves, to
be sure, must proceed on the basis of the values reflected in the rele-
vant convention. The interpretive paradigm of CISG article 7 speaks
of the principles on which a particular convention is "based." Such
considerations surely inspired the comment of Professor John
Honnold that the recognition of a particular general principle must
be "moored to premises that underlie specific provisions of the [U.N.
Sales] Convention."3 75
One should not read too much into this observation, however.
The "internal" development methodology described in CISG article 7
does not imply that all general principles are "embedded" by the
drafters "in" each convention in some collective, if unconscious,
process. Instead, the recognition of a particular general principle re-
quires the holistic form of inductive reasoning discussed above. 76
Under this interpretive process, text, context, and legislative history
serve as mere evidence in the primary inquiry into the values re-
flected by a particular convention. There is no formal requirement
that all general principles find a foundation in any specific intent of
the drafters.
Indeed, even the consensus understanding of the values reflected
in a convention's express provisions may evolve over time. Consider
the controversial issue of the role of "good faith" under the U.N. Sales
374 See Honnold, supra note 79, at 138 (summarizing the German and Dutch re-
ports to the 12th International Congress of Comparative Law of 1986 to the effect that
"failure to make full use of the reference in Art. 7(2) to the 'general principles' on
which the [U.N. Sales] Convention is based would undermine the Convention's provi-
sion (Art. 7 (1)) calling for 'uniformity in... application'").
375 HONNOLD, supra note 23, at 155.
"" See supra notes 265-79 and accompanying text (discussing academic approaches
to general principles and inductive reasoning). Professor Honnold himself later ad-
vocated a "generous response to the invitation of Article 7(2) to develop the [U.N.
Sales] Convention through the 'general principles on which it is based'" in order to
promote the needs of uniformity. HONNOLD, supra note 23, at 157; see also id. at 60-61
("The Sales Convention must be read and applied in a manner that permits it to grow
and adapt to novel circumstances and changing times."). The French text of the
paradigm of CISG article 7(1) supports this more flexible approach. That version
suggests that the relevant general principles are not merely those on which a conven-
tion "is based," but rather those which "inspired" a convention. See CISG art. 7(1)
(Fr.), reprinted in Bianca & Bonell, supra note 160, at 749-50 ("les principes g6nfraux
dont elle s'inspire ou").
[Vol. 146: 687
DYNAMIC TREATYINTERPRETATION
Convention. This issue was controversial precisely because of the
widely divergent views on the force of "good faith" under national
law.a"  It should not surprise, therefore, that opponents of a corre-
sponding provision in the Convention, which included, significantly,
delegates from the United States,7 8 argued that the differing domes-
tic social and legal traditions would preclude uniformity in the appli-
cation of such an abstract concept379
The best the drafters could achieve on this contentious issue was
described, perhaps sardonically, by Professor Farnsworth as "a states-
manlike compromise."ss  The compromise amended CISG article
7(1) to read: "In the interpretation of this Convention, regard is to
be had.., to the need to promote uniformity in its application and
the observance of good faith in international trade. "381 The precise
effect of this curious arrangement was unclear from its inception.3m
Viewed in isolation, it at a minimum reflects an inability of the draft-
ers to agree on a broader role for good faith than an instrument of
37 See supra note 361 and accompanying text (contrasting the approach of the
German courts with that of the U.C.C. in the United States); see also Ferrari, supra note
180, at 212-13 (discussing domestic systems' differing conceptions of "good faith").
378 See E6rsi, supra note 61, at 348 (noting the opposition of delegates from the
United States to a broad good faith provision); E. Allan Farnsworth, Problems of Unifica-
tion of the Law of Sales from the Standpoint of the Common Law Countries, in PROBLEMS OF
UNIFCATION OF INTERNATHONAL SALES LAW 1, 11-13 (1980) (noting the United States'
hesitancy in endorsing the CISG provision on good faith). Interestingly, the principal
supporters of a good faith provision were the (then) socialist countries. See E6rsi, su-
pra note 61, at 348 ("[T]he Hungarian delegation submitted a proposal for the adop-
tion of the principles of fair dealing and good faith ....").
7 See Formation Deliberations, supra note 348, para. 44, reprinted in [1978] 9 Y.B.
Comm'n Int'l Trade L. 39 U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/SER.A/1978 (noting arguments of op-
ponents that "the development of a coherent body of case law was unlikely to take
place, since national courts would be influenced by their own legal and social tradi-
tions in applying the [principle] to individual cases"); First Committee Deliberations, supra
note 167, in Official Records, supra note 7, at 258 para. 50 (noting the comments of
Professor Farnsworth that "he felt that a [good faith] provision such as the one pro-
posed would be uncertain and dangerous in practice"). For a more detailed analysis
of the debate over the good faith provision, see HONNOLD, supra note 23, at 146-47;
Bonell, supra note 160, at 68-69, 71; and Winship, supra note 327, at 630-32.
Farnsworth, supra note 378, at 19.
ss CISG, supra note 7, art. 7(1). For the drafting history of this compromise, see
Formation Deliberations, supra note 348, paras. 55-60. Various delegations made attempts
at the 1980 Vienna Conference to alter this limited compromise, all of which were un-
successful. See First Committee Deliberations, supra note 167, in Official Records, supra
note 7, at 257-59 paras. 40-57 (noting support for retention of the existing reference to
good faith).
3 See, e.g., Bonell, supra note 160, at 83 (referring to the good faith clause as a
"rather peculiar provision"); E6rsi, supra note 61, at 354 (describing the good faith
provision as a "strange arrangement").
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interpretation of the provisions of the Convention.3 A number of
commentators have thus concluded that the Convention imposes no
obligations of good faith on the parties to an international sales con-
tract
84
Scholarly analysis subsequent to the adoption of the Convention,
however, has led to an emerging consensus on a much more expan-
sive role for good faith.m Whatever the drafters' actual intent, this
new consensus recognizes "good faith" as one of the "general princi-
386ples" of the Convention. Adjudicators have also begun to join the
chorus. 7 As a result, the principle of good faith can also serve the
See HONNOLD, supra note 23, at 146 (noting that the drafters decided that a
.good faith" provision "should not be imposed loosely and at large, but should be re-
stricted to a principle for interpreting the provisions of the Convention. This com-
promise was generally accepted and was embodied in the concluding words of Article
7(1)."); E6rsi, supra note 61, at 349 ("[A]lmost everybody thought [article 7(1) was] a
strange compromise, in fact burying the principle of good faith and thus covering up
the lack of compromise."); E6rsi, supra note 312, at 2-7 (observing that the compro-
mise on good faith "consign [ed] it to a ghetto and g[ave] it an honorable burial").
M4 SeeE. Allan Farnsworth, Duties of Good Faith and FairDealing Under the UNIDROJT
Principles, Relevant International Conventions and National Laws, 3 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP.
L. 47, 55 (1995) (arguing that "Article 7.1 falls short of imposing a duty of good faith
on the parties"); Winship, supra note 327, at 631 (observing that "the reference to
'good faith' is limited to interpreting the Convention"); see also HONNOLD, supra note
23, at 146-48 (arguing that "the Convention rejects 'good faith' as a general require-
ment and uses 'good faith' solely as a principle for interpreting the ... Convention,"
but later examining the broad role of that principle under specific Convention provi-
sions).
It is an accepted canon that public international law treaties are to be inter-
preted in a spirit of good faith. SeeVienna Convention on Treaties, supra note 70, art.
31 (1) ("A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith ... ."); Bederman, supra note 69, at
968 (arguing that the principle of good faith is designed to promote a friendly spirit
between countries). Even under the limited view of its effect, the "good faith" provi-
sion of CISG article 7 plays a broader role than this accepted canon. The subject of
the presumption of "good faith" under this interpretive paradigm is not merely the
contracting states; rather, CISG article 7 instructs interpreters to "to promote.., the
observance of good faith in international trade." CISG, supra note 7, art. 7(1) (emphasis
added).
See Bonell, supra note 160, at 84-85 (discussing various meanings of good faith);
Herber, supra note 72, at 94; Magnus, supra note 274, at 114 ("[T]he overwhelming
majority of commentators views the principle of good faith [in CISG article 7(1)] also
as a standard.., for the entire relationship between the parties." (translation by
author)); cf. Isaak I. Dore &James E. Defranco, A Comparison of the Non-Substantive Pro-
visions of the UNCITRAL Convention on the International Sale of Goods and the Uniform
Commercial Code, 23 HARv. INT'L L.J. 49, 61 (1982) (stating that good faith "appears to
be a pervasive norm analogous to the good faith obligation of the U.C.C."); Kastely,
supra note 168, at 597-98 (arguing that the "fundamental value of good faith ... is im-
plied throughout the Convention's detailed provisions").
M7 See supra note 359 and accompanying text (noting a German court's recogni-
tion of the "controlling principle of Treu und Glauben [good faith]" under article 7(1)
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broader "gap-filling" functions contemplated in CISG article 7(2),S
and thus is relevant in disciplining the behavior of the parties as
well."
This expansive role of good faith is founded on an evolution in
the understanding of the values reflected in the Convention's regula-
tory scheme as a whole."9 In light of the Convention's comprehen-
sive definition of the fights and obligations of the parties, this wider
perspective reveals that the purported limitation to interpretation is a
semantic distinction without a substantive difference.39' The curious
of CISG (translation by author)); OLG Celle, Case No. 20 U 76/94 (May 24, 1995)
(F.RIG.), available in CISG Databas supra note 333, at 6 (same); OLG Munich, Case
No. 7 U 1720/94 (Feb. 8, 1995) (F.RIG.), available in ClSGDatabase, supra note 333, at
12 (concluding that the principle of Treu und Glauben under CISG precluded a seller
from asserting certain claims for damages); Arbitral Award of the Internationales
Schiedsgericht der Bundeskammer der gewerblichen Wirtschaft No. SCH-4318, re-
printed in 2 UNILEX, supra note 235, E.1994-13, at 327 (June 15, 1994) (suggesting that
good faith is one of the general principles of the U.N. Sales Convention).
For an analysis of these functions, see supra Part III.C.1. Tellingly, the obliga-
tion of good faith already had been recognized as a "general principle" under the
Hague ULIS, although that Convention contained no express reference similar to that
in CISG article 7(1). See OLG Dfisseldorf, Case No. 6 U 206/77 (Jan. 20, 1983)
(F.R.G.), reprinted in INTERNAToNALE RECHTPRECHUNG zu EKG UND FAG, art. 17, No.
7, at 186 (Peter Schlechtriem & Ulrich Magnus eds., 1987); cf Eduard Wahl, Article 17,
in KOMMENTAR ZUM EINHEITLICHEN KAUFRECHT 121, 135-36 (Hans Dolle ed., 1976)
(discussing the "worldwide meaning" of good faith).
S9 See ENDERLEIN & MASKOW, supra note 72, at 54 (discussing the notion "that the
principle of good faith also addresses the parties and their conduct"); Bonell, supra
note 160, at 84 (stating that good faith is "also necessarily directed to the parties to
each individual contract of sale"); Schlechtriem, supra note 339, at 25. But see Ferrari,
supra note 180, at 214-15 (rejecting the argument that the principle of good faith can
impose additional obligations on the parties).
390 See ENDERLEIN & MASKOW, supra note 72, at 54 (arguing that even though the
more limited role of good faith "might have been the intention of some delegations,
the final Convention has to be interpreted as a whole and in such a way that each and
every [one] of its provisions acquires a meaning"); E6rsi, supra note 61, at 348
(discussing how individual delegations' positions played out in the Convention's
larger groups). Even commentators who see greater potential force in the original
limitation to "interpretation" have acknowledged that good faith will, in the course of
time, extend to the parties as well. See ENDERLEIN & MASKOW, supra note 72, at 54-55
(concurring with Professor Winship that the criticism of good faith will "lead to the
recognition of a general obligation of the parties to behave accordingly"); Wnship,
supra note 327, at 635 (acknowledging the likelihood that "over time a general obliga-
tion on contracting parties to act in good faith will be accepted").
" Through the interpretation mandated by article 7(1), these comprehensive
substantive provisions include an obligation to exercise the defined rights and per-
form the defined obligations in good faith. See Commentary on the Draft Convention on
Contractsfor the International Sale of Goods, Prepared by the Secretariat, UNCITRAL Working
Group on the International Sale of Goods, U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/5
(Mar. 14, 1979), in Official Records, supra note 7, at 18 (identifying the variety of
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compromise of article 7(1) may require consideration of good faith
only in the interpretation of a convention. It does not, however, pre-
clude the recognition of good faith as a "general principle" of• * 392
broader application.
Support for this conclusion is also found in a subtlety that is only
ambiguously reflected in the English language version of CISG article
7(1). Only by carefully reading this version does one find that the
word "promote" applies not only to "uniformity," but to "the obser-
vance of good faith in international trade" as well . That provision
thus instructs adjudicators to include a prospective calculus in their
interpretation of an international convention. In fixing the contours
of the rights and obligations defined in the Convention, article 7(1)
calls upon adjudicators to consider how their decisions will promote
the observance of good faith by other transactors in the future. As a
result, the mandated consideration of good faith is also directed to
the conduct of the parties to international transactions!"
The message here is that the limited expectations of the drafters
do not operate as an absolute constraint on the dynamic development
of the law. As the case of "good faith" reveals, evolutions in the con-
sensus on the values reflected in a convention can result in an inter-
"manifestations of the requirement of the observation of good faith" in the Conven-
tion, but observing that "[t] he principle of good faith is... broader than these exam-
ples and applies to all aspects of the interpretation and application of the Conven-
tion").
$92 An interesting question in this regard is whether the principle of good faith can
"piggyback" on other, less controversial, general principles. Recall, for instance, the
general principle of "reasonableness." See supra notes 268-70 and accompanying text.
One could argue that through its role in "interpretation" of the Convention, "good
faith" is an implicit component of the general obligation of reasonableness. I see no
obstacle to this reasoning, but, as I argue in the text above, find it unnecessary to the
ultimate conclusion that good faith is a general principle of the Convention in its own
right.
393 CISG, supra note 7, art. 7(1). Recall that, taken as a whole, article 7(1) reads:
"In the interpretation of this Convention, regard is to be had to its international char-
acter and to the need to promote uniformity in its application and the observance of
good faith in international trade." Id.
39 This conclusion may even extend to article 6's definition of the contours of
party autonomy. See Bernard Audit, The Vienna Sales Convention and the Lex Mercatoria,
in LEX MERCATORIA AND ARBITRATION 139, 153 (Thomas E. Carbonneau ed., 1990)
(arguing that under the U.N. Sales Convention contractual provisions must be inter-
preted in accordance with good faith). But seeFerrari, supra note 180, at 224 (asserting
that party autonomy prevails over all other general principles). As noted above, some
adjudicators-without addressing the substance of this controversy-have used gen-
eral principles such as good faith and estoppel to limit even the exercise of express
contractual rights. See, e.g., supra notes 356-59 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 146: 687
DYNAMIC TREATYINTERPRETATION
pretation that matures beyond the actual contemplation of the draft-
ers. An international convention in this sense is a living, maturing
body of law, founded on certain fundamental values but capable of
adapting new interpretations for changed environments.3 5 The in-
tent of the drafters is but one of the relevant considerations in this
dynamic process of growth and development."s
Even under such dynamic considerations, the text, context, and
drafting history of a specific provision will of course remain the pri-
mary interpretive materials. This conclusion will apply with particular
force if such materials are clear and still relevant at the interpretive
moment. The friction will arise, however, when a specific provision
conflicts with the temporally fluid values reflected in a "general prin-
ciple."
This suggests a form of interpretive continuum influenced by the
dual considerations of clarity and temporal proximity.! An explicit
textual provision supported by a clearly articulated intent or purpose
in the drafting history, and in relative temporal proximity to the in-
terpretive moment, should only rarely yield to the influence of a
"general principle." The effect of a letter of confirmation under the
U.N. Sales Convention provides a good example here. 98 A provision
of ambiguous content and intended application, in contrast, should
not enjoy this presumption, especially when interpreted long after its
s95 This concept carries implications for the international commercial law unifica-
tion movement as a whole. Subsequent conventions have adopted the interpretive
paradigm of CISG article 7-including its good faith provision-verbatim. See supra
notes 172-78 and accompanying text.
39 See Bonell, supra note 160, at 90 (observing correctly that "[o]nce adopted the
Convention, like any other law, has a life of its own, and its meaning can change with
time so that the intention of the drafters is only one of the elements to be taken into
account for the purpose of its interpretation"); see also Audit, supra note 394, at 153
(noting that the "Convention is meant to adapt to changing circumstances"); Kastely,
supra note 168, at 607 (arguing that article 7(1) "will allow discovery of principles be-
yond those elaborated in the text itself").
397 Professor William Eskridge identified and elaborated on this concept of an in-
terpretive continuum in advocating a dynamic interpretation of domestic statutes. See
Eskridge, supra note 105, at 1496-97 (constructing a model for reading statutes dy-
namically); see also supra notes 110-13 and accompanying text (discussing the dynamic
element of the "practical reasoning" approach advocated principally by Professors
Eskridge, Frickey, and Farber). For a similar approach, see MacCormick & Summers,
supra note 215, at 530-31 (suggesting a relative interpretive hierarchy beginning with
"linguistic arguments," then "systemic arguments," and then "teleological-evaluative
arguments," all of which are informed by "transcategorical arguments" founded on
intent).
s See supra notes 338-39 and accompanying text (discussing different approaches
as to the effect of letters of confirmation).
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adoption. The evolution in the understanding of the principle of
good faith may illustrate this type of dynamic interpretation s9
International conventions will be particularly susceptible to the
indeterminacy that arises from age . 0 0 As a result, contemporary val-
ues in the form of the flexible general principles of a particular con-
vention will take on increasing significance over time. There are im-
portant limitations here, however: The only "contemporary values" of
relevance in this dynamic interpretive process will be those of a
clearly international character.' Moreover, even those international
values that satisfy this requirement-such as the most prominent can-
didate in this respect, the UNIDROIT Principles for International
Commercial Contracts4 2-will not exert influence of their own
force.40 ' Rather, such values will take on relevance only to the extent
that they can inform the contemporary understanding of general
principles (good faith, reasonable conduct, adequate cooperation,
'9 See supra notes 378-95 and accompanying text (discussing various approaches to
understanding the dynamic nature of the rule of good faith).
.. See supra note 243 and accompanying text (discussing the difficulty in updating
international conventions).
401 See supra notes 179-82 and accompanying text (discussing the requirement of
CISG article 7(1) that an interpreter have regard for a convention's "international
character").
"2 Many of the scholars involved in the drafting of the U.N. Sales Convention sub-
sequentiy participated in the preparation, under the auspices of UNIDROIT, of a form
of a "Restatement" of international contract law. See MICHAELJOACHIM BONELL, AN
INTERNATIONAL RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACT LAW: THE UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES OF
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRAcTs (1994) (restating the content of the
UNIDROIT Principles);Joseph M. Perillo, UNIDROIT Principles of International Commer-
cial Contracts: The Black Letter Text and a Review, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 281, 282 (1994)
(analyzing the UNIDROIT Principles).
.0 See Michael Joachim Bonell, The UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial
Contracts and CISG-Alternatives or Complementary Instruments, 1 UNIF. L. REv. 26, 36
(1996); Alejandro M. Garro, The Gap-Filling Role of the UNIDROIT Principles in Interna-
tional Sales Law: Some Comments on the Interplay Between the Principles and the CISG, 69
TUL L. REV. 1149, 1153 (1995) (arguing that "UNIDROIT priniciples offer the judge
or the arbitrator a rule that is likely to be more suitable to an international commer-
cial contract than a domestic rule of contract law"); see also Magnus, supra note 274, at
493 (arguing, too broadly in my view, that the UNIDROIT Principles can be used to
fill gaps in CISG even if "they formulate general principles that cannot be derived di-
rectly from CISG" (translation by author)).
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and the like) 4°4 first articulated through an analysis of the relevant
convention itself.
405
D. Building an International Common Law in an
Expanded Interpretive Community
Viewed from a distance, the notion of dynamic jurisprudence in
the development of the law would appear contrary to a goal of inter-
national uniformity. Encouraging reliance on undefined and fluid
"general principles," it would seem, sanctions a kind of interpretive
ad hocism, the very antithesis of uniformity in application. A number
of scholars have echoed this precise sentiment in reviewing the inter-
pretive methodology of CISG article 7.4 Some commentators even
have seized upon the abstract nature of concepts such as "good faith"
414 See supra Part III.A.3, B.1 (discussing the internal development methodology
embraced in the paradigm of CISG article 7). International values such as the
UNIDROIT Principles become relevant in this context precisely because the substan-
tive content of a "general principle" is not frozen as of its adoption in a particular con-
vention. By their very nature, notions such as "good faith" have meaning only with
reference to the contemporary context of their application. For a discussion of "good
faith" under the UNIDROIT Principles, see Michael Joachim Bonell, Policing the Inter-
national Commercial Contract Against Fairness Under the UNIDROIT Principles, 3 TuL J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 73, 75 (1995); Hartkamp, supra note 317, at 65 (discussing the vari-
ous roles good faith plays in doctrine); and Mary E. Hiscock, The Keeper of the Hame:
GoodFaith and FairDealing in International Trade, 29 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1059, 1059 (1996)
(considering the concept of good faith "in nondomestic, nonconsumer transactions in
common law systems").
*5 A prime example of this function of the UNIDROIT Principles is on the vexing
problem of the interest rate on sums in arrears under the U.N. Sales Convention. For
an analysis of this issue, see supra notes 331-37 and accompanying text. The
UNIDROIT Principles expressly define a method for calculating the appropriate in-
terest rate. See UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL CONTRACrS princ. 7.4.9(2)
(1990) (defining the rate as "the average bank short-term lending rate to prime bor-
rowers prevailing for the currency of payment at the place of payment"). This rule can
be used to give substance to the general principle of "full compensation" under CISG
with regard to the proper interest rate on sums in arrears. See Bonell, supra note 403,
at 37; Garro, supra note 403, at 1156-57 (arguing that "if an issue were to arise cocern-
ing the proper rate of interest to be applied to a monetary obligation due under a
contract of sale governed by the CISG, one may properly resort to the UNIDROIT
Principles for the purpose of determining such a rate").
"6 See Dore & Defranco, supra note 386, at 63 (arguing that the concept of good
faith is so vague that "courts will be unable to develop a common definition"); E6rsi,
supra note 312, at 2-12 (arguing that "the real danger to unification is that in the
search for general principles it is unlikely that the tribunals and parties would find the
same 'general principles'"); Note, supra note 250, at 1992 ("[B]ecause the term
'general principles' is indeterminate, disputants will ultimately argue over what other
law applies. It is precisely this conflict that unification is intended to avoid.").
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as an argument for a reserved approach by courts in the recognition
of a convention's "general principles."
40 7
There is indeed a superficial appeal to such arguments. As Kent
Greenawalt noted on the "elusive quest" for limits on judicial discre-
tion over twenty years ago, "our capacity for self-deception increases
as the level of abstraction gets higher."40  In the international con-
text, this risk of self-deception takes the form of the attraction of fa-
miliar domestic legal norms when national adjudicators give content
to abstract concepts in an international convention. Moreover, these
national adjudicators will themselves inevitably be influenced by their
divergent legal, political, and cultural traditions. From this, skeptics
argue that the goal of bringing certainty to international transactions
through international uniformity in the law is a costly illusion.
407 See Farnsworth, supra note 384, at 55-56 (opposing "any reference to good
faith"); E. Allan Farnsworth, The Convention on the International Sale of Goods from the Per-
spective of the Common Law Countries, in LA VENDITA INTERNAZIONALE 1, 18 (Dott A.
Giuffre ed., 1981) (arguing against the recognition of a general principle of "good
faith" and "fair dealing" under the U.N. Sales Convention because they"are [so] vague
that their meaning cannot help but vary widely from one legal system to another [and
that t]heir use on operative provision ... of the CISG would surely lead to confusion
and non-conformity"); Note, A Practitioner's Guide to the United Nations Convention on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 16 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 81, 89 (1983)
(suggesting that "[tihe vagueness of a good faith provision may create problems for
courts trying to decide when and how to apply it; in addition, overuse or underuse of
the principle may lead to inconsistent results or to outright abuse"); Note, supra note
250, at 1991-92 (arguing that, because of the uncertainty of the compromise on good
faith, courts remain free to apply corresponding domestic law).
408 Kent Greenawalt, Discretion and Judicial Decision: The Elusive Quest for the Fetters
That Bind Judges, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 359, 397 (1975). For an application of this con-
cern to "general clauses" under a civil code, see Dawson, supra note 319, at 44445, 445
(noting the temptation to view such clauses as "express licenses to judges to go out
hunting anywhere and bring back their trophies, to be hung then in the living room").
41 See, e.g., Peter Behrens, Voraussetzungen und Grenzen der Rechtsfortbildung durch
Rechtsvereinheitlichung, 50 RABELSZ 19, 27 (1986) (arguing that to expect uniform in-
terpretation of international legal standards "would demand from national judges a
level of comparative law education and an appreciation of foreign legal systems that is
simply unrealistic" (translation by author)); Hein K6tz, Rechtsvereinheitlichung-Nutzen,
Kosten, Methoden, Ziele, 50 RABELSZ 1, 7 (1986) (expressing the fear that the permitted
resort to abstract general principles by national judges will destroy the very uniformity
the U.N. Sales Convention was designed to create); Hobhouse, supra note 243, at 533
("[T]o contemplate that conventions for world-wide adoption will actually produce a
uniformity of decision and approach in all countries.., is illusory. The courts of each
country will approach the resolution of any dispute from a view point of its own legal
and commercial culture and the divergent influences will be far stronger than the in-
fluence of any convention."); see also Malcolm Evans, Uniform Law: A Bridge Too Far?, 3
TuLJ. INT'L & COMP. L. 145, 158 (1995) (analyzing the arguments by skeptics of the
promise of international private law).
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A careful consideration of the interpretive paradigm of CISG arti-
cle 7 reveals, however, certain procedural antidotes to this potential
homesickness of national adjudicators. 4'0 The first of these antidotes
relates to what might be termed a "backward-looking" component of
uniformity. Fidelity to this directive requires that an interpreter give
deference to prior decisions by adjudicators of other countries on the
same or similar issues.41 ' At its core, this mandate seeks to bridge the
formal independence of national courts. It does so by directing them
to view their own interpretive discretion as constrained by the deci-
sions of courts in other contracting states.
The second unifying force arises from a "forward-looking" com-
ponent of the mandate of uniformity. Implicit in the need to pro-
mote uniformity4 1s is an instruction that an adjudicator consider the
likelihood that a particular interpretation will find international ac-
410 On the use of the term "antidotes" in this context, see Honnold, supra note 62,
at 208.
411 This is now a well-accepted requirement of the interpretive paradigm of CISG
article 7. See, e.g., HONNOLD, supra note 23, at 142-43 (noting that the Convention re-
quires consideration of interpretations formed in other countries); Bonell, supra note
160, at 91 ("Ajudge or arbitrator faced with the same issue should in any event take
into consideration the solutions so far elaborated in other Contracting States.");
Franco Ferrari, The Relationship Between the UCC and the CISG and the Construction of Uni-
form Law, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1021, 1027 (1996) (arguing that in interpreting the
U.N. Sales Convention adjudicators "must take CISG decisions rendered by judicial
bodies of other contracting states into account"); Herber, supra note 72, at 89 (noting
that uniform interpretation and application of the UN Sales Convention can only be
achieved "if the courts in the CISG member states applying (the Convention] take into
account the decisions of courts in other member states" (translation by author));
Kastely, supra note 168, at 601 ("Article 7 envisions deliberation in which courts will
treat the decisions of other national courts as significant to their own interpreta-
tion .... "); Cook, supra note 212, at 199 (contending that the United States courts
should "grant[] considerable weight to foreign decisions" in interpreting the terms of
the Convention).
412 Indeed, the Supreme Court has observed, in interpreting an international con-
vention without a corresponding express legislative direction, that "'the opinions of
our sister signatories [are] entitled to considerable weight.'" Air France v. Saks, 470
U.S. 392, 404 (1985) (quoting Benjamins v. British European Airways, 572 F.2d 913,
919 (2d Cir. 1978)). To support this process, UNCITRAL has established a system,
known by the acronym "CLOUT" (for "case law on UNCITRAL texts"), in which na-
tional correspondents collect the decisions that interpret the private law conventions
negotiated under its auspices. The Secretariat of UNCITRAL then arranges for the
translation of abstracts of these decisions and for their dissemination to all contracting
states. The information collected under the CLOUT system can also be found in
UNCITRAL Homepag supra note 33.
4's Recall that CISG article 7(1) requires that an interpreter of a convention have
regard for the "need to promote uniformity in its application." CISG, supra note 7, art.
7(1) (emphasis added).
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ceptance. One German scholar has aptly termed this the "consensus
capacity" of an interpretation.
In one sense, this observation merely confirms that courts should
not fall back on national concepts as interpretive aids for an interna-
tional convention.4 1 5  The notion of "consensus capacity" also sug-
gests, however, a more subtle consideration. The interpretation of an
international convention is relegated to formally independent na-
tional adjudicators proceeding on the basis of different, but equally
authentic, texts. The inference that emerges almost from the state-
ment of this fact is that there are no a priori correct interpretations,
only ones that have more compelling justifications than the compet-
ing alternatives. Moreover, as an interpretive inquiry falls under the
influence of abstract concepts (such as a convention's "general prin-
ciples"), the importance of justification becomes even more pro-
nounced.
Viewed in this light, the need to promote international uniform-
ity takes on a particular meaning: In its practical effect, it calls upon
courts to explain in detail the justifications for their interpretive deci-
sions. This may require, for example, formal citations to a provi-
sion's drafting history when there is any degree of doubt as to the
provision's intended meaning and scope.
A final antidote for the homeward tendency of national adjudica-
tors is found in an expanded view of the relevant interpretive com-
munity. To ensure consideration of the broader, including prospec-
tive, implications of an interpretive decision, the needs of uniformity
will require adjudicators to rely more extensively on scholarly writ-
ings. The use of scholars' more detached views, often known collec-
tively as "doctrine, is a common practice in the elaboration of civil
codes as a means of building consensus on difficult issues.418  Re-
4,4 See Huber, supra note 26, at 432 (referring to the "Konsensfdhigkeit" of an inter-
pretation).
41- See supra notes 180-82 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of an
international perspective).
416 See supra Part III.B (examining courts' role in interpretation).
417 See Edgar Bodenheimer, Doctrine as a Source of the International Unfication of Law,
34 AM. J. COMp. L. 67, 71 (Supp. 1986); Frier, supra note 200, at 2205 (discussing the
interaction "between 'case law' (jurisprudence) and academic writing (doctrine)" in the
interpretation of the French Civil Code).
418 See Summers & Taruffo, supra note 233, at 474 (comparing the influence of
scholars on various nations' codes); Frier, supra note 200, at 2205-09 (discussing the
development of European codes).
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course to doctrine in the interpretation of international conventions
should serve the same function.4 9
Taken together, these considerations suggest a dynamic process
of interaction among national courts on an international level. The
absence of an international commercial tribunal of last resort means
that a true unification of the law can be achieved only through discus-
sion and deliberation among the formally independent national ad-
judicators.2 The model for this process is thus not one of "dis-
covering" the preordained answers for the difficult interpretive issues,
but rather one of international consensus-building on their appropri-
ate resolution.421
In the early stages of this process, the force of the justificatory ar-
guments in individual decisions will play the significant unifying role.
Purists will counter here that however compelling in reasoning, a sin-
gle decision by a foreign tribunal cannot acquire formal precedential
419 See HONNOLD, supra note 23, at 144; Ferrari, supra note 180, at 208 (discussing
ways to limit the danger of differing interpretations of a uniform law); Honnold, supra
note 79, at 127. For a broader analysis of this issue, see Bodenheimer, supra note 417.
In the same vein, the importance of arbitration for international transactions will ele-
vate the persuasiveness of the interpretive decisions of arbitrators. The needs of uni-
formity will require that these, too, be consulted as a part of the relevant interpretive
community for international private law conventions.
420A possible solution to this problem would be to create an international
"permanent editorial board," similar to that for the Uniform Commercial Code in this
country. For a suggestion in this direction, see Michael Joachim Bonell, A Proposal for
the Establishment of a Permanent Editorial Board for the Vienna Sales Convention, in IN-
TERNATIONAL UNIFORM LAW IN PRAGnICE 241 (1988) [hereinafter UNIFORM LAW IN
PRACTIcE]. Unfortunately, efforts to found such a board as the final arbiter on the
interpretation of private law conventions have not been successful. Indeed, in 1988
the delegates to UNCITRAL specifically rejected such a proposal. See Report of the
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law on the Work of Its Twenty-First Session
43 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 17), U.N. Doc. A/43/17 (1988), reprinted in [1988] 19 Y.B.
Comm'n Int'l Trade L. 16, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/SER.A/1988.
421 For an analysis of this process in terms of a "rhetorical community," see Kastely,
supra note 168, passim, but in particular at 593-94 (observing that the choice of
"informally defined words" in the U.N. Sales Convention "may initiate discussion of
what ideas are held in common and what are not, a discovery process that might oth-
erwise be foreclosed. The international trade community will grow and shape itself in
such conversations."); see also Antonio Boggiano, The Experience of Latin American States,
in UNIFORM LAW IN PRACTICE, supra note 420, at 28, 47 ("Uniform law requires uni-
form caselaw, a new common law.... Foreign precedents would not be precedents of
a foreign law but of unform law."); Honnold, supra note 62, at 212 ("[I]nternational ac-
ceptance of the same rules gives us a common medium for communication-a lingua
franca-for the international exchange of experience and ideas.").
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status.4s On its surface, this observation is certainly correct. For good
reason, the drafters of CISG article 7(1) did not mandate immediate
and absolute uniformity. The consequence would have been that the
first judicial interpretation on a given issue, whatever the force of its
reasoning, would bind the courts of all contracting states in subse-
quent decisions. Such a result would ossify the law precisely in the
manner CISG article 7(1)'s dynamic interpretive approach was de-
signed to prevent.
Yet the required regard for the needs of international uniformity
is more potent than mere persuasion. As the case law on an issue
grows in mass, so too in the course of time will its gravitational
force.4s And as an international consensus emerges on a given issue,
the express legislative direction in CISG article 7(1) that courts defer
to the needs of international uniformity will give that gravitational
force all of the practical effect of precedent.
424
The diversity of legal and cultural traditions among the various
domestic interpreters of an international convention admittedly may
cause difficulties in the development of international uniformity.
Over time, however, the attractive power of the international consen-
sus on the unresolved issues in a convention will dissipate the cen-
trifugal force of domestic social and legal traditions.425 The essential
42 Cf Farnsworth, supra note 384, at 55 ("Taken literally, [article 7(1)] does no
more than instruct a court interpreting the Convention's provision to consider the im-
portance of the listed factors.").
42 This metaphor of "[t]he gravitational force of a precedent" derives from
Ronald Dworkin. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 113 (1978).
424 The Supreme Court has come to a similar conclusion in interpreting a set of
uniform international rules governing bills of lading (the so-called "Hague Rules")
which do not even contain an express direction to consider the needs of international
uniformity. See Vimar Seguros Y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528
(1995). There, the Court "decline [d] to interpret our version of the Hague Rules in a
manner contrary to every other nation to have addressed" the issue in dispute. Id. at
537. For more information regarding the Hague Rules, see supra note 50.
4 See Kastely, supra note 168, at 607 ("As courts and others engage in ... discourse
[over general principles], the need to resort to national law will be less and less felt.").
This "gravitational force" of uniformity under the U.N. Sales Convention and its prog-
eny is even greater than in the case of the Uniform Commercial Code. Although its
goal is to bring uniformity to the law, the U.C.C. is structured as purely local legisla-
tion which is subject to local modification-both in connection with original adoption
and thereafter-by the individual states of the United States. The U.N. Sales Conven-
tion and its progeny, in contrast, are "self-executing" in nature and do not permit ad-
justments by their member nations. See supra notes 50, 244 and accompanying text
(observing that the international commercial law conventions under consideration
here do not permit reservations by ratifying states other than those reservations ex-
pressly authorized). Moreover, the paradigm of CISG article 7 contains an express
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purpose of the general principles methodology in this process is to
require discussion on an international level toward the development
of such a consensus.
This suggests a final point about the required deference to the
needs of uniformity. Admittedly, the last clause of CISG article 7-in
contrast to its predecessor, the Hague ULIS426--permits resort to na-
tional law when a convention's general principles fail to provide
guidance.27 This option operates, however, subject to the magnetic
influence of the needs of uniformity. Implicit in the uniformity di-
rective of CISG article 7 is thus a requirement that an interpreter ex-
haust all possible grounds for decision on an international level-• * 428
analogy as well as deductive and inductive general principles -
before retreating to nonuniform domestic law.
As we have seen, courts in some civil law countries have based the
development of much of the private law on the principle of "good
faith" alone.4 This experience is not, of course, dispositive in the in-
ternational context. But given the delegation of authority to develop
the law on the basis of a convention's general principles, it strongly
suggests that fidelity to the needs of international uniformity should
make the path of escape for homeward-minded national judges a nar-
row one indeed.
CONCLUSION
"When we speak of a body of law," Frederic Maitland observed
over one hundred years ago, "we use a metaphor so apt that it is
hardly a metaphor. We picture to ourselves a being that lives and
grows, that preserves its identity while every atom of which it is com-
direction that interpreters view a commercial law convention as international in char-
acter. See CISG, supra note 7, art. 7(1) (mandating regard for a convention's
"international character"); see also supra notes 180-83 and accompanying text
(analyzing this element of CISG article 7).
42G See supra notes 160-61 and accompanying text (discussing the requirement of
the Hague ULIS that all unsettled questions be resolved in conformity with its internal
general principles).
427 See Bonell, supra note 160, at 82-83 (observing that article 7 allows recourse to
domestic law in the absence of governing "general principles"); Ferrari, supra note
180, at 228 (same).
428 See supra Part III.A.3 (discussing various interpretive methods).
429 See supra notes 318-24 and accompanying text (explaining several applications
of the concept of "good faith").
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posed is subject to a ceaseless process of change, decay, and re-
newal."
30
At heart, the interpretive paradigm embraced in the U.N. Sales
Convention and its progeny conceives of an international convention
in the same terms. Recognizing the practical impossibility of legisla-
tive rejuvenation, that paradigm suggests an image of a living, matur-
ing body of law, founded on certain fundamental values, but capable
of adapting to new environments. Implicit in this philosophy is an ac-
tive developmental and remedial role for the judiciary in ensuring the
long-term vitality of an international law unification effort.
The consequence is a rejection of the restrictive formalism that is
evident in much of the recent Supreme Court treaty jurisprudence.
Although occasionally liberal in rhetoric, the common practical out-
come of treaty interpretation in recent years has been distinctly con-
servative. The Court has consistently refused to view a treaty as a body
of integrated norms that would be capable of generating internal so-
lutions for gaps in its provisions. The image of a treaty suggested by
this approach is thus one of a mere skeleton of rules. It is in this re-
spect, in particular, that Supreme Court treaty jurisprudence has par-
alleled the "new textualism" that has gained recent prominence in
domestic statutory interpretation.
The role of the judiciary in the interpretation of the new genera-
tion of international commercial law conventions is of a decidedly
more dynamic nature. The "general principles" methodology em-
braced there empowers courts to fashion substantive solutions for
gaps in a convention's regulatory scheme. Properly appreciated, this
approach amounts to a delegation of lawmaking authority to the
courts. But the unique element is the international dimension. Bol-
stered by a mandated deference to the needs of uniformity, the
"general principles" methodology sanctions participation by courts in
this country in the fashioning of an international common law
around the frame of an international convention.
The success of the U.N. Sales Convention has demonstrated the
power of this dynamic interpretive process. Although still in its in-
fancy, national adjudicators have already begun to seize upon the
Convention's "general principles" as a means to develop new substan-
tive solutions for gaps in its provisions. In the process, they have ad-
'" 2 FREDERIC WILUAM MAITLAND, Outlines of English Legal History, 560-1600, in
THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF FREDERIC WILIAM MAITLAND 417, 417 (HAL. Fisher ed.,
1911).
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vanced the core mandate of promoting international uniformity in
the body of law within its scope. This experience reveals compelling
grounds for further emulation as the law continues to mature into the
next significant stage in its development, unification on a transna-
tional level.
* * * * * *
